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Abstract: Restoring the "Shining Waters:" Milltown, Montana and the History of
Superfund Implementation

Chairperson: Dan Flores
This dissertation is a case study of a dam removal and river restoration within the
nation’s largest Superfund site. In 1981, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
included Milltown Reservoir on its first list of Superfund sites. Superfund law capped
two decades of the federal government’s most aggressive environmental legislation.
While tracking the national story of Superfund law, my story provides a local view of
how individuals, organizations, and agencies shaped the Superfund process. After the
EPA designated Milltown a national Superfund site, the environment itself, persistent
work within the channels of public policy, and federally-mediated compromise helped
restore some shine to Milltown’s waters.
Milltown is representational, rather than unique. Human health concerns, which were
the primary purpose of Superfund, garnered Milltown designation. Arsenic contaminated
the groundwater in a residential community. Groundwater contamination has been the
most consistent and worrisome risk throughout the history of designating Superfund sites,
while arsenic tops the list of contaminants reported at those sites. Nearly a century of
upstream mining caused Milltown’s problem. Mining sites cost more and occur more
frequently than any other Superfund cleanups. Two major corporations were responsible
for funding cleanup at Milltown, whereas nearly half of all Superfund sites have two to
ten responsible parties. Thus, Milltown is exceptionally representative of Superfund’s
history.
Using extensive archival research, government documents, oral histories, newspaper
accounts and personal observation, I have written a dissertation that explores how
Milltown provoked major changes in Superfund implementation and late-20th century
environmentalism. The final remedy at Milltown removed an average-sized dam and
restored a section of the Clark Fork River. The process increased the importance of
public input in Superfund and its emphasis on restoring environments. That shift
coincided with a turn toward repairing degraded landscapes by both grassroots and
national environmental groups. Milltown helped foster the growth of a corporate,
restoration industry. And, it helped define restoration, while pushing restorative efforts
beyond the confines of its Superfund boundaries.
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Introduction
The notes of a single observer, even in a limited district, describing accurately its
features, civil, natural and social, are of more interest, and often of more value, than the
grander view and broader generalizations of history.
-Anonymous epigraph to Bela Hubbard Memorials of a
Half-Century (1887)

The more a site feels like a place, the more fervently it is so cherished, the greater the
potential concern at its violation or even the possibility of violation.
Lawrence Buell Writing for an Endangered World

In 1980, the population of Milltown, Montana, was not enough to warrant a listing
on the U.S. census, not even in combination with the nearby communities of Bonner and
West Riverside. Most of the economic activity in those towns revolved around a
plywood factory located on the banks of the Blackfoot River, just upstream from its
confluence with the Clark Fork. The heyday of milling in western Montana, and hence
local population, had declined since the first decades of the century. That highpoint,
three-quarters of a century earlier had included the building of a modest hydroelectric
dam that impounded the waters of the rivers’ confluence to produce power for the local
mills, businesses, and some residents. Since 1908, the Milltown Dam and Reservoir had
been fixtures of the community.
All the way across the continent, Congress passed and President Jimmy Carter
signed the Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) in 1980. Better known as Superfund because of the $1.6 billion cleanup trust
fund the law established by taxing chemical and petroleum industries, it was meant to
help identify and clean up the nation’s worst toxic waste sites. Within a year of its
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passage, Superfund’s first National Priority List of such sites included Milltown. By
1983, the small western Montana community joined a few hundred other places as the
country’s first federally designated Superfund sites. Milltown would eventually become
the tail end of the largest such site in America, encompassing roughly 120 miles of the
Clark Fork River watershed.
Superfund capped two decades of the nation’s most vigorous environmental
lawmaking. Precipitated by highly publicized environmental emergencies at places like
Love Canal, New York, and Valley of the Drums (think oil barrels, rather than percussion
instruments), Kentucky, the law aimed to stop, contain, and potentially clean up the
dumping of toxic wastes by industries. Its namesake fund came from a tax on corporate
dollars and a fundamental stipulation of the law was that the “polluter pays.” Where the
Environmental Protection Agency, which oversaw the law’s implementation, could
connect a viable responsible party to a contaminated site, that party would have to pay for
its remediation.
What happened at Milltown in the course of thirty years from its designation as a
Superfund site to river restoration efforts at the site demonstrates some of the essential
ways that Superfund has changed through its implementation. The final remedy at
Milltown was to remove a very average-sized dam and restore a section of the Clark Fork
River, western Montana’s largest headwaters of the Columbia. After the EPA designated
Milltown a national Superfund site, the environment itself, individual’s persistent work
within the channels of public policy, public comment, federally mediated compromise,
corporate funding, a fish, and a Hollywood movie all shaped the Superfund process at
Milltown. That process helped increase the importance of public input in Superfund, as
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well as the EPA’s increasing attention to restoring environments. At the same time,
environmental groups, such as those involved at Milltown, also began focusing more on
restoration of damaged environments. While Superfund cleanup at Milltown did push the
law and environmental advocacy in new directions, many things about how it all
happened were not exactly exceptional.
Dams are found everywhere in America. In her book Watershed: The
Undamming of America, Elizabeth Grossman pointed out that the Army Corps of
Engineers could give only a rough count of “over 75,000 dams” on the country’s
waterways. While she summarized significant dam removal efforts in the late 20th
century, Grossman saw those endeavors as the beginning of restoring “approximately
600,000 miles of what were free-flowing rivers.” Most of those river miles have lain
stagnant for many years as the dams that impede them have persisted for decades and, in
many cases, for centuries. In other words, most people live near a dam at least something
like the one at Milltown, Montana.1
As a Superfund site, Milltown is almost typical; it had many of the significant
features found at the “tens of thousands of hazardous waste sites” the EPA has located in
the United States since passage of CERCLA. Concern over the site began because of
human health concerns, which was the primary purpose of the original Superfund bill and
continues to be a basis of site investigations and designations. At Milltown, arsenic
contaminated groundwater, and “25% of all Superfund sites have arsenic as the top
contaminant,” according to a statistical analysis of the law. Groundwater contamination

1

Elizabeth Grossman, Watershed: The Undamming of America, (New York:
Counterpoint, 2002), 3.
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has been the most consistent and worrisome risk throughout the history of designating
Superfund sites.
Nearly a century of upstream mining caused Milltown’s problem. Mining sites
cost more and occur more frequently than any other type of Superfund cleanup. Two
major, industrial corporations were responsible for funding cleanup at Milltown.
Nationally, nearly half of all Superfund sites have two to ten responsible parties. And,
like Milltown, most sites that make the EPA’s National Priority List are located in a
rural-urban interface. The dam and reservoir’s location in a cluster of small communities
just upriver from one of Montana’s largest cities and just downstream from expanses of
relative wilderness made it representational within Superfund history. But that location
also gave the site some exceptional qualities that played into the law’s implementation.2

Milltown, Montana, developed as a timber-mining town at the confluence of two
western rivers that are headwater streams of the great river of the West, the Columbia.
Both the Blackfoot and the Clark Fork gather from the melting snows and cold springs of
the Continental Divide. The Blackfoot’s icy waters form near a place where a small
mine’s thermometer once registered the lowest temperature in the continental U.S. at 69.7
degrees below zero. Norman Maclean, who grew up fishing and working in the woods of

2

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm. Katherine D. Walker, March Sadowitz, and
John D. Graham, “Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and
Management,” in Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law, ed. Richard L.
Revesz et al. (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1995), 40-41. Katherine N.
Probst, “Evaluating the Impact of Alternative Superfund Financing Schemes,” in
Analyzing Superfund, 148-149. Jack Lewis, “Superfund, RCRA, and UST: The Clean-up
Threesome,” EPA Journal, 17(1991): 10. Katherine N. Probst, Don Fullerton, Robert E.
Litan, and Paul R. Portney, Footing the Bill for Superfund Cleanups, (Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institute and Resources for the Future, 1995).
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the Blackfoot drainage, wrote of this river in A River Runs Through It that “It runs
straight and hard.” The river’s upper two-thirds owes its swift flow, rocky bed, and
steep, forested hillsides to the work of glaciers. Over the course of thousands of years,
ice-age glaciers in modern-day Washington created a reservoir that extended into the
Blackfoot Valley. Dozens of times those ice dams burst and unleashed the largest floods
ever recorded on earth. The violence of those floods carved the Blackfoot’s narrow
lower third. So, lacking expansive floodplains and valley bottoms, the Blackfoot was a
place of passage and short-term habitation to the first people who lived in the region.
After millennium of use as an Indian route from the more temperate, open environments
of western Montana to the bison-rich Northern Plains, the Blackfoot valley became prime
timber country to the area’s first American industrialists. By 1908, the tens of thousands
of logs the river floated from mountain camps to the sawmills of Bonner and Milltown,
Montana, backed up behind a new reservoir where the Blackfoot joins the Clark Fork.3
The Clark Fork River arises on the flanks of the Continental Divide south of the
Blackfoot. Unlike the Blackfoot, its water rushes off the mountainsides into streams that
meander through broad valleys, a trait that earned the river’s uppermost stretch the name
Silver Bow Creek because of its long, looping course and its clarity. Similarly, Warm
Springs Creek, the river’s second major feeder stream, got its name because of the
relatively warm water it contributes to Clark Fork. The Clark Fork winds its way toward
its meeting with the “hard and straight” running Blackfoot through 120 miles of willow
3

Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1976),
13. William Farr, “Going to Buffalo: Indian hunting migrations across the Rocky
Mountains, Part 1, Making Meat and Taking Robes & Part 2, Civilian Permits, Army
Escorts,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History, 53(Winter 2003): 2-21 and
54(Spring 2004): 26-43. Richard Manning, One Round River: The Curse of Gold and the
Fight for the Big Blackfoot, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1997).
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and cottonwood bottomland that gives way to winter-hardy grasses on most of the valley
floor. Or at least it once did.
The Blackfoot’s timber industry grew up because of the state’s mining boom.
When the Milltown Dam was completed in 1908, it began suppling the power to mill
millions of board feet of timber a year. Trees cut and floated down the Blackfoot River
helped build railroad tracks along the Clark Fork so the timber could reach the mines of
Butte, Montana, supporting shafts and adits, as well as fueling smelters. The
mountainsides that birth the Clark Fork are the work of massive igneous (volcanic)
uplifting that formed a massive layer of granite embedded with minerals such as gold,
silver, and copper. When prospectors first began digging for riches in the area, however,
they were also dredging up other, associated metals, like cadmium, mercury, lead, and
arsenic. By the turn of the 20th century, the discovery of massive copper veins in Butte
prompted industrialization and consolidation of the area’s mining. Company miners
extracted tons of metal-filled ore out of the ground every day. Butte-born journalist
Edwin Dobbs reported in Harper’s Magazine that “From the late 1800s through the first
third of this [20th] century, the so-called Mining City yielded about 13.25 billion pounds
of copper, which was a…sixth of the world supply…Overall, the Hill has produced about
20 billion pounds of copper.”4 Whereas that copper rode the nation’s first
transcontinental railroad – the Northern Pacific (NPRR) – along its path to helping
electrify the country, then became valuable ammunition in both world wars, the unwanted

4

Edwin Dobbs, “Pennies from Hell,” Harper’s Magazine, October 1996, 40.
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slag, filled with toxic minerals, found its way into the Clark Fork through drifting,
dumping, and flooding.5
In 1908, area residents celebrated the completion of Clark’s Dam. Built by Butte
mining magnate William A. Clark at the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork
Rivers, the dam was meant to power sawmills and a trolley, as well as electrify the
growing city of Missoula, seven miles downstream. With far bigger banking and mining
investments to oversee, Clark never bothered to visit his new dam. The locals who
praised its contribution to western Montana’s economy, soon saw its benefits nearly
washed away. The same year the Milltown Dam was completed, a record flood swept
down the Clark Fork. Water that measured five-times the average spring runoff bore
millions of tons of mining waste downriver. The flood smothered the riversides with a
mix of heavy metals. What didn’t wash up on the banks, the Milltown Dam trapped.
From there, the waste metals from Butte percolated into the surrounding groundwater.
Along with massive amounts of raw mining waste, Butte also lost a small power dam in
that flood. Seven miles downstream of the Milltown Dam, Missoula, Montana, lost all its
bridges over the Clark Fork in 1908, but celebrated the dam as saving the city from far
more damage. Within a century Missoula, however, would be celebrating the removal of
the Milltown Dam, which people had come to see as a threat rather than a savior.
Like Milltown, Missoula’s growth was linked to Butte’s. In 1883, when workers
completed the NPRR by driving a proverbial “golden spike” into a wooden tie in central
5

Michael P. Malone, Richard B. Roeder, and William L. Lang, Montana: A History of
Two Centuries, revised edition, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976). Michael
Malone, The Battle for Butte: Mining and Politics on the Northern Frontier, 1864-1906,
(Helena: Montana Historical Society Press, 1981). David Stiller, Wounding the West:
Montana, Mining, and the Environment, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
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Montana, they quickened the link between western natural resources, like timber and
precious minerals, and eastern markets. But, not every tree, ingot of metal, or dollar rode
the rails east. Along with industry, many urban centers developed in the West.
Missoula began as a center of trade. Remembering a large valley where three
rivers – the modern-day Bitterroot, Blackfoot, and Clark Fork –converged, a pair of
railroad surveyors-turned-entrepreneurs returned to that valley in 1860. C.P. Higgins and
Frank Worden opened a market and called their settlement Hellgate Village. The name
referred to the narrow defile out of which the Clark Fork spilled into the valley, long
known as a place where Plains Indians such as the Blackfeet raided western tribes like the
Salish for their horses. Intertribal battles littered the dark canyon with the bones of fallen
mounts and riders alike. Because of Hellgate Village’s location at the hub of trade routes
that people had been using for millennia, and because of its relatively mild climate, it
prospered and grew. Within two decades the town included flour and sawmills.
Bakeries, a brewery, fruit orchards, and an increasing complement of merchants and
residents soon followed. Many of the things made or traded in Missoula were sold
upriver in Butte. Before the end of the century, Montana had its first university in
Missoula. The city’s new name was an abbreviation (or, more likely, a
mispronunciation) of the Salish word Il-mis-eul-etsch-em, which meant “Shining
Waters.” The name referred to a Salish story about how Coyote once threw the ashes of
some beautiful women into the valley’s river, bringing the deceased back to life as a
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riverside Aspen grove and making the river that watered the trees – eventually named the
Clark Fork after explorer William Clark – glisten.6
By the time the EPA designated Milltown a Superfund site, the Clark Fork had
lost much of its shine. While industrial logging and mining were the culprits above the
Milltown Dam, Missoula was hardly isolated from that history or the river’s
contamination. Power from the Milltown Dam electrified the city, lighting businesses
and providing it with trolley service. By 1909, a year after the dam’s building, two
transcontinental rail lines hemmed in the Clark Fork for much of its course through
western Montana. In downtown Missoula, the NPRR paralleled the river’s north side and
the new Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad flanked its south banks. As
Missoula bloomed into the “Garden City,” a nickname it borrowed from Chicago, it also
emulated that midwestern metropolis by becoming one of the largest mercantile centers
in the Northern Rocky Mountain West. With the expansion of trade, services, and
population in Missoula, from a university to major medical facilities, to moderately-sized
manufacturing businesses and a military fort that became a WWII internment camp, the
Clark Fork River carried an increasing burden of sewage and trash. Residents riprapped
its banks through town with boulders and the occasional wrecked automobile. Like most

6

George F. Weisel, “Ten Animal Myths of the Flathead Indians,” Anthropology and
Sociology Papers, 18(1959): 9; Ella E. Clark, Indian Legends from the Northern
Rockies, (Norman, OK.: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 61-136; and SalishPend d’Oreille Culture Committee and Elders Cultural Advisory Council, Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, The Salish people and the Lewis and Clark Expedition,
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).
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everywhere in industrial America, people saw the Clark Fork as a natural asset because of
its ability to carry off waste.7
When it came to implementing Superfund at Milltown, modern Missoula turned
out to be up to the challenge. Historians of the American West have argued that an influx
of fairly wealthy people seeking picturesque real estate, natural playgrounds, and a
thriving service economy in moderate-sized western cities, like Missoula, have driven the
rise in environmental advocacy in such places. In Imagining the Big Open, Liza
Nicholas, Elaine M. Bapis, and Thomas J. Harvey compiled essays reflecting that sort of
demographic shift and its influences. In his book Bobos in Paradise, New York Times
columnist David Brooks dubbed thirty-somethings, who had come to Missoula,
Bozeman, Boulder, Colorado, and “half of the towns in northern California, Oregon, and
Washington State” in the late 20th century, Bourgeois Bohemians, or Bobos. The new
wealthy class, or modern Bourgeoisie, had taken on liberal leanings left over from the
Beats and mid-century counter-culture, argued Brooks. Failing himself to find bliss
along the banks of the Blackfoot River, Brooks explained the Bobo attraction to such
places as superficial, as fashion, as a way for people with expendable income to flaunt
their environmental, as well as other liberal, values without really challenging the
capitalist system that allowed them to do so. If Brooks was right about the influx of

7

Shirley Coon, “The Economic Development of Missoula, Montana” (MA thesis,
University of Chicago, 1926); Ruth Boydston Scott, Missoula: Trading Post to
Metropolis, (Missoula, MT: R. Scott, 1997); Malone, Roeder, and Lang, Montana: A
History of Two Centuries.
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Bobos to Missoula, then they turned out to be willing to challenge the system with
respect to Milltown Dam.8
On the surface, Missoula certainly fits the description of a Bobo paradise. The
old downtown sports plenty of art galleries and home furnishing vendors.
Businesspeople, along with the city’s wealth of university and medical employees, favor
fleece and hiking boots, or river sandals, depending on the season, over dry-cleaned
ensembles. Fundraisers for the town’s glut of non-profit organizations draw sit-down
dinner crowds of generous donors. Auctions at such functions often include art and cases
of wine. But those are not the only dynamics underlying the environmental advocacy in
Missoula that drove the Superfund cleanup at Milltown. And they are not wholly new
dynamics.
Missoula has always been home to educated, middle, and upper-class residents
who take on social activism readily. Shortly after the town’s founding, its proverbial
fathers – mostly small-time entrepreneurs – convened a few weeks of vigilante justice
that resulted in a handful of hangings to keep the place safe from a growing criminal
element and safe for the town’s growing business interests. The town lobbied to get the
state’s first university, which it designed on land south of the Clark Fork donated by a
local businessman. Missoula’s Jeanette Rankin became the first woman elected to the
U.S. Congress in 1916 and the only federal legislator to vote against the country’s entry
into both world wars. When Montana rewrote its state constitution in 1972, its guarantee
to state citizens of a “clean and healthful environment,” as well as other provisions, made
8

Liza Nicholas, Elaine M. Bapis, and Thomas J. Harvey, eds. Nature, Identity, and Play
in the New West, (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2003). David Brooks,
Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There, (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2000), 104.
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that constitution one of the most progressive in the nation. Representatives at the
Constitutional Convention from Missoula helped spearhead that effort. As home to more
than 1200 nonprofit organizations and a population of fewer than 70,000 in the early 21st
century, Missoula is routinely considered one of the foremost places in the country for
tax exempt, social organizations. Social activism had a long history in Missoula;
environmentalism was an extension of that tradition.9
Missoula’s role in pushing the Superfund implementation in nearby Milltown was
not the product of a radically new western demographic. It was environmentallyconcerned citizens who came to Missoula (often to attend the university), stayed because
of their love of the place and their attraction to the environment, who became committed
to working for conservation organizations, local government, the university, and small
businesses. It was the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes that used their 150-yearold treaty rights to participate in an environmental issue that drew broad public interest.
It was of people who cared about the local environment because of their direct contact
with it through recreation, study, work, and everyday endeavors, who engaged with the
future of the dam. The median income in Missoula does not make it a wealthy city; a
standing joke about the laughably low wages in Missoula compared to elsewhere is that
they’re due to the “mountain tax.” Most people sacrifice income to live in Missoula.
And not everyone in town is either a devoted or armchair environmentalist. Trucks with
anti-wolf restoration bumper stickers vie in popularity with Subarus sporting save-your9

“Make it Missoula,” last modified April 1, 2012,
http://www.makeitmissoula.com/community/non-profits/. Jo Rainbolt, Missoula Valley
History, (Dallas: Curtis Media Corp., 1991). Montana Constitutional Convention,
Montana Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972, (Helena, MT: Montana Legislature,
1979-1982); Bicentennial Committee Bonner School, A Grassroots Tribute: The Story of
Bonner, Montana (Missoula MT: Gateway Press, 1976).
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favorite-environmental-thing slogans. And, the place has two Wal-Marts, plenty of fast
food, and, like most of America, a majority of eligible citizens who don’t vote or
participate in civic matters.
That said, Missoula has a core of residents who value its outdoor opportunities
and who act routinely to protect, and in the case of Milltown, restore them. As surely as
spring brings buds to the maple trees and lilac shrubs lining many of the valley’s
residential neighborhoods, cars bloom bright-colored kayaks on their roof racks and
trucks sprout trailers bearing rubber rafts. Missoula’s citizens frequently and
overwhelmingly approve ballot measures to maintain or increase the city’s more than
3000 acres of open space. In 1980, the year Congress passed Superfund, Missoulians
approved a half million-dollar open space bond; within 15 years, voters upped their
contribution to that cause to $5 million. Forming the north flank of the Clark Fork River
between Missoula and Milltown, 1465-acre Mount Jumbo cost taxpayers $2 million to
conserve. Similar hillsides, large wooded tracks of land, and accessible peaks surround
the city and offer hundreds of miles of trails to the people who have paid to keep them
intact and accessible. The state’s 1985 stream access law allows the public to use any
river or stream for recreation within its ordinary high-water mark, regardless of land
ownership adjacent to the waterway. Local businesses sport logos with native fish,
mountain vistas, river runs, and other such place-based images. “Moose Drool,” “Trout
Slayer,” and “Dancing Trout” are three of the best selling beers brewed in Missoula.
Those are just a few snapshots of the values people in Missoula brought to the Milltown
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Dam Superfund process. And those values helped push the process toward dam removal
and river restoration. Columnist David Brooks should have looked a little harder.10
That push represents one of the most significant trends in American
environmentalism. In a 2007, the journal Environmental History published an essay by
Jenny Price in which she charted the history of American environmentalism from its
roots in preservation efforts to its dispersion into a myriad of competing issues and
interests in the last quarter of the 20th century. Yet, in “Remaking American
Environmentalism: On the Banks of the L.A. River,” Price offered river restoration as the
new “icon” around which 21st century environmentalism might rally. Describing public
efforts to restore the Los Angeles River into a free-flowing body of water within a 50mile greenway from its former tomb of concrete, she provided a profile of the kinds of
efforts taking shape across the country, albeit in smaller ways. Restoration efforts like
L.A.’s and Milltown’s are, according to Price, part of “an eco-frenzy without precedent.”
In his 2012 book Recovering a Lost River: Removing Dams, Rewilding Salmon, and
Revitalizing Communities Steven Hawley argues that that frenzy should extend to the
removal of four dams on the Snake River that are much larger than Milltown was. As the
push to remove dams and restore rivers mounts, it joins a broader restorative strain in 21st
century American environmentalism. What is happening on the L.A. River complements
what is going on across the West with the reintroduction of wolves to places like
Montana, cutthroat trout, bull trout, and salmon recovery efforts in numerous watersheds,
as well as the designation of new prairie preserves. The EPA has edged Superfund

10

“Missoula’s Open Space Program,” last modified April 2, 2012,
http://www.ci.missoula.mt.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=650;
http://www.ci.missoula.mt.us/index.aspx?NID=185.
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implementation in the way of restoration because of Milltown and its place in a much
bigger context of restoring American environments. As a Superfund site, Milltown was
representational of that national context, but its location upriver from Missoula led to
exceptional outcomes for both Milltown and Superfund law.11
Other than a few evaluations of Superfund statistics, most of the historical
literature on the law focuses on its creation. That analysis has successfully shown the
vigor of national environmentalism and federal legislating of environmental regulation
during the 1970s that included the Clean Air Act and the establishment of the EPA in
1970, the Endangered Species Act in 1973, and the Safe Water Drinking Act the
following year. In the case of NEPA and ESA, historians have also paid attention to how
some of that legislation has changed through implementation. The Endangered Species
Act, for example, has enabled the protection of a far wider variety of species than its
creators perhaps intended, as well as providing a legal tool for preserving ecosystems
rather than just individual members of them. Studying the implementation of Superfund
at Milltown provides the opportunity to see how major provisions of the law shaped
environmental cleanup and vice versa. The process at Milltown altered the Superfund
law, increasing the importance and impact of public participation, as well as pushing
toxic cleanup towards the broader goal of ecosystem restoration. Milltown’s Superfund
history offers an opportunity to analyze the workings of environmental law where “the

11

Jenny Price, “Remaking American Environmentalism: On the Banks of the L.A.
River,” Environmental History, 13(July 2008): 539. Steven Hawley, Recovering a Lost
River: Removing Dams, Rewilding Salmon, Revitalizing Communities, (Boston: Beacon
Press, 2012). Flores, The Natural West. Also see: Dave Forman, Rewilding North
America: A Vision for Conservation in the 21st Century, (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
2004); Christopher McGrory Klyza and Bill McKibbin, eds., Wilderness Comes Home:
Rewilding the Northeast, (Middlebury: University Press of New England 2001).
16

rubber hits the road,” as a regional EPA administrator once described its local
implementation.12
The proverbial rubber that hit Milltown’s road included Superfund’s essential
provisions and some of its most important revisions. In my chapter one, Superfund’s
mandate to identify the nation’s worst toxic messes came about at Milltown not because
the EPA scoured the country for contaminated environments, but through local residents
pressing local government to do routine water quality tests. The work of local university
scientists contributed, as did the advocacy of a range of citizens at the local and state
level. This chapter documents the law’s purpose in attending to human health issues
more than environmental health during its early years. It also shows how Superfund went
beyond regulating contemporary toxic waste with its focus on historic sources of
industrial pollution. Chapter two charts the ways that designating a single Superfund site
at Milltown led to a much broader recognition of the whole Clark Fork watershed as an
environment abused by the area’s legacy of industrial natural resource extraction. Part of
that shift resulted from the thorough environmental study that Superfund demands as a
step toward determining how to remove or contain contamination. In addition, this
chapter demonstrates the ways that the river helped determine remediation at Milltown.
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Shannon Petersen, Acting for Endangered Species: The Statutory Ark, (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas, 2002); Lindstrom, Matthew J., and Zachary A. Smith, The National
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Executive Neglect, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001); Richard L.
Revesz and Richard B. Steward, Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law,
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1995). U.S.EPA, Region VIII, “Citizens’
Superfund Workshop,” 5/5/1990, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Montana
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Whereas chapter two traces how the problems at Milltown alerted people to
watershed-wide issues, the following chapter goes in the opposite direction as the focus
of both locals and the EPA narrowed onto the Milltown Dam. One of Superfund’s most
important provisions requires the designation of liable parties responsible for
environmental cleanup costs. When this happened at Milltown, both the corporation
liable for in-stream contaminants and the owner of the Milltown dam garnered liability
designation. Along with denying responsibility, the dam’s owner infused the Superfund
process with its first major controversy over relicensing the impoundment. In the context
of liability issues, the local community made its first impact on Superfund law by
convincing the EPA to include greater public participation in the process. This episode
foisted the dam into the Superfund decisions at Milltown and exemplified the heart of
EPA authority over environmental cleanup - liability.
No major modern environmental story is complete without a lawsuit. Chapter
four introduces the most important legal suit in the Milltown story, whereby the state
sued the largest liable party for damages to natural resources. As the largest suit of its
kind in Superfund and state history, this action was one key to linking Superfund cleanup,
or remediation of contamination, to ecosystem restoration. In addition to exploring the
actions of state agencies, this portion of the story in Restoring the “Shining Water”
features a growing awareness by the public of the past and potential value of their
watershed.
Chapter five reiterates the importance of the environment in stories of how people
manage it. Herein the Superfund process at Milltown demonstrates how a spring ice
flood impacted Superfund implementation. Along with restorative efforts on the
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Blackfoot River, Robert Redford’s production of the film A River Runs Through It, and
an the importance of the bull trout as a threatened species, the flood expanded the scope
of what needed to be cleaned up at Milltown, as well as the purpose of doing so. While
human health remained a vital impetus to Superfund, endangered species and ecosystem
health became more prominent issues driving remediation decisions at Milltown. The
public attention to these events helped drive that decision finally toward the possibility of
actually removing the century-old dam.
A bumper sticker bearing the phrase “Remove the Dam, Restore the River”
promoted an advertising campaign by the grassroots environmental group associated
most closely with the Milltown Superfund process. Chapter six tells the story of how that
campaign, and the flood of public input that followed, swayed the EPA to pursue cleanup
remedies that included tearing down a dam. This episode demonstrates how Milltown
changed the way the EPA handled public input at Superfund sites and the weight the
agency gave that input. At the same time, the campaign helped push Superfund from
being about containing or removing toxic wastes to restoring broken environments.
Restoring the “Shining Waters” ends with an account of some of the key
differences between remediation, Superfund’s original purpose, and restoration, its new
direction. Chapter seven features one of the most unique restoration projects that evolved
out of the Superfund project at Milltown. That project shows how restoration extended
far beyond the boundaries of the original toxic site and encompassed both ecosystem and
cultural renewal. This entire history features analysis of the major economic
considerations surrounding Superfund, from its tax on industrial corporations and their
liability for cleaning up the environment, to debates over Congressional renewal and
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expansion of the bill. Chapter seven addresses the ways that Superfund has helped foster
a growth in the environmental restoration industry, as well as boosted local economies by
helping turn places associated with waste into spaces for outdoor recreation. Along with
restoration, Milltown became a model for the ways the EPA is beginning to use
Superfund to redevelop local economies, rather than just cordon off or carry away the
contamination that plagues them.

What happened at Milltown between the discovery of arsenic in a few dozen
people’s drinking water in 1980, the removal of Milltown Dam in 2008, and the ongoing
restoration work at the site, provides a chance to rethink the implementation of federal
environmental law. That sort of place-based inspection reveals instances of individuals
and collective public participation altering federal law through its legislative amendment
and its practical application. For example, the outpouring of support for dam removal
and river restoration as a solution at Milltown led to that decision, pushed the EPA to
consider public input earlier in its decision making process, and added weight to such
input within the agency.
Many dams had been demolished in the U.S. before Milltown. But none of them
had come down as part of a Superfund site. The final decision for Milltown demonstrates
Superfund’s evolution from a law aimed at responding quickly to contain and remove (if
possible) large sources of contamination affecting human health, to a pedantic process
where remediation is a first step toward restoring portions of whole ecosystems, and
redeveloping less destructive economic opportunities in their vicinity.
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In the more than three decades since Superfund became law, environmentalists,
politicians, administrators, and the public have often had cause to criticize it as less than
super. If its history as seen through the story of Milltown seems an oddly positive
contrast to critiques of the law’s sluggishness or ineffectiveness, that is partly because
people involved in the process at Milltown made it positive and remember it as such. As
with any story about environmental issues, there were controversies. People who
committed entire careers to the process found it tedious at times. But it was a process
that worked. Having worked in the Missoula river conservation community throughout
the entire Milltown Superfund process, Trout Unlimited director Bruce Farling admitted
that the EPA’s decision to force two “very powerful corporations” to fund a dam removal
and river cleanup project costing them hundreds of millions of dollars was “really, really
big.” Mostly, it “tells other communities what the possibilities are,” he believed. With
our wealth of environmental histories about degradation and failure, it’s worth having a
few, like Milltown’s, which provide models of relative success.13
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Bruce Farling Interview, OH428-04, Archives & Special Collections, Maureen and
Mike Mansfield Library, The University of Montana-Missoula.
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Chapter 1
Arsenic in Old Places:
Milltown’s Path to Superfund Designation
Expect poison from the standing water.
William Blake
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund),
Section 9604

William Woessner and Johnnie Moore rented a chain saw for twenty-five bucks.
Then the two junior professors at the University of Montana recruited some graduate
students and drove to the Milltown Reservoir a few miles up the Clark Fork River from
Missoula. As Woessner remembered it, the saw’s fourteen-inch blade failed to cut deep
enough into the ice, so they took turns bashing at the frozen surface with an iron bar.
Once through, they plunged a grab sampler – reminiscent of a hinged pair of hand-sized
excavator buckets – down the hole, scooped a load of reservoir-bottom muck, hoisted it
up, sealed it in a plastic bag, and labeled it. Skiing across the groaning surface of the
reservoir with their sled of gear in tow, they sawed and bashed and retrieved samples of
its silt-covered bottom from four locations. As they went, wind-whipped flurries of snow
erased their tracks, and the work kept them warm only so long.
“What in the heck have you guys been doing with this thing,” the man at the tool
rental shop asked when they returned the saw with its chain encased in ice.
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Woessner and Moore explained that they taught in the university’s Geosciences
Department and that collecting sediment samples from under the frozen reservoir brought
them and their gang of graduate students out on that February afternoon in 1982. They
were following a hunch that somehow the sediments were the source of the arsenic
recently discovered in Milltown’s community water wells. Little did they know that the
twenty-five dollars the department afforded their mission would be the first of hundreds
of millions of dollars to flood into solving the problems long-hidden under Milltown’s
reservoir.14

Residents of Milltown knew their water had problems. For years they had
watched the black stains on their sinks, tubs, and toilet bowls grow darker. Clothes
laundered at home turned rust-red. Cars and houses took on a faint, yellowish hue when
people washed them. Some grew accustomed to the metallic taste of their tap water
without ever growing oblivious to the displeasure. Others had given up drinking the stuff
by the time health department officials took samples in 1981, after Milltown resident
Uuno Hill called the department and asked someone to come out and test his water,
“because it smelled bad.”15
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Marin A. Popoff, “Hydrogeologic Survey of Milltown, Montana and Vicinity,” (paper
written for the Department of Geology, University of Montana, Missoula, MT., June 15,
1982). Johnnie Moore and William Woessner, October 3, 1982, letter to the Missoula
City-County Health Department, in collection at MCCHD. Sherry Devlin, “History's
troubles,” Missoulian, January 27, 2002, A1.
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Leo and Theola Dufresne, OH 419-06, Archives & Special Collections, Maureen and
Mike Mansfield Library, The University of Montana-Missoula. “Safe water finally flows
in Milltown,” Missoulian, May 10, 1985, and Kevin Miller, “Arsenic probe is stepped up;
warning issued,” Missoulian, December 16, 1981, 1; David Roach, “Contamination
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Water testing was supposed to be a standard procedure by then. Montana’s
implementation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in 1974 mandated that such
tests occur every three years. The Missoula City-County Health Department had tested
the Milltown well that served Hill prior to 1981, but only for basic sanitation, not for its
chemical properties. When the state laboratory found that the sample taken in May of
that year contained levels of arsenic far exceeding federal standards, health department
officials returned to Milltown and took seven more samples.16
Yet the results of those samples remained undisclosed. Ten days before
Christmas, reporter Kevin Miller first broke the news that both state and local health
department officials had been sitting on news of arsenic-laced water from Milltown wells
for months. An anonymous informant told Miller about the results from the spring
inspection. The state lab in Montana, run by the Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences, did not analyze the seven additional samples until August, due
to what the department’s director called “a personnel problem.” The state lab then
delayed informing the state or city health agencies about elevated levels of arsenic for
another month. Adding to this pattern of delays, health officers at both the city and state
level decided to keep the results from the public until they better understood the problem.
“I hate to tell people, ‘Hey, you’ve got arsenic in your water and that’s all we know,’”

leaves residents perplexed,” Missoulian December 16, 1981, 9. Also see, Johnnie N.
Moore and William W. Woessner, “Arsenic Contamination in the Water Supply of
Milltown, Montana,” in Arsenic in Ground Water: Geochemistry and Occurrence, ed.
Alan H. Welch et al., (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 331.
16
Personal communication with Peter Neilsen, Missoula City-County Health
Department, October 14, 2009, notes in author’s possession.
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said state environmental health officer Joe Aldegarie in defense of his department’s
decision to withhold their findings.17
In the days following Miller’s December news story, details about the state’s
mishandling of the inspection and the contamination itself became clearer. Aldegarie
apologized for the delays and hinted at a shake-up in management of the state’s lab. He
and Missoula health officials turned their attention to Milltown’s water. Four of the
seven Milltown water samples registered up to 370 micrograms per liter (μg/L) of
arsenic, which is roughly equal to the sweet content of a gallon of pure water with one
and a half grains of sugar added to it.18 When the SDWA became federal policy in 1974,
the Environmental Protection Agency deemed 50μg/L the temporary “maximum
tolerance level” for arsenic, pending more conclusive research about its effects on human
health. By 1981 the EPA was considering lowering the standard to 10μg/L. Meanwhile,
Milltown’s wells were registering seven times the federal limit of 50μg/L. How those
levels of arsenic-contaminated water might affect the people drinking it remained, as
Aldegarie implied, poorly understood.
Poor understanding bred caution, and more than a little confusion. The day after
the first story about arsenic in Milltown water appeared, local health officials delivered
letters to the thirty-three residences connected to the four contaminated wells,
recommending that people quit drinking or cooking with the water in their homes. That
day’s local paper reported that research correlated skin cancer with significantly lower

17

Kevin Miller, “Arsenic found in Milltown water supplies,” Missoulian, December 15,
1981, 1; Miller and Roach, Missoulian December 16, 1981.
18
One gram equals 1,000,000μg, and roughly about 1000 grains of sugar. Therefore,
370μg of sugar equal .37 grains. One gallon equals 3.78 liters. So, 370μg/L, or
.37grains/L of sugar equals 1.4grains/gallon.
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levels of arsenic than were present in the Milltown case. In contrast, the same paper also
noted that a city-county health official recognized studies showing that it takes much
higher levels of arsenic than Milltown water contained to cause acute health problems. A
day later another round of letters strengthened the warning about not consuming water
from contaminated wells. In a follow-up news story, Aldegarie called the second letter,
“a stronger statement because we can’t take any chances.” Local health officials warned
that the levels of arsenic in Milltown water posed, “long-range health hazards for
residents.” By day three of the story’s unfolding, the newspaper’s editorial page struck a
more fearful tone in reporting that arsenic is, “pretty deadly stuff.” In addition to eating
away at internal organs, the paper warned about nerve damage, skin cancer, and a host of
symptoms such as, “vomiting, diarrhea, muscle pain, headache, weak pulse and, to cap
the climax, coma and death.” But, they concluded, since levels of arsenic in Milltown
were lower than those known to induce such problems, “there seems to be no reason for
panic.” That said, a week after the story got out, follow-up well tests produced a water
sample that was ten times the federal limit on arsenic. Missoula health officials
announced plans to test Milltown residence’s hair and fingernails for long-term arsenic
accumulation beginning the first of the New Year, 1982. Even with limited and
sometimes conflicting information about arsenic at hand, health officials were erring on
the side of caution. In the public perception, precise measurements and conflicting
research on arsenic mattered less than arsenic’s infamy. Arsenic had become
synonymous with toxicity. And, the EPA hinted at getting involved at Milltown.19
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At first, it seemed that locals were taking the bleak news in stride. Referring to
the possible danger of drinking her water, one woman said, “My hair seems to be getting
darker instead of whiter, so I don’t know.”20 Joking aside, Milltown residents began
grappling with the problem of finding safe drinking water, and they were not alone.
Besides attracting the local university’s scientific community, the issue caused local
politicians to take up the cause, as did state and federal officials. As the political sphere
of involvement grew, Milltown gradually became a national, toxic landmark. This
process increasingly challenged local perceptions and resources. For the first time,
Milltown residents had to come to terms with the idea that their environment, the place
where they worked and their children played was contaminated and potentially deadly.
Just as Milltown residents were aware of their daily, domestic exposure to less
than perfect water, they understood their industrial surroundings. For almost a century,
the local lumber mills had embedded Milltown in the nexus of natural resource extraction
that characterized the West. Rail traffic had stopped in Milltown since the completion of
the Northern Pacific’s transcontinental route in 1883. Throughout most of the twentieth
century, the world’s most productive copper mines operated about 100 miles upriver
from Milltown in Butte. For the decade prior to the arsenic discovery, Milltown was
home to the region’s largest plywood mill. People intuited that the water contamination
stemmed from this industrial heritage, but they were unaware of the extent or the exact
source of the problem. Solving those mysteries would take years.
top previous levels,” Missoulian, December 22, 1981, 1; Miller, “Hair, fingernails tests
planned in arsenic-contamination probe,” Missoulian, December 23, 1981, 9. Jose M.
Azcue and Jerome O. Nriagu, “Arsenic: Historical Perspectives,” in Arsenic in the
Environment: Part I: Cycline and Characterization, edited by Jerome O. Nriagu, (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994).
20
Ibid, Missoulian, December 16-18, 1981.
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And the solution would soon put Milltown on the Environmental Protection
Agency’s National Priority List (NPL). In fact, by 1983 arsenic contamination of a few
dozen Milltown wells earned the town’s reservoir a place on the federal government’s
first NPL and its subsequent designation of one of the first Superfund sites in America.
What began as a local need for uncontaminated water became a national project to restore
a major western watershed. The earliest advocates for what became the nation’s largest
Superfund site were not environmental groups but local residents acting on intimate
health concerns and awareness of their surrounding’s industrial past.
With the number of Superfund sites growing every year, it is worth thinking about
how Milltown’s designation evolved at the local level. The story of Superfund
designation at Milltown offers some unique perspectives on ways in which the law has
played out. First, this local, western story challenges the ways historians have portrayed
contaminated places. Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act in 1980 in response to a social justice movement led by
Lois Gibbs and the Love Canal Homeowner’s Association in New York. Yet the image
of a community battling to redress their unwitting exposure to toxic contamination by a
malevolent corporation that Love Canal exemplified does not fit Milltown. The
contamination at Milltown was certainly due to a combination of the legacy of industrial
extraction methods and natural systems. Superfund designation was less a fight than the
outgrowth of a functioning municipal regulatory system (water sampling), public
comment and concern working in the usual avenues of participatory government, and
cooperation between the local, state, federal government, the public, and private business.
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Second, when trying to explain the ways in which people understand their
environments, historians have given more attention to historical antecedents, such as
Christianity and European aesthetics, than they have to seemingly more mundane and
personal things like work, play, or bodily fear, all of which informed people’s perception
of place during the Superfund process at Milltown. Finally, Superfund at Milltown came
about in the absence of any organized environmentalism such as the established, national
groups or radical fringe – the personality split of environmentalism in the 1980s.
Environmentalism, even in its local, cooperative, and practical guise, only appeared in
Milltown after the Superfund designation. In the beginning the situation unfolded mostly
via routine governance and the actions of individuals within the community and within
the agencies involved.21

Two rivers meet just below Milltown. Yet for most of the town’s history the
union of rivers was hidden.
In Milltown the engine of industry was a dam built in 1907 to impound the
confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork Rivers. One of the many new hydroelectric
dams being built in the new century, it powered the region’s largest lumber mills,
including the Western Lumber Company (owned by the dam’s builder, mining magnate
William A. Clark) as well as the Blackfoot Milling Company (owned by the Anaconda
Company) in the town of Bonner less than a mile east of Milltown. The dam’s generators
21
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also powered one streetcar that ran between Milltown and Missoula, seven miles
downstream, and another that travelled up and down the Bitterroot Valley, south of
Missoula. Electricity from the dam lit Missoula’s main streets and well-to-do homes and
businesses.
In addition to electrifying the region, the dam and the milling that it powered
brought people to Milltown. Most of the people who came to Milltown were young men
in search of work. By then, the Anaconda Company owned the mill, and because of its
mining and smelting operations the lumber industry was booming, as it had been for
decades. Milltown lumber supported the ever-growing labyrinth of mines beneath Butte.
Milltown lumber fueled the smelters that melted metal, especially copper, out of Butte
ore. With Milltown lumber, railroad crews tied the tracks that connected the forests to
the mills, the mills to the mines, the mines to the smelters, the smelters to wire
manufacturers, and the manufacturers to retailers. Builders used Milltown lumber to
construct homes and businesses in Montana and, increasingly, wired them with Butte
copper. In 1920, when the three Dufresne brothers moved to Milltown to work in the
mills, the Anaconda Company had more than doubled the previous year’s production and
the value of their lumber nearly equaled all other manufacturing in the county.22
Those who came for jobs were following a westward movement of the lumber
industry. Many French-Canadians and Norwegians left logged-out areas of New
Brunswick and the Great Lakes for the prospect of work in western Montana’s robust
timber industry. Finns and Swedes tended to make their way to western Montana as first
generation immigrants who had lost their farm and timberland, or artisanal businesses, as
22

Shirley Coon, “The Economic Development of Missoula, Montana,” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1926), Table XVIII and XXVII.
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industrialization and industrial-scale agriculture marched north and eastward across
Europe. Swedes tended to come as bachelors, the Norwegians and Finns as families that
organized readily around social activities like saunas and church going. For a few years
before the establishment of the post office, in 1912, Milltown went by the name
Finntown. By the time the Dufresnes arrived, WWI had dampened immigration. For the
increasingly stable population in Milltown at that time, wages and work were good. Like
many others, the Dufresne brothers used the opportunity to start families.23
Leo Dufresne was born in Milltown in 1923. He grew up in his parents’ company
house and became accustomed to the ethnically distinct bars and neighborhoods that
defined the town. The summer after finishing high school, Leo started working at the
mill. At that time, the company rented the modest clapboard houses around town for
about twenty dollars a month. Even after Leo retired from millwork the company
subsidized his rent. After Champion Lumber bought the mill from Anaconda in 1972, the
company supplied workers with firewood for the winter. With the abatement of most
labor issues following the world wars, Leo Dufresne, like most of his fellow millworkers,
appreciated his employer and the lifestyle working in Milltown afforded. He especially
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enjoyed watching his sons grow up in the same, seemingly wholesome, environment he
had.
Summers, Leo Dufresne’s three boys swam in the Milltown reservoir or in a
favorite eddy on the Blackfoot or Clark Fork Rivers that fed it, just as their father had in
his youth. When the reservoir, which they commonly referred to as “the river,” or “the
lake,” froze during the area’s long winters, they ice-skated. Autumn and spring offered
the possibility of watching migrating trumpeter swans take respite in the calm water of
the reservoir. Although those big white birds were too rare to hunt legally, ducks
abounded and provided many families a taste of autumn’s bounty. And except for during
the height of spring floods, young boys like the Dufresnes could, and did, fish all year
round.24
Depending on the season, the Milltown Dam drew fishermen for different
reasons. “In the fall, when they were spawning,” Dufresne recalled, “they’d come up
against the dam and everybody’d go down there and catch whitefish because they’d all be
up against the dam.” The northern reach of the Sapphire Mountains that forms the
southern edge of the Clark Fork’s valley at Milltown blocks sunlight from shining
directly on the river and reservoir during the winter. So, the boys sat in the warmth of the
powerhouse and dropped lines from its windows into the reservoir below when the dam’s
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operator or engineer was kind enough to let them in from winter’s cold. Many locals
preferred catching the northern pike that populated the warmer, slower water in the
reservoir compared to the trout inhabiting the cooler, swifter currents of the Clark Fork
and Blackfoot Rivers. They enjoyed the pike’s mild, oilier flesh to the rivers’ various
trout species. Mill engineer John Price’s son, along with his two cousins, once caught
enough pike in just a few summer days to fill the family freezer. When his dad found the
freezer full of roughly a hundred fish he told the boys they had to quit fishing until they
ate all they had already caught. The boys soon convinced Mrs. Price to fry their entire
catch. They invited all the kids in town over for a fish fry and were back out fishing the
next day.25
The harmony of living and working in Milltown did not blind people to its
industrial character. People enjoyed the local environment, but they clearly knew that it
was not native or natural. With generations of mill workers and lumbermen in their
family histories, Milltown residents understood that the dam and reservoir were the
foundation of a working environment upon which they depended. In addition to the
enjoyment that environment provided, it came with some annoyances. Even after the
community drilled a few wells in the 1940s to service residences, some men hauled five
gallon buckets of water home from the mill at the end of their workday because the mill’s
well water tasted better and ran clearer than the community well. Many of those men
remembered seeing their parents walking between home and the company well with a
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yoke supporting buckets of water intended for laundering and bathing balanced on their
shoulders. So, too, the local river water was not always pristine.
A short walk separates the two rivers that filled the reservoir and the clear
appearance of the Blackfoot often contrasted sharply with the plumes of reddish-brown
water that coursed down the Clark Fork River. Watching those plumes, Milltown
residents understood the connection. How could they not? Wood products from their
mills went upstream to Butte and Anaconda; industrial run-off returned along with the
water that powered those mills. The rivers suffered local customs as well. Some
Milltown residents dumped their garbage and old junk off a local bridge into the Clark
Fork. But no one saw even those instances of water pollution as poison. No one
suspected the full extent to which the area’s industrial legacy was affecting the
environment.26

Arsenic contamination in Milltown wells hit the TV news immediately following
the local paper’s story in December 1981. After watching a report about the
contamination, William Woessner dialed the Missoula City-County Health Department.
Eager to get involved, Woessner introduced himself as a first-year professor at the
University of Montana in Missoula with a background in hydrogeology. As a student of
how water moves through the earth, he had published a few reports on relationships
between groundwater and mining in the West. Health department officials were happy to
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enlist him in figuring out what was going on in Milltown. As he had hoped, Woessner
soon found himself tracking down the source of the arsenic in Milltown wells.
Some Milltown residents pointed to local sources of the contamination such as an
old dump, the local plywood mill, the railroad tracks, or even the local habit of tossing
everything from trash and old appliances to abandoned cars into the river. Woessner
investigated the possibilities. The construction of Interstate-90 through town in the 1960s
necessitated moving a makeshift dump. Construction crews used dirt and gravel from
below the old dump for fill beneath some of the interstate footings near the reservoir.
Woessner figured that since locals used the dump for household trash, it probably did not
contain much, if any, arsenic. Some speculated that the town’s plywood mill was the
source of the arsenic. When the Anaconda Company liquidated its mills in 1972 in an
attempt to keep its American mining operations afloat, US Plywood bought the Milltown
operations and transformed them into one of the country’s largest plywood
manufacturers. Hundreds of Milltown residents, who found jobs with the new wood
products company after Anaconda laid them off, pointed to their new employer’s practice
of dumping wood treatment chemicals along the banks of the Blackfoot River just before
it reached the reservoir. Again, Woessner discounted that theory when he consulted mill
records and found no historic use of arsenic at the site.
In the early reports that spurred Woessner’s interest, state environmental health
officer Joe Aldegarie speculated that “arsenic may have seeped into groundwater from
the sludge behind the Milltown Dam on the Clark Fork River.”27 Local opinion offered
the same culprit. Many residents pointed at those reddish-brown plumes coloring the
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Clark Fork. It was no secret that the Anaconda Company produced tons of arsenic and
other heavy metals for most of the twentieth century as byproducts of the country’s
largest copper mining and smelting operation sitting at the headwaters of the Clark Fork
River. Those byproducts had nowhere to go but with the flow of the river, and that flow
slowed at Milltown. In addition, a graduate student in the university’s Environmental
Studies program found exceptionally high levels of copper, zinc, iron, and manganese in
the reservoir’s sediment during her investigation of river-borne heavy metals in 1975.
Although she did not test for it, Woessner understood that arsenic often occurs with other
heavy metals and is moves with them in the process of mining, milling, and smelting
copper. Woessner felt confident he was closing in on the culprit. So he recruited his
colleague, Johnnie Moore, rented the chain saw and headed to the frozen reservoir.28
For lack of further funding, it took a while before the professors and their
diehard students got their initial sediment samples tested. When they did, the high levels
of arsenic in the samples increased the suspicion that Milltown reservoir was the source
28
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of toxins contaminating the local ground water. But how could arsenic in the reservoir’s
sediments get into the aquifer that supplied Milltown’s well water?29

Like mountain-fed rivers across the West, the Clark Fork reaches its peak flow in
the spring. As days grow longer and temperatures rise, some of the year’s mountain
snowpack melts and courses downward. Rivers rise. As surface water wanes with
warmer days and drier hillsides, river levels drop. Yet in an unseen movement of water,
some of the mountain precipitation continues to feed the river by seeping downward and
following ancient, water-carved paths through the earth. Lots of this groundwater
eventually reaches alluvial aquifers. These water-bearing strata are made up of old
riverbeds, so they are most often adjacent to, and slightly above newer riverbeds.
Because of their position and porosity, groundwater from alluvial aquifers usually leaks
into the nearby surface water, often a river. This movement of groundwater to river
characterizes most of the Clark Fork. At Milltown something unusual happens.
Woessner discovered that around Milltown, especially under the reservoir, surface
water fed the groundwater. About a mile above the dam, the Clark Fork River ceased
falling its average ten feet per mile, and bloated into the long, narrow, relatively shallow
reservoir. Ten or twelve thousand years before the construction of Milltown Dam,
another dam had drowned the area under nearly 1000 feet of water. Glacial Lake
Missoula filled upwards of forty times, over as many or more millennia, as glaciers
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flowed south, damming the ancient Clark Fork River in modern-day Idaho. These ice
dams backed up massive amounts of water. Each time, the weight of all that water and
the effects of warming weather broke the ice dam, and unleashed the greatest floods
recorded on earth’s surface. Those floods poured into the Pacific, reshaping many miles
of sea floor with a mix of earth, water, ice and the last blast of an unbelievably turbulent
force that had just carved the Columbia River basin hundreds of feet deep in places.
Closer to the original ice dams, the floods gouged a moon-like surface into eastern
Washington known as the scablands. The ice-encrusted waters of the glacial lakes
terraced the hillsides around Missoula and Milltown with their abandoned shorelines.
And where the Clark Fork’s valley pinches into a narrow canyon around Milltown, those
epic floods dropped a load of rocks in their wake. These, “high-energy fluvial and
catastrophic glacial-flood deposits” left a layer of boulders, sand, and silt up to 10 meters
thick in the stretch of valley around Milltown. The same narrow stretch of canyon that
collected all that earthen debris became an ideal spot to build a dam. So, Milltown
Reservoir sat atop that ancient layer of rubble, which acted like a very leaky platform.30
In addition to figuring out that there was an anomalous, downward gradient from
the reservoir to the groundwater below, the University of Montana geologists gathered
sediment samples and drilled wells in an attempt to quantify the amount of arsenic in the
reservoir and assess its quality as a means of linking it to the contaminated wells. They
mapped a wedge of sediments that thickened from half a meter three kilometers upstream
from the dam, to nearly eight meters at the dam site. The team’s calculations showed that
through all that sediment the reservoir discharged more than a million cubic feet of water
30
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per day into the adjacent groundwater system or about a dozen Olympic-sized swimming
pools worth of water. They suspected that as water surged through the contaminated
Milltown sediments into the groundwater it carried arsenic. Woessner soon had a chance
to voice his suspicions.
This time, the Missoula City-County Health Department called Woessner. They
wanted to know just how much arsenic-laced sediment the reservoir contained. Sitting in
his office on a Sunday, Woessner reached up to an aerial photo of the Milltown reservoir
and used his thumb to estimate the reservoir’s area. He then mentally-multiplied the area
by what he thought was the average depth of the sediments, roughly four feet. His “back
of the envelope calculation” of 1800 tons was “a lot of arsenic” spread throughout a
potential volume of about 4.4 million tons of reservoir sediment. With all that arsenic
sitting above the Milltown aquifer it was hard for Woessner to suppose there could be
any other explanation for the contamination. Yet, no one had proved that the arsenic in
the wells and in the reservoir were of the same form, and hence connected. And at the
time, the UM team lacked the funding to pursue such proof. For that, Woessner blamed
national politics.31
Back in 1980, when the US Congress established the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act, commonly known as
Superfund, the act mandated that the EPA, “locate, investigate, and clean up the worst
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sites nationwide.”32 Since the dawn of nuclear testing and the exposure of widespread
pesticide use as human health threats, Americans had become increasingly concerned
about pervasive industrial pollution and the toxins it introduced into their daily lives. The
overwhelming bipartisan support for passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, including a
swift and sweeping Congressional override of Nixon’s effort to veto the bill, passage of
the SDWA two years later, and Superfund in 1980 demonstrated how the general concern
over industrial pollution and environmental toxins had polarized around water more than
any other aspect of the environment.33 Yet, the incoming Reagan administration
staunchly opposed implementing Superfund, which required the federal government to
spend money on environmental remediation or pursue lawsuits against corporations
responsible for polluted areas. Woessner had received a small amount of federal funding
for his team’s groundwater investigation at Milltown. But as part of Reagan’s agenda the
administration identified itself with a state’s rights stance, a free-market mindset, and a
thinly veiled anti-environmental soul. That agenda pushed the EPA to avoid litigation
and seek to cooperate with responsible corporate parties to alleviate environmental
problems in conjunction with states’ wishes. At Milltown, since there was no definitive
source of the problem, much less a legally responsible party, this simply meant no more
EPA funding.34 Nonetheless, a few months after his conversation with the Missoula
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health department’s director, Woessner heard that the EPA had included Milltown
reservoir as part of its inaugural designation of the nation’s most toxic places. The
agency cited Woessner and Moore’s initial conclusions in its decision.35

Getting a commitment from the EPA took more than Woessner’s thumb on a map
indicating that there was probably lots of arsenic around Milltown. While he was
figuring out the science of the problem, others had begun responding in different ways.
Local pressure did as much for the cause as did the mounting evidence.
Milltown residents organized a water users association in the spring of 1982.
Already bearing the cost of hauling clean water to their homes, residents wrote $20
checks to set up the new association, hire a lawyer, and begin the task of finding a new
source of water, a task estimated to cost between $40,000 and $100,000. In the coming
months, Champion International Corporation, owners of the local sawmill and the
housing affected by the poisoned wells, volunteered to pay the new water users
association’s legal fees. The company also loaned the water users group a truck to haul
uncontaminated water to their homes twice a week. A year after the water users
association formed, the company gave the group the twelve acres of land on which the
company houses with contaminated water stood. Outright ownership of that land and
those homes would allow individuals or the group to apply for bank loans to help finance
a new water supply or make much needed home improvements. Buoyed by the news of
35
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the $120,000 gift of land, the association’s president, Melody Fuch, had no problem with
the deal’s caveat that mineral rights still belonged to the Anaconda Mining Co. “They can
dig for all the arsenic they want,” she gibed.36
Fuch and others welcomed additional forms of help. Montana Peoples’ Action, a
social and environmental advocacy group, organized a letter writing campaign aimed at
getting Milltown on the EPA’s National Priority List for Superfund. Others showed
concern about corporate liability for the arsenic seeping under Milltown. Bob Ream, a
professor of wildlife management in the UM School of Forestry and the Democratic
candidate for the state House seat covering the Missoula and Milltown voting districts
publically pressured the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), owners of all the upstream
mining operations formerly run by Anaconda, to pay for a thorough study of the problem.
With local and state pressure rising, along with mounting scientific evidence at hand, the
EPA moved Milltown up its priority list.37
Of course the environmental realities at Milltown helped its chances of making
the NPL. The Superfund law’s Hazardous Ranking System scored sites based on their
“probability of release,” “nature of material that might be released,” and “potential
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targets.” Milltown rated high on all three variables. Toxins were already being released
into wells via groundwater, which accounts for the maximum risk pathway in Superfund
evaluation. The main culprit at Milltown, arsenic, tops the Superfund list of risky
contaminants. And Superfund was designed to prioritize protection of people’s health,
which was the primary “target” at Milltown. With those variables Milltown easily
ascended the rankings.38
Being higher on the priority list made Milltown more likely to receive federal
assistance. As decreed by Superfund legislation, that assistance would amount to 90% of
all expenditures on the site, if the state paid the complement. The EPA’s representatives
in Helena, the state capital, had not released the new rankings. That did not stop one of
Montana’s U.S. Senators, Democrat John Melcher, from prematurely announcing that the
higher ranking “qualifies Milltown to be considered for EPA Superfund.” Melcher was
not alone in celebrating.
Missoula health officials lauded Milltown’s rising rank among the nation’s top
toxic places because it carried the possibility of federal money and because it meant the
vision of Milltown’s problem had shifted. EPA agent Jim Dunn described how the
agency broadened the scope of the problem at Milltown, garnering it a higher rankings,
when “instead of saying the groundwater was contaminated, we looked at the
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contamination as a symptom of another problem.” Missoula’s newspaper cheered the
change in perspective and acknowledged that it thought the other problems were the
reservoir, the river, and its historical upstream use. In 1982, a year after Milltown’s
contaminated wells first made news, the EPA designated the site one of 418 official
candidates for clean-up efforts based on human health concerns. The head of the
Milltown Homeowners Association called the announcement, “a nice little early
Christmas present.”39
Of course, there was nothing in that holiday gift so far, except for a federal
promise to begin considering remedies. In another example of how Superfund
progressed through the usual workings of government and public policy that gift began to
fill. As the New Year approached and a new session of the State Legislature convened,
there was a flurry of local and state efforts directed at moving the Milltown Superfund
site forward. Montana governor Ted Schwinden assigned a staff member to investigate
the issue, as well as recommend solutions and sources of funding. Montana Senator Max
Baucus (D) wrote to the EPA’s regional administrator requesting the “assistance” that
Superfund would provide for Milltown residents. Efforts by Missoula’s newspaper
leaned in the same direction when, between Christmas and the first days of 1983, an
editorial urged locals to write to the EPA encouraging the agency to include Milltown in
their final cut. The editorial warned Missoulians of the bigger worry they might face if
the arsenic-saturated sediments in Milltown washed into the Missoula aquifer.
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Many downstream residents were already aware of the potential problem the
dam’s sediments posed. Since the late 1970s people from Missoula protested periodic
drawdowns of the reservoir because the practice killed fished. At the time no one
understood that arsenic was part of the sediment contamination, but people advocating
stricter regulation of drawdowns knew that toxic, heavy metals were part of the problem.
A “reader comment” submitted early in the New Year warned of a similar potential
disaster. With the discovery of arsenic, the dam and reservoir suddenly became a toxic
time bomb to people outside the immediately contaminated area and the EPA appeared to
be the community’s best bet at disarmament.40
People were beginning to frame the problem as bigger than just drinking water for
thirty-three Milltown residences. Yet many of the letters sent to the EPA kept the
attention on the urgency of the local problem. One fifth-grader captured the essence of
the letters’ emphasis on the most vulnerable victims of the contamination when he wrote:
“There are many old people and children. Please help them.” Similarly, a Milltown
mother offered the anecdote that when she mixed her well water into her baby’s bottle “it
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curdled the milk.” Senator Melcher used the word “families” a dozen times in two pages
of his letter to the EPA. The intimate nature of the contamination, literally entering
people’s homes and bodies, filled those letters.
Ironically, the actual effects arsenic contamination had on Milltown residents
remained virtually unaccounted. Montana Public Interest Research Group (MontPIRG),
a statewide advocacy group for public interests, conducted its own health study of people
living in the homes connected to the contaminated wells. They found that residents
reported high incidents of respiratory and skin problems, both of which medical studies
correlate with chronic arsenic exposure. News sources never reported the MontPIRG
study, nor did health officials or the EPA ever follow up on it, or, as MontPIRG
recommended, conduct a more thorough investigation. Rather, involvement in the issue
was spreading far beyond the confines of Milltown, just as people were beginning to see
the problem as stretching far upriver and into the area’s deeper industrial history, as well
as into the future of downstream populations. The language of intimate effects combined
with far-reaching possibilities motivated people, especially those outside Milltown, to
seek federal help and money.41
In the end, EPA funding hinged on the state. Even if the EPA put Milltown on
their final NPL, they could not deliver any funding to the Milltown project until Montana
approved a similar appropriation. State authority was needed to trigger federal
participation. The Montana State Legislature, in the midst of their biennial, ninety-day
session, began pushing a “mini-Superfund” bill sponsored by Bob Ream, who had
41
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defeated his Republican rival, a Milltown resident. EPA’s director of Montana
operations reminded Montanans that his agency had moved Milltown into the top 200 of
the country’s potential Superfund sites. He signaled that Milltown would probably make
the final list, especially if the state had already committed its matching funds calculated
at $220,000. Montana People’s Action helped Milltown residents promote the bill
allocating those funds. Such efforts paid off in a near unanimous decision. Upon signing
the “mini-Superfund” bill, Governor Ted Schwinden pronounced that the appropriation
law “sends a message to the federal government that we are serious about protecting our
citizens from the consequences of hazardous waste.” When Schwinden said “hazardous
waste” he was concluding that the arsenic came from Milltown’s industrial heritage. If
there was still any uncertainty in the scientific community as to where the arsenic came
from, there was no such doubt in popular perceptions.42

With the state’s checkbook at the ready, the EPA committed to Milltown. In May
1983, before the spring floods swelling the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers abated, the
state and the EPA hammered out an agreement that included money for a thorough study
of the problem and the search for a permanent source of clean water in Milltown. By
July the EPA awarded $570,000 to the project. Finally, Milltown seemed to be on the
path to some answers and solutions.43
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Getting to this point had taken a long time. Two years had elapsed from the time
the Missoula City-County Health Department sampled Milltown’s water until the EPA
and the state committed funds to the arsenic-contaminated environment. In that time,
local and state agencies delayed informing the public of the test results. Once they did,
information on the extent of the problem and the true health concerns remained murky.
Lack of funding hampered the scientific community. And conservative aspects of federal
Superfund legislation hampered the federal government from getting involved until the
state committed to the project. Meanwhile, Milltown residents took on much of the
burden of looking after their own health and creating whatever temporary solutions they
could. They also watched as perceptions of their local environment changed as it entered
a new spotlight. Where they once saw a familiar and much-loved environment that held
the stories of many generations, now the image of a poisoned place emerged. The water,
in which many Milltown children swam, like their parents and grandparents before them,
grew ominous and took on the specter of being one of the nation’s most fouled
environments. And fouling it was one of history’s most infamous poisons. In Milltown,
the discovery of arsenic contamination altered the character of an old place and set the
community on a path of even greater change.44
While the EPA’s designation of Milltown as a Superfund site both condemned it
and offered it hope, it would also begin the process of revealing the great ghost of
western history. As many Milltown residents intuited, the very economy that built their
world had a darker, potentially deadly side that the water surrounding them had quietly
carried. Since the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, the EPA’s efforts to address the
44
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problem of toxins in America’s water supply aimed at stopping industrial sources of
harmful chemical compounds and heavy metals from ever entering the water. With
Superfund designation at Milltown, the EPA committed itself to remedying not just ongoing and future sources of industrial water contamination, but to redressing the past as
well. All of which hinged, initially, on human health concerns – a new understanding of
the river system as a toxic environment that carried a century’s worth of industrial mining
waste into the intimate spaces of people’s homes and bodies. Rather than through
fighting, Milltown received Superfund designation through a fairly cooperative effort that
included local grade-schoolers through the ranks of federal agencies. Clean drinking
water was on its way. But tainted tap water was to become just the beginning, the
proverbial headwaters initiating a much bigger stream of change, as it were. In the wake
of Superfund designation at Milltown, the focus would soon broaden and the participants
multiply.45
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Chapter 2
Floods of Change:
From Tainted Wells to Threatened Watershed
Much of the frontier is river, and rivers are meant to bring men together, not to keep them
apart.
J.B. Jackson, Landscape in Sight: Looking at
America
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the President
determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility…he may issu(e) such orders as may be necessary to
protect public health and welfare and the environment.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund),
Section 9606(a)

The discovery of arsenic in Milltown’s wells began when a local resident
complained to the health department about the quality of his drinking water. University
of Montana scientists identified the millions of cubic feet of sediment accumulated
behind the Milltown Dam as the source of that arsenic. Public concern, supported by
Montana politicians, led the EPA to designate the Milltown Reservoir as one of the
nation’s first Superfund sites. But it was not locals, state or federal officials, or even the
dam’s corporate owners who instigated the next major change in store for the Milltown
Dam. It was the river.
May is usually a pivotal month for the Clark Fork watershed. It is the wettest
month. And it is the first month in which the air temperature remains above freezing for
more than half its days. As rain falls and snow melts, western Montana rivers swell. In

Chapter 2: Floods of Change

May, the Clark Fork River more than doubles its flow along its upper stretches, including
where it passes through Milltown. Those are the averages, anyway.1
In 1986, spring high water came early for much of the Clark Fork basin.
Unseasonably warm temperatures in late February meant that rain, rather than snow, fell
for days. Seven miles downstream from Milltown in Missoula, the local newspaper
blamed the early season flood conditions on, “Sunday’s three-tenths of an inch of rainfall
and Monday’s halter-top temperatures.” Rain and melting snow coursed across frozen
ground, clogged sewer drains with un-raked autumn leaves and a winter’s worth of
debris, and flooded streets throughout town. One morning’s front-page story featured a
photo of a man standing in knee-deep water while he tried to unclog a street drain with a
shovel.2
As residents of Missoula mopped flooded basements, stacked sandbags, avoided
flooded streets, and generally marveled at the ponds in their neighborhoods, the Clark
Fork River grew. On Monday, February 24th, the river rose from two to six feet through
Missoula, which was well below the area’s flood stage of eleven feet. But because it was
such an early-season flood those extra four feet of river carried lots of ice. As that ice
floated into Milltown reservoir it piled up behind the old wooden dam.
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By Tuesday, ice floes smashed through the top of the Milltown Dam, sending an
eight-foot wall of water and wooden debris over its face. While “the river rose noticeably
after the noon collapse, floating miniature icebergs and huge sodden logs through
Missoula,” according to newspaper accounts, spokesmen for the dam’s owner – Montana
Power Company (MPC) – and state Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (FWP) officials remained
unworried about downstream flooding. What worried watchers was the dam’s safety and
the toxic sediment contained behind it. FWP biologists began testing the river for heavy
metals immediately following the dam breach.3
After nearly two decades of managing the dam’s operations, Emmett “Smitty”
Smith had shepherded the aging structure through plenty of seasonal high water events.
But never had one threatened to wash out the entire dam. As the ice and logs pounded
against the mostly wooden dam, Smith chose what he regarded as “a beating rather than
getting killed.” He closed all the dam’s gates so that the reservoir would rise and float
the threatening debris over the dam, rather than smash through it. Smith’s choice to
sacrifice most of the wooden gates and spillway, which the ice and log jams pummeled as
they careened over the dam’s face, probably saved the dam. Afterward he said of his
own decision, “If we hadn’t done that…we’d have lost the whole dam. It would have
taken it right down to bedrock.” While Smith’s experience wagered injury over
annihilation, the flood-damaged dam set in motion a more pressing debate about the
structure’s future, one that would ultimately take it “right down to bedrock.”4

3
4

Michael Moore, “Missoula mops up,” Missoulian, 2/26/1986, 1-2.
Steve Woodruff, “Dam, suckers survive,” Missoulian, 4/5/1986, 9.
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The condition of the Milltown Dam after 1983, especially following the rather
minor flood of 1986, altered discussions about the long-term fate of the Milltown
Reservoir. Newly formed environmental groups, state and federal officials, and the dam’s
owners had to confront the growing perception of the Milltown Reservoir as part of a
river-wide pollution problem. Concern about the toxic sediment behind the dam
expanded from being about local drinking water contamination to threatening the health
of the entire downstream river basin. Focus on human health widened into river health.
That expansion of concern, which mounted following the 1986 flood, also fit into a
coalescing number of studies aimed at quantifying the health of the upper Clark Fork
River. Local and state research efforts dovetailed with the ongoing Superfund study of
the river, even as the fate of Superfund itself hung in the balance of Congressional
debate. Milltown weighed in on that balance, making its first mark on Superfund
legislation.
Furthermore, most studies and attention began to target fish, especially wild trout,
as the indicator of overall river health. Public and governmental acknowledgement of
basin-wide pollution problems also prompted the possibility of designating the entire
upper Clark Fork River as a series of Superfund sites. The floodwaters that catalyzed
these changes regarding the Milltown Superfund site were not the first to affect the dam,
nor would they be the last. Nevertheless, the water that poured over the dam in late
winter of 1986 forced local environmental groups and citizens, as well as state, federal,
and company agents, to tackle the issue of what to do with the aging structure because of
the downstream threat it posed.
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The 1986 flood was no great anomaly. Just five years earlier a seasonally
predictable May deluge damaged the dam’s spillway; less than a decade prior to that, ice
floes riding floodwaters dinged the structure. By the 1970s and ‘80s, the dam’s age made
it susceptible to the river’s force, yet the worst damage sustained by the dam had
occurred just six months after its completion.5
Building the Milltown Dam had meant reshaping the Clark Fork River. When
work began in the fall of 1905, the Clark-Montana Realty Company, owned by coppermining magnate and Montana Senator William Andrews Clark, had more than a hundred
men on its payroll, along with 28 teams of horses excavating what was then known as the
Hell Gate, or sometimes, the Missoula River. The men, mostly recent Scandinavian
immigrants, along with French-Canadians and Slavs, dug diversion ditches so that they
could scour the river bottom of sediment, rocks, and “large boulders” in an effort to strike
bedrock for the dam’s footings. To locals it seemed like a massive undertaking.
Although contemporary newspaper accounts touted it as a large, expensive, modern
marvel, it was actually a fairly modest project for its time. Bigger dams had long since
existed.6
At nearly 400 feet in length and 274 feet thick, a dam built outside of Cairo,
Egypt around 3000 B.C. would have dwarfed Clark’s dam in sheer girth. While the Sadd
5

Peter Nielsen, “Milltown Dam History: Chronology Compiled by Missoula City-County
Health Department,” December 3, 2001, digital copy in author’s possession.
6
Letters from Jerry Rourke to A.H. Wethey, Oct. 10 and 12, 1905, Feb. 5, 10, 1906, MC
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23/Folder 1, Montana Historical Society Archives, Helena, MT. “Excavation of
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el-Kafara dam was an anomaly of antiquity, by the late-19th century dam construction
was entering its heyday around the world. So was the science of dam building.
By the late 1800s, especially in the U.S., experience and empiricism gave way to
theoretical models and a rigorous study of hydrology. Experimental dam design and
construction included sloped rather than vertical faces, thinner, curved structures, and
wood or rock being replaced by cement and steel. Large arched dams made of reinforced
steel were proving their effectiveness in places like the San Bernardino Mountains of
California where the Bear Valley dam stood by 1884.
The most important advancement was the use of water-turbines in dams to
produce hydroelectric energy. Engineers favored the rapid fall and narrow canyons of
rivers in the mountainous regions of the American West for the building of hydropower
dams. By 1893 the Colorado River outside Austin, Texas, boasted a 65-foot high, 1300foot long masonry dam that generated 15,000 horsepower. Although a 1900 flood
destroyed that dam, others of equal size and capacity were impounding western rivers as
the new century opened and Clark’s project in western Montana got under way.7
So when boosters made claims about the Clark Dam’s largeness, they were
ignoring, or ignorant of, reality. In a five-year period surrounding the dam’s inception
and completion, Engineering News-Record, the nation’s leading publication on the
development of everything from rivets to railroads, failed to mention Clark’s dam at all.
Such journals favored stories about truly large or modern dams. Measuring about 220
feet long and 40 feet high, the dam on the Clark Fork was quite average. Rather than

7

Norman Smith, A History of Dams, (London: The Chaucer Press, 1971). Also see,
Daniel W. Mead, Water Power Engineering: The Theory, Investigation and Development
of Water Powers, (New York: McGraw-Hill Books Co., 1920).
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being a modern exception, the Clark’s Dam represented a fading generation of
construction technology, albeit one that lacked the perils of experimentation. In many
respects, it represented the tens of thousands of dams erected across American waterways
before the turn-of-the-century. And its power capacity, while an emblem of newness,
was modest. In sum, Clark’s project was common and conservative. Yet, the
construction methods and materials employed by the engineers of Clark’s Dam, while not
cutting-edge, were critical to the structure’s future.8
In profile, the finished dam looked like a squat pyramid set atop a low,
rectangular base. The water face, or upstream side of the pyramid, sloped at about 30
degrees and was covered in rock, or “riprap.” The air, or downstream face sloped slightly
steeper until just before reaching the base, where its angle softened, like a long run-out on
a child’s slide. Small, outhouse-sized compartments made of 10” x 10” wooden timbers
called “cribs” composed the matrix of the whole thing. Men filled each compartment
with rock and gravel hauled from the river excavation project, as well as from some
blasting of the canyon walls on either side of the dam meant to create flat side abutments.
The name for this type of “crib and rock” construction came from its interior design and
the materials. The tightly fitted timbers, which swelled when wet, the rock, gravel, and
“non-porous earthfill,” as well as a few sections of concrete poured on the upstream face,
combined to make the dam watertight. All the rock within the cribs, the “massive
durable riprap” piled along the up- and downstream side of the base, and the sloping
upstream face – meant to direct the force of the reservoir water down on the dam as much

8

For more examples of the size, capacity, and number of dams being built in the U.S. in
the early 20th century, see: Engineering News-Record, 52-62 (1904-1909).
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as it pushed downstream – counter-balanced the wood’s floatation, or what engineers
called “uplift.”9
Of his many tasks, engineer Jerry Rourke was particularly intent on designing a
structure that could withstand “30000 Sec. ft.,” of the river’s flow. “The biggest record I
have seen was only 24000 Sec. ft.,” he wrote in regard to his design choice. The dam
would soon see much bigger water than Rourke anticipated. By the time it did, Rourke
had quit.10
Whereas high water interfered with the pace of construction in Rourke’s first year
as dam engineer, in the second year floodwaters threatened the structure itself. By the
spring of 1907, Rourke’s replacement, George Slack, was overseeing both the
construction of the brick powerhouse and making repairs to parts of the crib and rock
dam that winter ice floes and spring flooding had damaged. Slack blamed his
predecessor’s efforts, or lack thereof for the repairs he oversaw. “The leaks in the
concrete wall are due to quality of workmanship,” Slack criticized. His evidence that
men not materials were at fault included the contention that “the cement used was the
‘Atlas’ brand, one of the best grades on the market.” By the following year, with the

9
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reconstruction work behind him, Slack showed unbound confidence in the retooled
dam.11
The dam’s builders had built more than what they thought was a sturdy river
impoundment. They intended for the structure to serve several functions. Clark’s Dam
was emblematic of a new wave of hydroelectric projects in the US but it did more than
produce horsepower. In addition to taking over construction of the powerhouse, George
Slack spent the winter of 1907 trying to buy riverfront property, especially land adjacent
to the soon-to-be reservoir. Given that it was the Clark-Montana Realty Company
building the dam, the purpose of buying land along the river in the vicinity of the dam
made sense. The engineer was prospecting on future population growth in the area and,
hence, booming local land market. In considering a new lease agreement for property
near the reservoir, Slack assessed that the ranch was “much more valuable this year than
last on account of the close proximity of the pond and its possibilities as a pleasure
resort.”12
The company was not the only one to see the new dam as a harbinger of growth
and economic opportunity. At least one landowner in the area drew up plans for a new
town site. Another individual began searching for the best spot to open a saloon.
Revealing both his Progressive era attitude about working class alcohol consumption and

11
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one of Clark’s primary intentions in building a power-producing dam, Slack thought the
saloon idea, “would not be very desirable in case you should build a saw mill here.”
A new sawmill was Clark’s goal for the dam’s power. Soon after the company
fired up its turbines in early 1908, Slack launched the next stage of the project. He
located ground for a new sawmill that would be close to its power source, as well as its
artery of commerce, the Northern Pacific Railroad line. Tapping the river’s power to
enable industrial extraction of natural resources also entailed controlling life beyond the
river. In particular, Slack engineered a spatial organization around the dam and new mill
site. About this plan he inquired of his supervisors, “Are you going to have the people
move their houses so as to fit the new lay-out of lots according to the drawings I sent you
last summer? The arrangement is very irregular at present.” Similarly, Slack sent his
boss recommendations for the best location for a “pleasure resort or park.” The dam was
not only to control the river, but to become the first piece in a new company town, which
eschewed “irregular,” vernacular development for “arrangement.”13
Nonetheless, actual electrical power, rather than the abstract power to control
space, was the primary purpose of the dam. On January 9, 1908, testing two of the
facility’s six turbines marked the first ceremony celebrating of the dam’s completion.
The Daily Missoulian praised the dam as, “one of the most substantial ever erected for
power purposes” and delighted in its output as, “the first electricity generated at the new
power house flashed over the wires at 3:14 o’clock…and for a period of several minutes
the big plant was brilliantly illuminated.” Celebrants in western Montana seemed to

13
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think they had their own Times Square or White City. The newspaper regaled in the
details of the dam’s powerhouse, which contained six turbines capable of generating
5000 horsepower when fully operational, which the paper reported, “will be sufficient to
supply the needs of the western portion of the state for many years to come.” Once the
dam’s full power supply was connected to the existing power plant, located nearby, it
would more than double its capacity, which was already enough to electrify the local
mills and every business and residence in Missoula into the near future.
Those present at the ceremony had growth in mind when they contemplated this
new power. When A.H. Wethey, superintendent of Clark’s enterprises in Montana,
acknowledged that the dam’s final price tag of nearly $400,000 was, “nearly twice as
much as we first anticipated,” he showed no signs of regret about the expenditures. “No
expense was spared,” reported The Daily Missoulian which gave an account of the
tremendous quantity of resources used in erecting the dam, including, “two million feet
of timber…5,000 barrels of cement,” and too many thousands of tons of rock and granite
to count. All of which was then backing up over a mile and a half of the Clark Fork
River and almost half as much of the Big Blackfoot to depths of up to 27 feet just behind
the new dam. All that water, held back by all that material, meant power, power for the
future. Wethey imaged that the dam would, “furnish power for local manufactories
which are bound to locate in this section of the state,” because, “there seems to be no
limit to the wonderful possibilities that can be accomplished with this great power.”
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Since the inception of the dam, Wethey and Clark’s company had at least one possibility
in mind.14
When the dam was still in the speculative stage, the first purpose of its power
already seemed to be a new electric streetcar business. As early as 1904, the manager of
the Missoula Light and Water Company (MLWC) was fielding letters about a prospective
“Clark Damm (sic)” and a “street railway in Missoula” that it might power. By the time
the prospect of a dam became a reality and construction started in September 13, 1905,
Clark was in the process of acquiring the MLWC for $900,000. The deal meant Clark
would provide power and water for nearly all public and private enterprises in and around
Missoula, which already included manufacturers of beer, milled grain, and lumber.
Diversifying his investments, including ownership of mines, banks, and public works,
had been Clark’s business strategy from his first entrepreneurial adventures in the
Montana gold camps of the 1860s and ‘70s.15
Harnessing the river’s power to help fuel the growth of what would become one
of the largest mercantile centers in the northern Rockies meant altering that river. Just as
the first step in constructing Clark’s Dam was excavating the river bottom, each step
14
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entailed some change in the environment. Obtaining construction materials meant cutting
trees from the mountainsides that descended into the Big Blackfoot and Clark Fork
drainages. Men blasted, picked, shoveled, and hauled rock and granite from the river
bottom, nearby quarries, and the Hell Gate Canyon walls, which they dynamited to create
flat abutments between which the dam would nestle. Far less local pathways of natural
resource extraction brought cement and steel to western Montana, including
manufacturers in Milwaukee, WI, Dayton, OH, and Chicago, IL –from which Missoula
borrowed its nickname, the Garden City, as well as its ambition to become a center of
manufacturing, mercantilism, and trade. Closing the dam’s gates drowned the confluence
of rivers, as well as 600 acres of riparian habitat, agricultural lands, and low-lying timber.
The alterations to the surrounding hillsides and river basin certainly affected the rivers’
natural flood cycles, but those alterations did not abate the cycles. Blocking up the river
to produce power also meant battling its natural flood regime. That battle began almost
as soon as the dam’s flood gates closed.16

At the dam’s public unveiling in January, 1908, Slack crowed that, “the dam will
be in such condition that the highest waters ever known in this vicinity will not affect it in
the least.” He would soon be eating spring crow.17
In March, the dam handled its first major bout of big water. Slack reported ice,
“logs, trees, and drift wood slowly going over the dam,” without causing any damage or
16
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disruption to its power production.18 May tested the dam more seriously. With heavy
rain in the valleys and snow falling in the mountains, western Montana’s rivers rose.
Showing his first signs of worry, Slack made daily examinations of the structure,
reporting on the rising height of the water pounding down the spillway and eventually
cresting the dam itself. The last day of the month, he recorded that, “water rose so
rapidly yesterday that we had to take down the flashboards at the south end of the
dam…At present the water is five feet and three inches on the crest, and still rising.” The
engineer set a team of men to dumping rock around the dam’s edges for extra bracing.
Men also dropped a few sticks of dynamite in the river below the dam to clear out a
growing tangle of debris.19
As the wall of water washing over the dam’s crest swelled to eight feet, it carried
away a pier attached to the powerhouse, which was filling with river water. Slack
continued to have men throw as much rock as they could haul at the problem. Still, the
rain outpaced the men.
It rained more in May 1908 than any month recorded in the state weather bureau’s
28-year history. By the sixth of June, rain had fallen in the Missoula Valley for 33 days
in a row. Across the state, rivers ran higher than anyone had ever seen. Raging water
demolished nearly every bridge and roadway within the floodplains from Butte to
Missoula. Even small streams, such as the Rattlesnake Creek in Missoula, swelled to the
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point of ripping two-story houses off their foundations and floating them downstream,
taking out trees, bridges, and other homes along the way, until the massive flotsam
dumped into the debris- and mud-filled Clark Fork River or lurched up into tangled piles
above the banks. As the water rose and wrecked havoc, people living near waterways
moved to higher ground. Businesses shut down as the focus of whole towns and cities
along the Clark Fork became flood watching.20
Because most transportation and communication routes in western Montana,
including the tracks of the Northern Pacific Railroad, followed low-lying valleys the
floodwaters stranded people. A summary of the damage along the length of the Clark
Fork River told the story of waters sweeping away wagon bridges, floating houses off
their foundations, washing out railroad beds, snapping telegraph and telephone poles,
breaching dams, and driving people to ever higher ground.21
Most news stories recognized Missoula as having, “suffered the worst of a great
calamity,” since the collapse of its bridges spliced the town in two. Yet even as people
congregated to marvel at the river’s load of trees, dead livestock, rooftops, outhouses, and
barges of splintered lumber, and to gaze across the muddy torrent at homes, businesses,
family, or friends who they had no hope of reaching, they worried most about unseen
happenings upriver.22
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On June fifth a telegram reached Missoula carrying the news that flooding had
washed out a power-producing dam on the upper Clark Fork, just below Butte, leaving
that city in temporary darkness. Speculation that the brand new Clark Dam was in danger
of bursting rose along with the river. Even as the rains subsided and the sun made its first
appearance in more than a month, the fate of that structure gripped downstream residents.
At one o’clock in the morning, June sixth, the river crested. Nearly 13 feet of water
flowed over the dam’s spillway. As Missoula residents contemplated a rupture in the
dam, their fear reached “the highest pitch of excitement and alarm, and the whole city has
been in a state of unrest unparalleled in its history for any cause,” according to the local
newspaper. Those fears included a forty-foot tall wall of water carrying millions of feet
of timber careening toward the city if the dam gave way.23
As quickly as it had mounted, fear of a dam failure subsided. Despite the damage
the flood had already done, joy spread when word came from upstream that the dam “had
passed the crisis of its test by flood.” Observers praised the dam’s strength. One man
who walked the seven miles upstream from Missoula said of the structure, “(T)here is no
more danger of the power dam going out than there is of the mountains washing down the
river.” Even though he could not see the dam for all the water rushing over its entire
length, he observed “not a particle of a sign of weakness in the structure…I never saw
anything stand up better than that dam.” While the dam withstood floodwaters of
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roughly 48,000 cubic feet per second during the height of the flood (nearly twice the high
water its engineers had anticipated), it did not emerge unscathed.24
Two days after the river crested the dam got a more thorough inspection.
One engineer reported that the powerhouse had sustained minor damage. Turbulence
created by floodwater pouring over the dam and down the spillway had eroded its
foundation. Through the following summer and into the fall, W.A. Clark’s company
rebuilt substantial portions of the dam.25

As the dam aged through most of the twentieth century it needed regular patching.
Water leaked through the structure and seeped under it. With increasing regularity the
Clark-Montana Realty Company, later the Montana Power Company (MPC) – after it
bought the dam in 1929 – filled cracks and plugged seepage by lowering the reservoir
and pouring more concrete into the problem areas. In March 1933 the MPC hired a diver
to inspect concrete patches the company had applied three years earlier, as well as assess
the dam’s overall stability from a fisheye view. Diver W.W. Blaine found, “a hole of
some considerable size…in the soft natural rock bottom about 10ft. in diameter and from
3 to 4 ft. in depth.” According to the company, such degradation was common and “not
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considered important.”26 In the early 1970s, a thorough safety inspection of the dam
reported eroding concrete patches and significant undercutting that “could ultimately lead
to partial failure of the dam.” Plus, decades of water eddying at the dam’s toe had
scoured the structure’s foundation, which the inspectors warned could “seriously
jeopardize the stability and safety of (the) structure.” Yet, MPC continued to patch its
aging dam.27
After the discovery of arsenic in 1981 led to its Superfund designation, the
structure’s problems garnered much greater concern. When leaks sprang through the
dam in the fall of 1983, environmental groups, state agencies, and the dam’s owners
began to take the situation more seriously. Members of the West Slope Chapter of Trout
Unlimited voiced worries about both the leaks and the drawdown of the reservoir
necessary to fix those leaks, which flushed toxic sediment downstream. Fisheries
biologists for the state FWP agreed. Both groups committed to monitoring downstream
water quality and fish kills if a drawdown was necessary. They also began expressing
interest in more than simply patching the dam. Trout Unlimited President Ray Prill
suggested that it was “time people looked at the dam and came up with some long-term
solutions. We don’t want them (MPC) to put a Band-Aid on it.” His suggestion
resonated with river watchers at all levels.
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Soon after the news of the leaks became public in 1983, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) ordered MPC to lower the reservoir and address the
dam’s problems. Before the end of the year MPC lowered the reservoir more than seven
feet without any significant downstream water quality issues and began contemplating its
options. The attention this incident garnered, compared to a long history of drawdowns
and dam repairs, made it clear that Milltown Dam and the toxic sediment it withheld was
becoming an issue of river-wide health.28
Lowering the reservoir and fixing a few leaks in a dam known to hold back
enough toxic sediment to warrant Superfund designation prompted the Montana Power
Company to consider the structure’s long-term future, much like Prill had advised.
During the middle of November, 1983, as the company undertook emergency repairs, an
MPC spokesman admitted, “the cost of maintenance and abandonment is being studied
over the long haul.” The company’s manager of hydro engineering promised that by the
New Year MPC would finish assessing what it would do with the dam, which suddenly
seemed to include “abandonment.” While the company did little to define what
abandonment meant, MPC spokesmen confirmed that the toxic material behind the dam
was crucial to their decision-making process.29

The concern about the state’s first Superfund site spread both up- and
downstream. Just as FWP and environmental groups tried to safeguard fishery health
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below the dam, they began trying to ensure the same above it. While the worry
downstream was the release of toxic metals from the reservoir, above the dam groups
focused on flushing the river of its industrial legacy and restoring a viable fishery. FWP
agent Larry Peterman said of the river’s first 120 miles: “Twenty years ago there was
nothing living in the upper Clark Fork. As late as 12 years ago, the upper Clark Fork was
a dead stream from periodic spills of pollutants. Today, the Clark Fork is a reclaimed
stream.” Contrasting the river’s barren past with its promising present was part of
Peterman’s strategy to support his agency’s efforts to ensure minimum flows in many of
the river’s most important tributary streams, as well as the main waterway. It was also an
acknowledgement that the same heavy metals that polluted Milltown sediments lined
pockets of floodplain from Butte to the reservoir.30
As attention radiated up- and downstream of Milltown, “study” became the
buzzword for the Clark Fork. In a 1984 Leap Year Day article the Missoulian reported
that Montana’s US Representative Pat Williams, a Missoula resident, “joined
congressmen from Idaho and Washington…in calling for an Environmental Protection
Agency study of pollution” in the river. While the request stemmed from a controversy
over a Missoula-area pulp mill discharging its waste into the river, its intent was to
address the health of the whole river. As Williams recognized, “(T)here exists no
baseline of information or a long-term plan for future use and protection of this vital
resource.” Williams’s concern was in concert with state agencies, public opinion, and, to
a degree, potential polluters. The attention to the Clark Fork as a whole watershed, as
opposed to isolated problems, such as fighting a single dam or source point of pollution,
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was an early example of a soon-to-be national trend of communities supporting river
wide study and advocacy.31
Within a month of Congressman Williams’s initial efforts to get the EPA involved
in a river-wide study, the state Health Department launched a two-year study of water
quality on the Clark Fork. The study area covered nearly 225 river miles with Milltown
Reservoir right in the middle. According to a spokesman for the Montana Environmental
Information Center, the state’s foremost environmental watchdog since its founding in
the mid-1970s, the Health Department study, much like Rep. Williams efforts at the
federal level, happened because “hundreds of people in Idaho and Montana took the time
to get involved.” Steve Pilcher, the chief of the department’s water quality office, also
acknowledged that the study resulted from “strong” and “outraged” public reaction over
pollution and the river’s overall health. “It is good news, indeed, that we have a
government in Montana that does listen to its people,” applauded the Missoulian.
Public outcry provoked the study but the public was not going to be alone in
paying for it. Unlike many environmental pollution problems, like at Love Canal, where
public outcry led to acrimonious battles of opinion that often divided communities along
racial or socioeconomic lines, those at Milltown benefitted from a Superfund process that
encouraged public input and interagency cooperation.32
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While it was public pressure, touched off by the leaky dam, that instigated river
wide study, the funding came from both public and private sources. The Health
Department estimated that monitoring thirty stations along the river, including highly
suspect areas such as reservoirs and mill sites, for “chemical, physical and biological
water-quality variables,” would cost $100,000 a year. Pilcher hoped that Williams’s call
for EPA support would include funds to match those of the state and an undefined
contribution from local industries.
By May, 1984, as predictable spring runoff swelled the Clark Fork, Montana’s
governor, Ted Schwinden, stood near the river’s headwaters in Butte and announced that
the Anaconda Minerals Co. had given him a $50,000 check to be followed by another
$150,000 over the next three years to help fund research on the Clark Fork. The governor
acknowledged that the money’s purpose of coordinating the Health Department’s study
with that of the EPA’s was appropriate, “because past Anaconda actions have impacted
the Clark Fork drainage.” With Anaconda’s contribution – meant to coordinate river
studies – public opinion, state and federal agencies, as well as industry had coalesced
around the issue of river health, an issue that included everything from sewage to pulp
mill pollution, but emanated out of the toxic legacy of mining epitomized by the
Milltown Superfund site. That is, the Milltown Superfund site was becoming part of a
more thorough concern about river health.33
Dealing with the river’s past had become the principle problem for its future.
Phrases like “future use” and “future protection” sprang up in the public conversation
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about the river.34 Considering the river’s long-term health hardly erased its past. In
1984, during the first summer of the new study, FWP officials found thousands of dead
fish floating in stretches of the Clark Fork above Milltown. Eventually they identified
the “mystery pollutant” as “tailings loaded with copper and other metals” that a severe
thunderstorm washed from old mine wastes and into the river.35
Although human health prompted worries about water at Milltown and along the
Clark Fork, fish came to be the centerpiece of many new studies. As biologists saw
themselves “beginning in the attempt to rescue the pollution-plagued river,” according to
ongoing newspaper stories, they focused most of their attention on “gathering
information on the river’s trout populations.” Of particular interest were “rainbow,
cutthroat, brown and Dolly Varden trout – species prized by sportsmen.” Working at
night with electroshock devices, biologists stunned these sport fish as they moved into
shallow water to feed. Stunned trout helped them “determine the number of fish in the
river, their growth rates, species mix, age and other characteristics,” such as how much
they were suffering from heavy metals and other sorts of pollution.36
Environmental groups and the public in general also saw fish health as the
foremost indicator of river health. Because people shifted their concern to fish, worry
over the Milltown Superfund site literally moved up and down the Clark Fork from the
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toxic epicenter of the dam and reservoir. The issue of fish would eventually become a
crucial turning point in the fate of the dam and Superfund site.37

Finally, a year after repairing leaks in the dam and announcing that it was
questioning the structure’s fate, MPC surprised river watchers with its vision. In midDecember 1984, the company “disclosed an $11.45 million plan to upgrade its badly
deteriorated Milltown Dam on the Clark Fork River near Missoula.” The company
submitted a request to the Public Service Commission, which regulates energy rates in
the state, to increase its electricity rates as a means of paying for the repairs. That is, the
company wanted public electricity consumers to pay for a refurbished dam. In its
preliminary report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), MPC claimed
that the proposed project was the only way to prevent the dam from collapsing. The
proposed repairs would include “replacing the existing powerhouse and turbines” thus,
“increasing the dam’s generating capacity to 4.3 megawatts from the current capacity of
3.4 megawatts,” as well as replacing much of the dam’s wood structure with concrete.
The company used the growing perception of the dam as a threat to river wide health, a
proverbial toxic time bomb, to scare the public into funding its repair work. Even though
Robert Periman, MPC’s hydro engineer, admitted that the dam “is nearing the end of its
useful life” and that “it eventually could fail, could wash out,” he rejected the idea of
dismantling the dam at a slightly higher cost, which the company could not easily pass on
to consumers.38
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Others following the fate of the river seemed to agree. The regional fisheries
manager for Montana’s FWP thought that “upgrading the dam appears to be the most
environmentally sound course of action because it would disturb the silt the least.”
Leaving the toxic mess in place appeared safer than trying to remove it at the time.39 The
local newspaper cheered the plan as a short-term risk with long-term gains in safety. An
editorial on the MPC plan saw the risks as “worth taking if, after reconstruction, the dam
will not have to be lowered so often for repairs.”40
Even with initial support from state agencies and the public, MPC still actually
had to draft a comprehensive plan for FERC approval, which took nearly six months.
When the company submitted its plan to FERC and released the two and a half inch thick
document to the public in June 1985, it reflected both widespread concern about the
dam’s toxic burden and MPC’s financial concerns. The reasoning behind the dam
upgrades was to “prevent the release of heavy-metal-contaminated silt in the reservoir
behind the dam.” The means to pay for the $11.5 million proposal were to “raise
Montana Power’s electricity rates by about $2 million annually.” To mend the dam,
MPC proposed building a concrete wall on the upstream side of the dam and to replace
the timber cribs with a concrete shell, all meant to stop the recurrent water damage the
dam had suffered. Mechanical gates would replace wooden flashboards, so that lowering
and raising the reservoir level would disturb the toxic sediment less. To go along with
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rate hikes the company also wanted to make the dam more productive by installing new
turbines that would generate roughly 25% more power.41
Not everyone embraced MPC’s plan. In Missoula, the recently formed Clark
Fork Coalition (CFC) held public meetings to inform local citizens and to gage their
opinions. In fact, the CFC, which would become the foremost environmental group
concerned with the dam’s future, arose in response to MPC’s proposal to rebuild the
Milltown Dam. Or more specifically, the CFC formed over concern about the “high
levels of heavy metals” that made the dam and reservoir a federal Superfund site. As a
coalition spokeswoman predicted, “the Milltown Dam project will become one of the
major issues affecting the river during the next year.”42
By mid-summer, with the MPC plan still in the hands of FERC, residents
launched an effort to begin caring for the river on a community level. Like individuals
and communities were doing all over the country, Clark Fork residents created their own
opportunities to remedy environmental damage. The same people that supported
Superfund also supported more expedient and tangible ways of cleaning up the places
they lived. The “Greater Riverfront Project,” the first effort of a recently initiated forum
called “Good Work Missoula” organized roughly 50 volunteers one July morning along
the banks of the Clark Fork in downtown Missoula. The volunteers pulled noxious
weeds, “hauled ashore the rusted pipes and cables lying halfway in the water” and
generally, “tugged, trimmed, picked up and carried the junk” that marred the river and
marked it as a historical dumping ground. One newspaper account celebrated the
41
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diversity and cohesion of the volunteers by noting that they, “were a fair reflection of the
community at large. There were children and retired people, mill workers and
shopkeepers, a doctor here, a lawyer over there; there were unemployed people; there
were a few who were a little crosswise to the law at the moment, and there was a judge.
It was kind of hard to tell one from the other; they were all sweaty.”43 After wading in
the water and helping fellow community members retrieve such items as an old toilet
bowl, iron rails, and a set of rusty bedsprings, event coordinator and future mayor Daniel
Kemmis recognized that “there’s no end to it.” The Clark Fork was bringing people
together but needed far more help than the volunteers could offer in a single day.44
Locals did their best, while some began courting more federal support. With
Superfund sites already located along the Clark Fork’s headwaters on Silver Bow Creek
near Butte, Warm Springs Creek where it flows past the old Anaconda smelter, and, of
course, Milltown, the Clark Fork Coalition was in the midst of trying to get the entire
upper river deemed a Superfund site. In June, the citizen’s group pressed the head of the
EPA’s Superfund program, William N. Hedeman Jr., about such an expansion. “He said
he would in fact support that,” said CFC spokeswoman Kathy Hadley. She called the
possibility “a real victory for the coalition.” But this “victory” hinged in part on the
ongoing studies of the river.
Rather than duplicate local, university, and state study efforts, the EPA would
launch an expanded Clark Fork Superfund study only if the coordinated local study
showed widespread toxic contamination. This federal response came as a direct result of
43
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the CFC’s initiative, as well as what one EPA official called the complaint of many
citizens “that heavy-metals contamination in the river between Deer Lodge and Milltown
was being neglected.” If those complaints proved valid through extant studies, the EPA
appeared ready to connect the dots between Butte, Anaconda, and Milltown, making the
whole upper Clark Fork a Superfund site.45 Within a month that likelihood increased
when US Senator Max Baucus of Montana announced that a nominee to be the new
assistant chief of the EPA supported the river-long Superfund designation as part of the
overall expansion of Superfund itself.46

The Superfund law was set to expire on October 1, 1985, but as a Missoulian
editorial pointed out, both houses of Congress were “considering bills to extend and
enlarge the program.” Superfund renewal was national news. As early as February,
1985, a New York Times article revealed that Lee M. Thomas, the new head of the EPA,
supported the Reagan administration’s five year extension of the Superfund law, which
would have limited its use to “hazardous waste problems and emergency spills,” while
eliminating its application to “mining and pesticide residues or contaminated drinking
water.” In line with his conservative agenda, Reagan also wished to pass more of the
financial burden of waste cleanup program to states. Congress, the public, environmental
organizations, states, and even many corporations assailed this attempt to reduce the
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scope of Superfund. Accordingly, Congress passed a temporary extension of the law,
while various bills to expand it bounced between legislative houses.47
In a political climate that forecast cutting federal expenditures, de-regulating
industry, and weakening environmental laws, optimism about expanding Superfund
looked like a ray of hope for environmentalists, especially those along the Clark Fork.
Whereas the original Superfund law (CERCLA) established a $1.6 billion trust fund over
five years for “cleaning up abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites,”48 the new
proposals in Congress would reestablish the fund for another five years with an infusion
of between $7.5 and $10 billion. New versions of the law shifted more financial burden
to industries beside the chemical industry, which paid nearly 90% of the original fund
through taxation. Proposals to expand the tax base for Superfund to more industries,
including manufacturers, thus lessening the burden on those corporations singled out by
the original legislation, drew support from industry. The New York Times quoted a
spokesman for the Chemical Manufacturers Association as saying: “A larger Superfund
demands as a matter of economics and equity to be broadened.” Even with some
corporate support the threat of a Reagan veto loomed. So, Superfund was not easily or
quickly settled.49
By the beginning of 1986, the EPA began warning Congress, the President, and
the public that it would have to shut down its toxic waste cleanup within months, if no
new bill passed soon. The agency warned of the loss of “1500 employees working on

47

Jonathan Friendly, “President Asks 5-Year Extension of Toxic Waste Cleanup
Program,” The New York Times, February 23, 1985, 6.
48
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm
49
Gary Klott, “Superfund Tax Stirs Debate,” New York Times, 10/26/85, 36; editorial,
“Tough Superfund bill should be passed,” Missoulian, 7/25/1985, 11.
78

Chapter 2: Floods of Change

the toxic waste program, or more than 10 percent of the agency’s staff.” As importantly,
any further delay would stall or scuttle existing cleanup work, including studies and
planning, such as was happening up and down the Clark Fork River. As one EPA agency
put it: “In many places we will have to put up a chain link fence and walk away.” A
possible halt to one of the nation’s most recognizable environmental laws contrasted with
the bipartisan support its renewal had.50
Even the political infighting between party rivals in Congress amounted to how to
pay for expanding Superfund, rather than whether or not to do so. As a Times editorial
phrased it, Superfund debate in Congress was “Locked in a Lovefest,” wherein “the
House and Senate are competing to be the more generous benefactor.” By September,
1986, after a series of temporary extensions of Superfund, EPA head Lee Thomas had
shifted his support away from the Reagan reductions and toward congressional expansion
of Superfund. He redoubled his warning about a virtual shutdown of his agency if that
expansion failed to happen soon. At the same time, both houses of Congress had agreed
on nearly every detail of a new bill, save the money raising. The House favored simply
increasing the tax rates from the original law on oil and chemical companies, whereas the
Senate favored a broader industrial tax base. An opposing argument in Congress held
that only corporations directly linked to designated toxic waste sites should pay. Either
way, it seemed that Superfund, at the very least, was not on the proverbial chopping
block.51
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Superfund had not always been so secure in its short life. Just a few years earlier,
as leaks in the Milltown Dam spurred conversation about its future, the future of the EPA
and one of its signature programs – Superfund – came under question because of a
different sort of leaks. Working at a new job as the director of environmental health for
the Missoula City-County Health Department, Elaine Bild helped Milltown qualify for
Superfund status by making sure all the proper paperwork made it into the proper EPA
mailboxes. “I knew how the law worked,” she recalled. She knew that such human
agency and individual effort mattered in a bureaucratic process that included reams of
official documents and forms because she entered Missoula government as an escape
from her position as a project manager for EPA’s Superfund program. Bild had left
Superfund and Washington, DC, because of the corruption the agency suffered during the
first years of the Reagan administration.
Bild remembered “the election year of 1980 brought dramatic changes for the
worse.” After Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch as his new EPA director, corruption and
disorganization within the agency brought it under national scrutiny. The policies and
actions that Gorsuch, whom EPA employees called “Queen Anne,” supported “were
viewed as a reflection of Reagan’s own policies.” According to Bild and subsequent
Congressional investigations, those policies and actions included withholding agency
studies and information about pollution and environmental problems, government
contracts for environmental work going to private companies based on “who knew
whom,” ignoring EPA scientists and reports in favor of industry consultants, and general
disorganization. Bild remembered EPA employees fed up with the situation “were
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leaking so much information to Congress…that (the) chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee placed cardboard boxes outside his office where the flood of
documents could be deposited.” “Queen Anne” Gorsuch resigned in 1983 after serving
for two years as the EPA’s first female administrator. While Reagan was unable to
weaken the EPA or its mandates, such as Superfund, through Gorsuch’s leadership, her
years at the agency gained it disfavor in the public eye, as well as with Congress.52
With Gorsuch gone and the controversy surrounding her tenure marring the
Reagan administration’s environmental record lessened, Superfund began to carry out its
original mandate. The EPA included Milltown on its first list of 406 Superfund sites in
1983. The number of sites on the list nearly doubled by 1985, as Congressional debate
about the future of Superfund focused on expansion and greater funding.53
During the summer of 1985, Milltown made its first mark on Superfund
legislation. Long before the debate over Superfund funding was finished, US Senator
Max Baucus from Montana, who was on the Senate committee charged with reauthorizing Superfund, tried to amend how the program worked. To the dismay of
Montana environmental groups familiar with the state’s mining past and the
environmental damage it wrought, Baucus attempted “to exempt mining sites from the
Superfund cleanup law,” according to news reports.54 The Senator defended his move by
professing, “I am concerned that the current hazard ranking system may not accurately
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assess the relative degree of risk to human health and the environment posed by sites and
facilities subject to review.” Baucus claimed that his amendment would help classify
types of hazardous wastes. Opponents, such as the Montana Environmental Information
Center (MEIC), charged that the amendment would downgrade mining wastes in the
Superfund ranking system because those wastes tend to include a variety of chemicals
and elements and are often dispersed over large areas or throughout waterways. As an
MEIC spokesman claimed, the EPA “would much rather deal with tidy little barrels of
hazardous waste that they can pick up and bury.” Testifying to the Senate, Baucus
maintained that abandoned mining sites “could be listed on the NPL if they present a
genuine and substantial risk, but certain safeguards would be put in place…and that
higher priority sites are listed first.” MEIC’s past experience at Milltown and along the
upper Clark Fork, as well as their concern for plenty of other contemporary and
abandoned mining sites in the state, informed their opposition to the Baucus
amendment.55
Other western states that shared Montana’s mining history opposed Baucus’s
attempts to change the way the Superfund program classified wastes. New Mexico
governor Toney Anaya condemned the purpose of the change, which he summarized as
making it “difficult, if not impossible, for mining sites to qualify for cleanup using
Superfund monies.” Similarly, Colorado’s governor Richard Lamm said “no class of
industrial processes should be immune from the safeguards embodied by the Superfund
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legislation.” Both governors wrote to their Montana colleague, Ted Schwinden, hoping
he would persuade Baucus to recant his amendment.56 Just before year’s end, Schwinden
suggested that Baucus abandon his amendment for the time being. In the final product,
Congress struck language singling out mining sites in favor of a more general amendment
that defined wastes more clearly and emphasized the “quantity, toxicity, and
concentrations of hazardous constituents,” rather than quantity alone.57 Those familiar
with Milltown, including Schwinden, helped retain a broad Superfund mandate by
opposing Baucus’s efforts to curtail the legislation.
As the debate over Superfund progressed, Baucus moved with the tide of
expanding Superfund, including a broadened tax base. As a key member of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, Baucus summarized his reasoning for a
broader tax base to fund a Superfund renewal bill in a special Congressional Digest
report on “The Superfund Controversy” by writing, “Everyone contributed to the
problem, and therefore, everyone should contribute to cleaning up the problem.” That
included mining. He went on to confirm that Superfund was an accounting for America’s
industrial past, which justified making current industry pay, quipping that “past waste
management practices allowed us to manufacture goods for less than the true cost of
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production.” Superfund renewal would allow collection of those historic debts, of which
Montana had many.58

By the summer of 1985, the Montana governor’s Clark Fork River Basin Project,
charged with participating in the on-going river studies, was making predictions about the
waterway’s fate. Recognizing that the Clark Fork, like most western watersheds, had
hosted “more than a century of mining, timber, agricultural and municipal discharge,”
Ken Knudson, the head of the study, declared that the river was incapable of cleaning
itself up in any appreciable timeframe. Therefore, river cleanup was the responsibility of
its longtime users. The first hurdle for the Clark Fork, according to Knudson, was to get
people to see the river as something other than an industrial sacrifice zone. “For so long
not only did people take their streams for granted, but they considered the Clark Fork
Basin a lost cause because of the complexity and magnitude of the problem,” said
Knudson. So, along with studying the specifics of how polluted the river was, the first
step toward the river’s future was creating a new vision of it. With people flocking to the
riverbanks to help haul trash out of its waters, to the coordination of local, state, and
federal studies, both of those initial steps seemed to be taking place. In July, 1985,
President Reagan’s nominee to be the new assistant administrator overseeing Superfund
announced that he supported providing Superfund money to study the entire Clark Fork
basin, which could lead to more Superfund designations along the river.59
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As a river-wide focus coalesced along the Clark Fork, Milltown once again took
center stage. The late February flood of 1986 that carried a heavy burden of ice down the
Blackfoot and Clark Fork Rivers and broke wooden gates along the top of the Milltown
Dam returned the discussion of the river’s future to its central Superfund site. As
flooding subsided, MPC lowered the Milltown reservoir nearly seven feet, shut off the
dam’s turbines, and hosted officials from FERC to begin assessing damage to the dam.
The flood had busted 50 of 67 wooden gates and smashed a “living-room-sized” hole “in
the apron on the downstream side of the dam” where water crested the broken gates and
pounded down its face. An MPC spokesman warned: “We don’t think it will wash out
immediately…But left unattended, something could happen in the future.” The employee
speculated that the flood damage might prompt FERC to hasten its approval of the
company’s $11.5 million proposal to rebuild the dam. Whatever the status of its longterm re-construction plans, MPC proposed immediately repairing the downstream apron,
which covered and protected the dam’s rock and timber crib foundation. A busted dam
could spill the estimated seven million cubic yards of toxic sediment into the entire
fishery below Milltown, including the more populous Missoula from where the CFC and
most of the environmental concern stemmed.60
While MPC considered its options to restore the dam, the flood-damaged structure
amplified the conversation about the river’s future. A month after the flood and with
another, more seasonal surge of spring high water expected soon, Governor Schwinden
attended the Clark Fork Coalition’s annual meeting in Missoula to address the river’s
future. Acknowledging that some industrial use of the state’s resources would continue,
60
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the governor also emphasized “there is an overwhelming desire among Montanans to
preserve a place worth living in.” Crediting the CFC with arousing most of the concern
surrounding the Milltown Dam and the upper river, he claimed that cleaning them up was
“among the most exciting and worthwhile possibilities of my governorship.” He
emphasized the need for the ongoing research to quantify the river’s problems. The
newspaper article devoted to the gathering made the first public reference to “restoring”
the river. Schwinden promised the state’s continued support in that effort, while
maintaining “a spirit of shared responsibility is essential if we are to successfully tackle
the river’s very complex problems and the issues that are related to the recovery of the
river system.” Looking both backward and forward at the cleanup project he finished
with the platitude that: “As we approach our Centennial, we can feel proud that in
Montana’s second century, the Clark Fork will gradually be restored to what a river
should be: A source of life and, just as important, a source of inspiration to those whose
lives it touches.” The head of the governor’s river study reiterated the forward-looking
nature of restoration by urging members of the CFC to lay plans for the river’s future.61
The most immediate of those plans centered on MPC. A month after the February
flood, the company warned that “potential loss of life or property” should induce the
FERC to “accelerate” the review process for its $11.5 million renovation plan. While
state officials and the Clark Fork Coalition shared the worry about the dam’s failure, they
were less inclined to accept a hasty decision on its fate. The post-flood turning point for
the dam’s future came to a head over the company’s desire for quick approval of its plan
versus state and local opposition to such expedience. The governor’s Clark Fork River
61
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Project and the CFC both warned FERC that they would “formally intervene…in an
effort to force a full public review of the reconstruction project.” CFC spokesman Peter
Nielsen took the long-view of the circumstance saying, “we’re talking about what we’ll
be living with for 50 years…Let’s make the right decision.”62
While spring runoff never swelled enough to cause further damage to the dam, the
issue of what to do with the dam remained. In what seemed like a break from local
environmental groups, the state Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
(DHES) proposed suspending state water-quality standards so as to allow MPC to repair
the dam without regard to the amount of sediment washed downstream in the process.
The DHES move was meant to help MPC gain approval for dam renovations by FERC,
which required that any such work would not violate state water-quality laws. Knowing
that work on the dam would likely do so, DHES simply offered to curtail such laws.
State fisheries biologists, the CFC, and the Montana Environmental Information Center
pounced on such a suspension of state environmental regulations and threatened that a
full environmental impact statement be required for any dam rebuilding project.63
By the first of May, FERC seemed to ameliorate the debate. Acknowledging state
and local concern, the agency announced that it might grant MPC permission to repair the
dam’s damaged spillway during the coming summer, but hold its $11.5 million proposal
to rebuild the entire dam until federal regulators had sufficient time to study the problem
of potential toxic releases from the dam more thoroughly. This new two-part process
would also allow the completion of the Superfund study before any decision was made.
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The CFC’s Peter Nielsen called FERC’s phased review “good news.” The local
newspaper, the state, and even the MPC echoed Nielsen’s evaluation.
FERC approved the spillway repairs within a month, leaving in place Montana’s
water-quality laws and requiring MPC to monitor water-quality throughout its work.64
The approval required MPC to take all possible precautions against spilling toxic
sediment downstream. More importantly it left the possibility of rebuilding the entire
dam in question.
Throughout the dam’s history, leaks and floods eroded, dinged, and damaged the
dam. Following the discovery of arsenic in Milltown wells, the threat the river posed to
the aging dam expanded the concern about the toxic sediment it impounded. The flood
of 1986 brought the issue of the Milltown Superfund site being a river-wide worry to a
head. The expanded space of concern coincided with an expansion of people involved in
the issue, including new, local environmental groups, the state, as well as the dam’s
corporate owners and federal agencies. While these groups and individuals agreed to
immediate repairs of the damaged dam, they also began serious debate over the
structure’s long-term future.
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Placing the Blame: Liability at Milltown and the New Superfund

Before the flood of 1986, the contaminated reservoir garnered most of the
attention at Milltown. The flood shifted worry to the poor condition of the Milltown
Dam and what its failure would unleash on the river. At the same time, the Superfund
process heightened focus on the impoundment. After solving the initial problem of
contaminated drinking water and identifying the source of toxic wastes, Superfund
protocol called for the identification of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) and the
drafting of a feasibility study (FS). The heart of the FS is a list of possible long-term
solutions, or “remedial actions,” for the problem, which came to include dealing with the
dam. As a faulty stopper in the river, the dam was suddenly as big a problem as the water
it held.
When the Clark Fork’s flow dwindled to its yearly low in mid-August of 1986,
contract workers for the Montana Power Company began repairing the Milltown Dam’s
flood-damaged spillway. Because of the reservoir’s status as a Superfund site, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted MPC quick approval for
structural repairs to the dam. Since there was an “emergency,” FERC, as well as
Montana’s state environmental agencies and local environmental groups, favored
patching the dam as soon as possible, even at the risk of releasing some toxic sediment
from the reservoir into the river. Failing to act posed the bigger risk of a complete dam
failure.
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While the MPC contractors working on the dam expected to finish repair work
within a year, or before the spring run-off of 1987, the company also hired water quality
monitors to analyze how construction impacted the river. MPC’s permit required both
the timeframe and the monitoring because, as FERC wrote in its assessment, “the
potential for discharging large amounts of toxic-laden sediment downstream of the
spillway during construction…is great.” The local newspaper warned that the dam “was
an environmental disaster waiting to be unleashed.” Those worries took shape around
MPC’s reconstruction of their dam. As that work progressed, many of those same
observers, particularly members of local environmental watchdogs, the Clark Fork
Coalition, praised MPC and its contractors for avoiding disaster. Throughout the $2.3
million project, water quality monitors detected only “minor increases in metals” well
below permitted limits.1
Success in remodeling the dam, or what the MPC imagined as “Phase I,”
prompted the company to speculate on when it might begin “Phase II,” the centerpiece of
which was an upgraded powerhouse. But that speculation soon ran into reality.
In particular, the dam owners faced mounting opposition from environmentalists.
As a graduate student in the University of Montana’s Environmental Studies Department,
Peter Nielsen got interested in a lawsuit by the National Wildlife Federation and Trout
Unlimited against MPC’s plan to draw down the Milltown reservoir at a pace and to a
level that the plaintiffs claimed would harm fish and aquatic life. Before the discovery of
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arsenic and other heavy metals in those sediments, Nielsen followed the lawsuit and
joined protests supporting it with a focus on the quantity of sediment that rapid
drawdowns sent downriver. An injunction stopped MPC from proceeding with their
plans; the experience also changed Nielsen’s career path. He stuck around Missoula after
graduate school by making a living as a whitewater rafting guide. Then in 1985 he
helped organize and guide a whitewater outing to raise money for the people organizing
the Clark Fork Coalition.
By January, 1986, Nielsen was the new Clark Fork Coalition’s first permanent
executive director. The group envisioned itself as an environmental organization
working for the good of their namesake watershed. As such, the Coalition was on the
leading edge of a wave of new, locally-grown conservation groups across the U.S.
focusing on whole river systems. Like others in the burgeoning watershed movement,
Nielsen emphasized science. He and fellow coalition members also courted business. In
a letter to the Army Corps of Engineers about MPC’s Phase II plans, Nielsen described
his group as “an alliance of 53 businesses and organizations.” Business support was part
of the coalition’s goal of being a community-wide organization, rather than an issuebased grassroots group. Businesses joined because it gave them pro-environmental
credibility, (presumably) a small tax deduction for their support, and because many local
business owners were outdoor enthusiasts, much like Nielsen had been. In 1988 an EPA
Journal article on the relationship between commercial interests and public
environmental opinion stated that “(f)or business to maintain its profitability, influence,
and freedom, it must be sensitive to the concerns of the public – not just in terms of the
price and quality of the goods it produces but also in terms of public approval of its social
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and political influence.” Support for groups like the Clark Fork Coalition were visible,
local avenues by which a business could reveal “its social and political influence.”2
One of the CFC’s largest business supporters was the Montana Power Company.
Yet, as the Milltown Superfund site became the group’s most prominent concern, it
strained the Coalition’s relationship with the dam’s owners. Moreover, it was around that
strain that the CFC thrust itself into the public eye.
As the dam gained attention at Milltown, so did the issue of who was responsible
for cleaning up the toxic mess. EPA authority and local advocacy combined to push
MPC toward becoming part of the long-term solution at Milltown and put the emphasis
on what to do with the dam, rather than just how to clean up the contaminated sediments
behind it. Where MPC saw fixing the dam’s spillway as the first of two steps in
improving its asset, the Superfund law deemed it an emergency response, similar to
providing Milltown residents with a new, safe drinking water system. While MPC
wanted to move on to further improvements, the EPA, state agencies, and
environmentalists began pursuing the next phase of the Superfund process – establishing
liability and investigating permanent remedies.
At the same time that the EPA was enforcing its authority over corporate
responsibility for cleaning up the environment, the federal agency watched the fate of one
of its signature programs – Superfund – go from hanging in the balance between
Congressional support and executive veto, to expanding far beyond its original mandate
2
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and budget. Although this was happening far from the impounded waters of the Clark
Fork, the situation at the Milltown Dam and reservoir continued to alter how the public
participated in the Superfund process. All the while, the Superfund process began
reaping benefits for the contaminated river, long before any official remedial actions
happened.
In addition, the Superfund’s trajectory at Milltown, as well as at the national level,
support scholarship showing that despite the anti-environmental rhetoric of the Reaganera, it was during the 1980s that most of the significant, federal environmental laws
passed in the 1960s and ‘70s underwent their first significant implementation. In the case
of Superfund, Congress strengthened the law. On the other hand, environmental
historians have tended to see great polarity around environmental issues and laws during
this decade, where a close look at a place like Milltown provides an example of how the
federal and state agencies, environmental groups, the public in general, and, at times,
major corporations embarked on a path of compromise. And, Superfund law encouraged,
even mandated, such compromise.3
These results at Milltown confirm some arguments about national environmental
history in the 1980s. Historians, such as Samuel P. Hays, have portrayed this decade as
when support for the nation’s largest ten environmental groups boomed and the “Big
Ten” became major lobbying organizations based in Washington, D.C. As Hays and
others have argued, those changes resulted from a combination of widespread, long-term
national support for environmental issues inflamed by Reagan-era anti-environmentalism.
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When the executive branch did its best to cut environmentalists out of national politics,
their popular support increased. So too, a window of opportunity opened for local,
grassroots groups. But it was at that local level that Hays’s assertion that
“(e)nvironmentalists were rejected as legitimate participants in the give-and-take of
public affairs” makes less sense. When participation in public affairs is reduced to large
environmental groups and top administrators of the EPA, those groups may have
experienced rejection. Viewing the happenings at a place like Milltown, leads to a
different conclusion. Hays argued that environmentalists found “the administrative
apparatus of the state closed to their influence.” As this western Montana Superfund
story makes clear, the Clark Fork Coalition worked closely with the EPA. And the
agency, the authority of which resided at the regional, if not local level, courted the
participation of local environmentalists and the public. That is, Milltown illustrates how
local environmental groups may well have filled gaps that larger organizations
deemphasized, but did so largely in concert with federal and state agencies. Superfund
abetted environmentalists’ participation in public affairs. And groups like CFC did so
because of their long-term commitment to community needs, including a host of real,
local environmental issues, not as a reaction to national politics or a single environmental
problem.4
Finally, the idea that the Reagan administration provoked a transfer of power
from the federal government to the states, especially in environmental regulation, fails to
reflect how Superfund was working. Really, when and if the state gained authority it was
alongside a strengthened and better-funded federal government (EPA in this case). The
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EPA drew on and encouraged state authority. There wasn’t a finite pie of power over
which the state and the federal government fought for greater portions. Rather all
involved parties, from the federal government to individual citizens, gained new authority
or expanded roles in cleaning up the environment through a mostly cooperative process.
One thing that historians have seen clearly is the motivation people brought to
environmental issues. As Hays observed “the expression of environmental aspiration was
infused with a sense of place. People thought of environmental quality in terms of where
they lived or worked or engaged in recreation.” That was undoubtedly true at Milltown,
although the parameters of the place in question were shifting.5

As early as the initial designation of the reservoir as a Superfund site in 1983, the
EPA foresaw having to deal with the dam. At the time, the agency already viewed the
dam as a “source-control,” a tool for dealing with the toxins it trapped. MPC’s
maintenance and operation of its dam mattered. In the fall of 1984, the EPA stamped its
authority on the matter in a letter to the MPC, stating that the company must
communicate “any changes in the dam structure or operation” to the EPA and to the
state’s Department of Health and Environmental Sciences. More pointedly, the EPA
threatened MPC with clauses in the Superfund law that could result in the company
becoming a responsible party to cleaning up the site, if its actions released toxic
sediments from the dam. EPA Region VIII director John Wardell wielded a financial
stick. If the EPA designated the dam owners as a potentially responsible party, the
company would have to pay an agency-determined portion of future cleanup work. If the
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company refused its responsibility and the EPA had to foot the initial bill, the federal
government could sue the company for up to three times the cost the EPA spent on
cleanup efforts.6
The power company began informing the EPA of its plans. MPC’s pre-flood
engineering evaluation for rehabbing the dam included renovating the powerhouse to
increase its power production. The company planned to make repairs and upgrades at the
same time. They also prioritized minimizing long- and short-term environmental
impacts, such as allowing toxic sediment to wash downstream. As part of that effort,
MPC considered excavating contaminated sediment exposed by lowering and rerouting
the reservoir during construction.7
After the flood of 1986 damaged the dam, plans changed. By the end of March,
the EPA and all of Montana’s environmental agencies – Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences (DHES), Dept. of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC),
Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (FWP), and the Clark Fork Coalition (CFC) – petitioned FERC
to intervene in the dam reconstruction licensing process. The EPA paved the way for this
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intervention using Superfund law. The law empowered the agency to enter any legal
proceedings that might involve the release of hazardous wastes from a Superfund site.8
Each agency had specific reasons for intervening. In general, the state agencies
wanted to safeguard human health (especially the downstream Missoula aquifer that was
the drinking supply for much of the city) and the river’s natural resources against releases
of heavy metals. The EPA added to those concerns its future decisions regarding the
Superfund site. The CFC insisted on “adequate public review and intergovernmental
cooperation,” an independent, on-site monitor to assess downstream water quality during
construction, and the implementation of an MPC-funded fish mitigation program. All the
interveners favored FERC dividing the company’s proposal into two phases: fixing the
busted and near failing spillway, and upgrading the powerhouse.9
In a late spring news release, the DHES announced that they, along with the EPA,
had approved a FERC “emergency” order to allow MPC to repair the dam’s spillway.
But, the state and federal agencies pushed FERC to disallow the power company’s plans
to upgrade the powerhouse and generating capacity at the same time. Phase I could and
should proceed immediately. Phase II would have to wait. The justification was that the
EPA’s study of how to deal with the contaminated reservoir (the feasibility study) was
due out within a year and one of the possible Superfund alternatives was complete dam
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removal. If the EPA included dismantling, or at least altering the dam as part of the
solution to remediating the reservoir, MPC’s improvements would be a waste. The EPA
and state environmental agency were unsure about whether the power company could sue
for lost investment. What both agencies knew for sure was that the more repair and
upgrade work the company undertook on the dam, the more likely its efforts would result
in releases of contaminated sediments into the river.10
That wasn’t the only problem the EPA faced at the time. In fact, much bigger
changes loomed over the agency.

The original Superfund legislation, passed by Congress in 1980, expired in 1985.
A temporary measure kept the program funded through mid-summer 1986. Just as the
EPA began dangling Superfund laws over MPC, the agency was in jeopardy of having
the program’s funding and authority run out. Along with the hundreds of Superfund sites
around the country, Milltown faced abandonment by the federal government.
By October 1986, a Superfund Reauthorization bill was in front of President
Ronald Reagan and his advisors were recommending he veto it. Upon entering office,
Reagan’s administration tried and failed to undermine the original Superfund mandate.
Now the President faced a Congressional bill that increased the program’s funding
fivefold to $8.5 billion over a new five-year period, which was down considerably from
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some of the earlier iterations of the bill. Many in Congress had acknowledged studies by
the EPA that showed it would take $22.7 billion to clean the country’s 786 top priority
Superfund sites, to say nothing of the nearly 20,000 places the agency forecast as needing
designation. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimate for the same
work topped out at $100 billion. The bill that quintupled the Superfund budget would
come from taxing a much broader base of industries than the original legislation. Both
heavier taxes on corporations and public spending on the environment defied Reagan’s
stated economic principles. Yet, he faced strong support for the bill in Congress (even
Conservatives recognized how conservative the new fund was), among EPA
administrators, national environmental groups, as well as the Chemical Manufacturers
Association and other industries (that realized how much steeper the bill could be).
Everyone, except the executive, saw Superfund as a way to deal with publicly recognized
environmental disasters that was more efficient and cost effective than leaving the matter
to government agencies or, conversely, private business alone.
On October 17, 1986, Reagan signed the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, or SARA. For all the anti-environmental rhetoric and efforts that
characterized Reagan’s first few years in office, strengthening one of the nation’s seminal
environmental laws made seemingly little impression on the president at the time. In
1983 when EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch faced corruption charges in Congress,
Reagan defended her in his diary against “a lynch mob” media that “thinks it smells
blood.” He dubbed Congressional Democrats investigating EPA misdoings as “some
zany on the hill.” A year later, he privately accused environmentalists of “declared war”
on him at the beginning of his first term and being “arrogant and unreasonable” in
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general. Yet, Reagan recalled nothing about signing SARA in his diary, instead
commenting that he had “forgotten how really good” the 1942 film Kings Row, which
helped him rise to acting fame, was. Although Reagan took little note of the new law,
some of its amendments began to play out at Milltown.11
Even with its budget increase, the EPA began designating potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) at Milltown. As the title implies, a PRP is any individual or corporation
that might be liable for cleaning up a Superfund site. At Milltown the agency singled out
the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), Champion International Corporation, and the
Montana Power Company. Each PRP had a different link to liability.
The EPA named the Atlantic Richfield Company as PRP number one because of
its connection to the upper Clark Fork River’s industrial history. At the headwaters of
that river the city of Butte, Montana grew from a cluster of gold mining shacks in the
1870s, to being one of the West’s largest industrial mining centers, producing 43% of the
nation’s copper by the time Montana became a state in 1889. The vertically and
horizontally integrated mining industry dominating Butte included huge ore smelting
works in nearby Anaconda, named for the company that between 1900 and 1910
consolidated ownership of most of the Butte mining, smelting, and refining works.
According to the EPA, “as a result of one or more mergers, restructurings, transfers of
assets, continuation of business activities, or other corporate actions, ARCO is the

11

Jane L. Bloom, “Superfund: The Next Five Years,” Environment, V.27, No.4, (May
1985). Butte, MT. (AP), “Knell sounds for Superfund sites’ cleanup,” Missoulian,
6/4/1986, 31. Opinion, “Superfund veto risky for Montanans,” Missoulian, 10/15/1986, 6.
Also see: Revesz and Steward, eds., Analyzing Superfund, and Vig and Kraft, eds.,
Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan’s New Agenda. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan
Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 131-132,
252-253, 445.
100

Chapter 3: Placing the Blame

successor-in-interest to, and has assumed the liabilities incurred by Anaconda.”
Companies or individuals inherited liability.12
From the late 1800s through the early 20th century, mine owners from individual
placer miners to the Anaconda conglomerate built a chain of extraction that spanned
much of Montana. Trees cut from western Montana and milled in places like Milltown
made their way to Butte, underlying railroad tracks and supporting mineshafts. The first
industrial smelting operations consisted of huge beds of whole trees laid out over
hundreds of square meters. Miners piled raw ore on these open roasting pits, set them on
fire, and let them burn for days, weeks, and sometimes months. The long, slow, burning
within these heaps melted valuable metals out the ore. Workers then further refined the
metal through more controlled melting (and burning of massive amounts of wood).
Finally, they poured the refined metal – mostly copper – into molds and loaded it on
trains headed for manufacturing facilities that spun the copper into wire. The commodity
chain continued until copper wire found its way into homes and businesses across
America, including Milltown, where the electricity from the local dam pulsed through
that same metal conduit.
But commodities weren’t the only things to come full circle to Milltown. Heap
roasting ore in Butte left behind massive piles of “mine tailings,” valueless rock,
including a cocktail of heavy metals. The roasting process also filled the skies with
smoke so thick that people sometimes carried lanterns at midday to guide themselves
down the city’s busy streets. After local women’s clubs won a series of court battles that
12
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shut down the practice of heap roasting in Butte because the acrid, sulfurous smoke killed
their flower and vegetable gardens, mine owners moved their smelting operations into the
nearby Deer Lodge Valley. In the valley, ranchers took up the fight against the smoke
that corroded the lungs of their cows and horses, killing many of the beasts within a year
of exposure. Unable to stop the smelting, ranchers turned to the federal government. By
1905 the federal government’s US Forest Service had placed its Region 1 office in nearby
Missoula. One of the Service’s first tasks was to enforce smoke abatement measures on
the mine and smelter owners in order to protect the surrounding National Forests from the
killing effects of the black plumes.13
Even as residents fought to move and then regulate smelter smoke, that fine
particulate matter fell to the ground. Rain and time acting on gravity’s mandate washed it
into the surface water along with the water-soluble heavy metals in the mountains of
tailings that defined portions of the landscape around the smelting works of Butte and
Anaconda. In Butte, toxic metals flowed into Silver Bow Creek, the headwaters of the
upper Clark Fork River. Smoke that rose and settled in the Deer Lodge Valley did so into
Warm Springs Creek, the river’s next major tributary. What was killing roses and
tomatoes in Butte, as well as livestock and conifer forests around Deer Lodge, began
decimating the river.14
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When ARCO purchased Anaconda assets in 1977, including the smelting
properties that defined the Deer Lodge Valley, the Clark Fork River floodplain from
Silver Bow Creek to Milltown was defined by stretches of barren stream bank, called
“slickens,” as much as it was by native willows and cottonwoods. The Milltown
reservoir alone contained nearly 2000 tons of arsenic, equal weight in lead, as well as
tens of thousands of tons of slightly less poisonous metals such as manganese, zinc, and
copper that had escaped extraction. The river washed a large portion of those metals
down to the dam during the flood of 1908. Shortly thereafter, the new dam’s engineer
was already worrying about the accumulation of copper in the turbines and other
equipment. In 1977 there was no Superfund law and people knew few of the details
about the extent of contamination in the Clark Fork, so ARCO had little reason to
consider their environmental liability.
Superfund law made liability for such messes transferable. Companies bought
liability along with their acquisition of assets. The law allowed the EPA to designate
corporations, government agencies, or individuals without “showing of fault or
negligence on the part of a defendant.” Accidents counted. The law was “retroactive and
progressive.” Toxic messes made long before or after passage of Superfund fell under its
purview. Time did not matter. And liability was “joint and several,” meaning that any
defendant responsible for some portion of the waste problem could be responsible for all
the problem, unless it proved that the pollution was “divisible.” The new Superfund law
strengthened all of these clauses, making elusive responsible parties, less so. The law’s
Records, reels 601, 146, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of
Montana. Letters from George Slack to A.H. Wethey, 1908, MC 268, Montana Power
Company Predecessor Company Records, 1880-1947, Box 23/Folder 2, Montana
Historical Society Archives, Helena, MT.
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supporters realized that, as at Milltown, toxic pollution often hid behind a proprietary
web stretching back through a century of American industrialization. Even ARCO
recognized its responsibility under these laws and was a willing PRP from the outset.15
For its part Champion International Corporation denied any responsibility
connected to the Superfund site. A company spokesman characterized his employer as
“an innocent owner of a minute portion of the property below the high water mark of the
reservoir.” In addition, he explained to the EPA that while Champion had “generated”
none of the offending toxins, it voluntarily helped Milltown residents acquire a new water
system and had contributed to Superfund cleanup efforts elsewhere, when the company
“was properly identified” as a PRP. That, according to Champion, did not include
Milltown.16
The Montana Power Company’s connection to the contamination was an
exception. The company had bought the dam in 1929. MPC never produced or
transported any of the reservoir’s offending toxins. But, according to the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act, intentions didn’t matter as much as results.
Beginning with the construction of the dam in 1906, the structure had caught and
accumulated heavy metal-laden sediments, especially during the flood of 1908. The dam,
by creating the reservoir, was responsible for the conditions that conveyed those heavy
metals into the surrounding groundwater and from there into people’s homes.
Maintenance of the dam included flushing sediments downstream. Plus, MPC actually
15
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owned portions of the land on which the reservoir pooled; hence the company was liable
for the sediments thereon. Yet, MPC denied its liability. Early in the Superfund process
at Milltown, that denial had legs. SARA’s general provisions about liability seemed to
implicate MPC, but a single anomaly let the company off the hook. In a single, short
paragraph buried in section 118(g) SARA absolved the Milltown Dam’s owners and only
that dam’s owners of liability for the toxins behind the structure. That exception was the
work of Montana’s Senator Max Baucus who helped craft the SARA bill. But it was a
short-lived exception that Congress struck from Superfund law before the EPA made its
final decision at Milltown.17
Even as the EPA designated PRPs at Milltown, the agency began more immediate
forms of enforcement. In particular, the Superfund law encouraged the EPA to draw on
state support. In that effort, the EPA assigned ARCO the responsibility of evaluating the
state’s legal power to implement what Superfund terms “institutional controls,” or “legal
mechanisms to regulate land use and access to prevent exposure to hazardous
substances.” This included laws such as zoning restrictions or water regulations, which
the EPA preferred states handle. But as the federal agency confided to Montana’s
director of DHES, Superfund implementation had taught the EPA “that many States and
localities lack adequate authority, resources, or commitment to make institutional
controls a viable component of remedial actions.” Superfund encouraged the EPA to
help states define, fund, and embrace their role in carrying out institutional controls. The
17
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EPA saw state aid as part of a “temporary remedy,” one that the state could put in place
quickly while the permanent remedies of the Superfund process played out. Increasing
state involvement in the Superfund program was one part of SARA that seemed to
reinforce the Reagan administration rhetoric of shifting regulatory power toward states.
In truth, the situation at Milltown demonstrated that the EPA sought quick and efficient
enforcement of the Superfund law by working with the state, rather than shifting power
from the federal to the state level.18
State agencies, of course, had already participated in the Superfund process at
Milltown and continued to do so. Most of that participation continued to concern MPC’s
licensing process, first as the dam owner’s petitioned to carry out Phase II rehabilitation
work, then as they applied for special extensions for simply operating the facility.
The company’s hopes of refurbishing the dam’s powerhouse and increasing its
power output faltered due to the reservoir’s Superfund status and its potential
responsibility. All of the state agencies involved (DHES, DNRC, and FWP) ultimately
opposed the improvements, as did the Clark Fork Coalition and the EPA. In the short
term, they all worried that further work on the dam risked flushing contaminated
sediments downstream. And since they did not consider Phase II an “emergency,” they
wished to avoid that risk. In the meantime, they all agreed that since MPC was a PRP
(albeit unwillingly) and since the FS, which might determine the dam’s ultimate fate, was
due out within a year, the dam owners should hold off on doing any more work to the
structure. What no one suspected at the time was that the dam would become the
18
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centerpiece of cleanup efforts and that the FS would take much longer to produce than
expected.19
The Montana Power Company tried to counter criticisms of its plan. The
company emphasized how Phase II did, in fact, include structural upgrades that would
make the dam safer and less likely to discharge its toxic holdings. Engineers blamed any
such releases during Phase I on “natural events,” rather than construction. At one point
MPC’s VP of engineering wrote that, “changes in water quality are often brought about
by natural occurences (sic) and are independent of pond level,” as if the tons of heavy
metal piled behind the dam had no bearing on the matter, or occurred naturally. As far as
the environmental impacts of these occurrences, whether natural or not, the company
claimed that a century of upstream mining had damaged the river so profoundly that what
happened with the dam was all but negligible. Using fish as an example, an MPC report
claimed that: “We do not agree with the conclusion that the presence of the dam
significantly reduces the recruitment of young fish to downstream areas.” The assertion
that the whole river was a wreck because of historic mining, and that the dam was of no
consequence, was meant to imply that MPC had little or no responsibility under
Superfund. All the while, the company seemed to be trying to diminish the magnitude of
the problem by referring to the site as the “pond” rather than the much bigger sounding
“reservoir,” which was in standard use at Milltown. Again, that may have been another
subtle attempt to escape PRP status.

19

Letter from James W. Flynn (FWP) to Kenneth Plumb (FERC), 2/24/1987; Letters
from EPA to FERC, 3/24/1986, 5/23/1986, 2/10/1987, 3/17/1987; Letter from CFC to
FERC, 3/25/1987, all in Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown
Administrative State Site Records, reels 169 and 150 Government Documents, Mansfield
Library, University of Montana.
107

Chapter 3: Placing the Blame

The one portion of the Phase II plan that eventually roused the most local
opposition was MPC’s choice of where to dump toxic sediments. During Phase I
“emergency” repairs, the company dredged sediments and dumped them, along with old,
possibly contaminated, dam materials in what was supposed to be a temporary disposal
site near the reservoir. That disposal site became another point of contention in the
debate over the second phase. In the fall of 1987, John Wardell informed FERC that
MPC’s disposal site “appears to be located within a floodplain and wetland.” At a place
where water contamination earned Superfund designation, that was not good. As
Montana’s EPA director, Wardell laid out the hazards of dumping even more sediment
there, if FERC permitted further dam rehab. The site had no liner to prevent the
movement of contaminants back into the surface or groundwater, nor was the site
safeguarded against floodwaters, and the disposal site’s placement in a floodplain or
wetland exposed many of the sediment’s fairly inert metals to the air (or oxygenated
water), which could, according to Wardell, increase their “toxicity and mobility.”
Wardell reminded FERC that since this was happening in a Superfund site, the EPA had
ultimate authority, especially since the issue concerned a PRP possibly spreading more
contaminants. Facing identical concerns voiced by the Clark Fork Coalition, MPC began
adjusting its plans.20
In October 1987, representatives from all the concerned parties convened for a
“Milltown Dam Rehab Meeting.” In spite of all the initial opposition, FERC and MPC
20
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seemed to make a clear case that the old dam needed further repairs for safety reasons,
which did not constitute an emergency, but were urgent, nonetheless. Since the EPA
officials admitted that a feasibility study was “no nearer being finished now than we were
a year ago” and might not be complete until “mid-1989,” that urgency would only
increase. Everyone agreed that the Phase I disposal site was chosen for its proximity and
practicality during emergency repairs and would not be suitable for further disposal. The
meeting ended with the EPA warning the company that if repairs progressed and the FS
eventually scuttled those repairs, there was no guarantee that the MPC would receive any
compensation.21
The one projection that the MPC got right was its rebuttal to stalling Phase II
because of the EPA’s FS. The FS was suffering delays and the company found it unfair
that its rehab permit should remain on hold indefinitely. And, had FERC simply put the
Phase II permit on hold until finalization of the FS, the rehab work would have sat in
limbo for another decade.22
In 1987, the EPA delayed the FS by deciding to focus on cleaning upriver sites
first before making a final decision about more work at Milltown. With Milltown’s FS
essentially on the slow track, MPC pushed even harder for its proposed rehab work,
making use of what the Clark Fork Coalition called in its fall newsletter, Currents, “the
same old scare tactics about instability of the dam.” The coalition was particularly upset
about MPC’s desire to forego an on-site monitor and to continue using a wetlands
21
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disposal site for sediment storage. All non-corporate parties opposed those choices, too.
The EPA, which had the final say, looked unlikely to support such measures as part of the
dam fix. Nonetheless, the CFC appealed to the company’s sense of environmental
responsibility, ending its commentary with the assertion that, “it’s time for MPC to prove
that they are worthy of an environmentally responsible reputation.” During a meeting
that included the EPA, FERC, state agencies, and the CFC, agency and local pressure
finally won out. In the winter edition of Currents, the CFC revealed that MPC had
acquiesced to the demands for a safer, though more costly, disposal site, one about six
miles upstream and well out of the river’s floodplain. In a demonstration of its power
through “institutional controls,” the state continued to insist that MPC meet water quality
standards throughout the proposed project, which would likely force the company to treat
river water passing through the construction site. The CFC, directed by Peter Nielsen,
had been involved at Milltown since the beginning of its Superfund designation. But it
was only in the late 1980s, during the debates that put the dam at the forefront of the
cleanup process that the coalition became the most important and publically recognized
local voice in those debates. It did so while enjoying the support of local citizens and
businesses. Just as it courted diverse support, the coalition spread its attention over a
variety of issues connected to its namesake watershed. Thus, it diverged from the image
of traditional grassroots environmental groups.23
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The Clark Fork Coalition’s influence was clear by the spring of 1988. In March,
the Missoulian announced that FERC had approved of dam improvements “to protect
safety, but the company cannot install an additional megawatt.” Power upgrades would
have to wait until after the EPA reached a decision on cleanup. MPC also faced all the
issues and requirements that the CFC had argued for: an on-site monitor would be
present during all construction, water quality standards would remain in place, and a new
off-site disposal area would replace the wetlands dump. The local newspaper’s editorial
called the decision “a remarkable result,” crediting “compromise” for diffusing “a heated
environmental controversy.” But that compromise soon began to unravel.24
Soon after the FERC ruling, MPC appealed its new permit. In its appeal the
company asked for FERC to extend its operating license for the Milltown dam, set to
expire in 1993, until 2015, as well as a guarantee that it would be able to increase its
power generation before the original expiration date. According to Peter Nielsen, the
appeal also sought to weaken language about an around-the-clock monitor and water
quality standards during construction. As the new appeal sat, MPC moved ahead with
actual work. By mid-summer it was drawing down the reservoir by a foot per day, a
much slower pace than usual, as required by its permit to protect against flushing toxins
downstream. The reservoir would be drained and ready for construction by July 18
according to dam engineers.25
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One reason that the details of the dam rehab garnered so much meticulous
attention locally was that concern for clean river water was in the news. As MPC was
appealing to weaken the restrictions in its permit, the city of Missoula was trying to get
its water supply system designated as a “sole source aquifer.” That federal designation
signified that the municipality obtained nearly all its potable water from a single
groundwater system. And under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, sole source
aquifers qualify for “an elevated level of protection.” That protection included a
restriction on federal dollars going to any project that might contaminate a sole source
aquifer, including money spent on Superfund sites. So, if the city’s bid succeeded, it
would force the EPA to enforce the strictest measures against releases of heavy metals
upstream of Missoula. At the same time, the city was working to clean its own water
resources. Working with the CFC, the city requested a stricter pollution control permit
from the state Department of Water Quality. The new permit increased water
monitoring, stricter sewage treatment standards, and, most importantly, set Missoula on
the path to follow a strong national trend of banning phosphate detergents. Nielsen’s
CFC helped both measures succeed.26
Locals concerned with their water saw the city’s arterial river, the Clark Fork, run
unseasonably dirty looking in mid-July 1988. The cause was MPC’s rehab project. After
receiving its final FERC permit on July 8, the company then had to hire a contractor and
obtain state building permits, which delayed the start of construction even as the reservoir
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sat empty. The first phase of work was the building of a temporary dam, or cofferdam,
above the permanent and problematic structure to prevent the sort of sediment scouring
and flushing that was causing the river to run dark and ominous according to the CFC.
Company officials and, eventually, state water quality monitors, assured the public that
the sediment-darkened river posed no human health risk. At the same time, state fisheries
biologist worried that the sediment could affect the downstream trout population by
killing insects on which they fed. Whether bugs, fish, or people were at risk, the CFC
and the EPA began taking independent water samples below the dam.27
MPC’s contractors commenced the $13 million project by building the cofferdam
just before the end of July, which helped clear the river’s water. That did not stop the
CFC from filing a formal complaint with the EPA about “a potential for continued release
of hazardous substances from the Milltown reservoir.” The complaint mustered evidence
correlating the dam drawdown and delay with the sediment flows and requested EPA
assistance with analyzing the coalition’s independently-gathered water and sediment
samples. Arguing that it should not “be the responsibility of a citizens group to pay for
lab analysis when hazardous substances have been released from an NPL site,” the
Coalition sought to draw on the continuous and cooperative relationship the local
environmental group had developed with the federal agency through the Superfund
process.28
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But good relationships with the federal government did not trump regulations.
The EPA had Montana’s DHES respond to the CFC, explaining that since the federal
agency had already empowered the state agency to sample and analyze river water from
the same sites during the same times that the coalition sampled the river, the
environmentalists’ efforts were both redundant and unauthorized within the EPA budget
and plan. However, the DHES hinted that the samples had greater value than just
figuring out how much damage the one-time sediment flush did to the river. The EPA
planned to include the information in its ongoing efforts to write a FS, which might
include “drawdown of the reservoir and/or dam retirement” as permanent solutions for
Milltown. The letter also revealed that of the three PRPs the EPA had designated that
spring, ARCO was the only one that had “responded positively” and “expressed an
interest in taking the lead at Milltown.” That lead-taking included sharing the
responsibility of producing a FS.29
As agreeable to its role of responsible party as ARCO seemed to be, MPC
remained problematic. As the EPA expedited the lab results from samples of
downstream river water, the agency also requested that the dam’s owners speed up their
construction schedule. Hurrying up construction, the EPA reasoned, would diminish the
likelihood of subsequent sediment flushing and, hence, the likelihood of having to extend
Superfund designation below the dam. MPC continued to balk at the notion that
substantial toxins had flowed below the dam during their initial drawdown. And, a
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company spokesman rebuffed the EPA request, saying that the company’s work schedule
was set, due to its dependency on the availability of construction materials.30
MPC’s actions caused discord. In the fall, Larry Thompson, a manager for the
Montana Power Company, and Peter Nielsen published side-by-side opinion pieces in
Montana newspapers. Whereas CFC’s newsletters tended to distill the bureaucratic
process and the science affecting the river, these editorials were the first public appeals
for people to take sides at Milltown. They also demonstrated the ongoing contests over
what science prevailed and whose interests the Superfund process served at Milltown.
Writing from his office in Butte, Thompson lauded his company’s efforts to
prevent toxins from moving downstream during construction, blamed any delays on the
federally-mandated permitting process (and interventions therein), and mustered the
results from its own data collection to make that case that MPC caused no significant
damage to the river. He even hinted that the dam had saved the lower river from all the
upstream mining wastes and should be seen as an environmental safeguard, rather than a
hazard. Thompson ended with a sneaky jab at the CFC that “despite publicity-seeking
claims, every test to date has shown Montana Power to be in compliance with exacting
water-quality standards.” Thompson tried to portray his employers as a responsible
community partner.31
In contrast to Thompson’s defensive language and propensity to detailed dates
and deadlines, Nielsen appealed to a more specific group of river users. He mixed
colloquialisms, like calling MPC and the state Water Quality Bureau’s assessment that no
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substantial toxic sediments washed downstream during construction “bad science,
extremely misleading and pure baloney.” He rendered the technical details of water
testing into lay descriptions, such as, “technicians threw water fleas into the samples, then
concluded after 48 hours that because the organisms didn’t die, the sediments were not
harmful.” After detailing other inadequacies of the state’s tests (as opposed to those the
CFC took and the state and EPA rejected using), Nielsen called the delays, which caused
the sediment flushing, deliberate on the part of MPC to force FERC into agreeing to its
request for a more lenient construction permit. In other words, the CFC claimed that
MPC essentially polluted the river as a tactic to gets its license extended until 2015.
Whereas Thompson made frequent rhetorical use of the pronoun “we” to refer to both his
company and his – hopefully agreeable – audience, Nielsen attempted to represent a
much more specific, local audience. Throughout, Nielsen aligned the Coalition’s
concerns with those of “fishermen, recreationists and residents of river communities.”
While confirming his organization’s efforts and successes including corporate support in
environmental issues, Nielsen ended his editorial by reporting that he was going to ask
his “governing board to terminate MPC’s membership.”32
The pointedly critical language in those letters marked the first real confrontation
over the Milltown Superfund site. Disagreements of that sort would ebb and flow during
the next decade as the decision about what to do with the dam and reservoir underwent its
own changes, including three feasibility studies. Yet the resulting decisions revealed a
level of cooperation belied by intermittent disagreements. That decision demonstrated
the power the Clark Fork Coalition’s threat to smear MPC’s environmental image held.
32
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During the summer of 1988, as MPC wrangled with the environmental
community and various agencies, the company also continued to deny its role as a
responsible party. From a funding standpoint, that meant that the EPA would have to
enforce a “fund lead” liability scheme. This meant that the federal agency would pay up
front for any expenditure at the Superfund site and then try to extract reimbursement from
PRPs later, through negotiations or adjudication. If the EPA ended up in court with a
PRP, Superfund law entitled the government to charge the defendants up to three times
the amount of the Superfund bill the agency incurred. That method of funding cleanup
work characterized Superfund’s earliest efforts, which were terribly inefficient. What
was happening at Milltown represented a changing liability scheme.
After Congress passed the SARA amendments in 1986, the EPA began pursuing
an “enforcement lead” strategy at Superfund sites. Even though the new legislation more
than quintupled federal funding for cleaning up the nation’s worst toxic messes, the EPA
began using its authority to force PRPs to fund cleanup work from its first stages through
its completion. Studies showed that assigning corporate responsibility early on
eliminated or reduced court time, reduced the cost and time of actual cleanup, as well as
keeping the Superfund in the black.
Reducing costs at cleanup sites was particularly important where mining waste
was the source of contamination. Mining sites tended to cost more than twice as much to
clean up as any other type of site. At Milltown, no one knew what the final bill would be
in 1988, but since the EPA first named its PRPs, ARCO, in contrast to MPC, had
accepted its responsibility. By doing so, the company participated in the EPA’s transition
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toward “enforcement lead” cleanups. Ultimately, ARCO bore the lion’s share of the
cleanup costs and responsibilities. But for the first few years following the flood of 1986,
most of the public attention and inter-organizational tensions involved MPC. Even in the
EPA’s 1988 “Initial Site Evaluation,” the agency scarcely mentioned ARCO, whereas it
detailed the ongoing permit negotiations between MPC and FERC.33
By the fall of 1988, the Montana Power Company faced further setbacks in its
efforts to relicense its dam and in its public perception. Initially, the dam owners and the
CFC made attempts to mend their relationship over the issue of fish. The environmental
group helped broker a deal between the company and the state in which MPC would
contribute $50,000 to study the fishery downstream of its dam aimed “to boost the river’s
fish population.” In exchange, the coalition and the state agreed to support MPC’s bid to
extend the dam’s license to 2015. In January 1989, FERC squashed that deal in its
surprise decision to disallow an immediate extension of the dam license. The decision
came as a result of the EPA’s continued insistence that the pending FS, which could
determine the dam’s fate, took priority over the company’s license. That would not be
the end of the relicensing story, but never again would the company apply for a long-term
license. Instead, “complete removal of the dam,” the last possible remedial action
(cleanup choice) buried in the EPA’s “Initial Site Evaluation’s” would incrementally
come to the fore, with the Coalition leading the way.34
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At the same time that MPC lost its license bid due to concerns about the longterm future of toxins in the river, local residents began to attack the company’s disposal
of toxic sediments on land. As part of the Phase II permit agreement, the dam owners
agreed to build an “upland disposal” site upriver from the dam and well out of the
floodplain. All of the parties involved in the permit negotiations consented to that plan.
But, the five families that lived within a few thousand feet of the new disposal area
weren’t part of the planning party. In a letter to MPC’s vice president, those residents
expressed their anger at being left out of the process, as well as about specific health
hazard concerns the site posed to their families. They complained of being “subjected to
large volumes of dust for at least three weeks, twenty four hours a day.” That dust, they
worried, contained toxic metals from the reservoir. Even after the dust settled, the
residents faced the economic loss of living next to a hazardous waste disposal site that
was temporary, but had no specified timetable for removal. Their list of financial losses
included “property devaluation, loss of development potential and inability to obtain
loans due to proximity of the dump.” Their initial letter ended by lamenting that the
disposal site infringed on the natural beauty that drew them to their current, and now
sullied, homes.35
Two months later, when an EPA project manager responded to the homeowners’
concerns, he failed to address the point that the Superfund process had left out of its
decision making the most locally-situated residents. Rather, he reaffirmed that the site
was probably temporary, pending the final Milltown cleanup plan, which he incorrectly
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assumed “will be made within the next couple of years.” Mostly he tried to assuage
worry by summarizing the safety of the temporary site, constructed under EPA
“guidance.” Unsatisfied, the residents penned a more thorough letter reiterating their
initial concerns, then detailing specific problems with the disposal site that they observed
during its construction and filling. These problems included possibly defective or
compromised plastic lining in the disposal pit and sloppy handling of hazardous
materials. The group closed this time with a battery of questions about responsibility for
the site’s construction and monitoring, as well as the demand that the EPA deem it
temporary regardless of the long-term solution to the rest of the Milltown reservoir. This
second letter forced more than a courteous response.36
Whereas local residents famously had taken two EPA agents hostage during the
conflict over hazardous waste at Love Canal, which had resulted in the passage of the
original Superfund legislation, it only took two letters from local homeowners to force a
thorough EPA response at Milltown. Between the Love Canal story in the late 1970s and
one of the largest Superfund projects in the country a decade later, the federal agency had
learned to respond much more quickly to homeowners’ questions, demands, and fears. In
fact, as Milltown illustrates, Superfund made public participation a fundamental part of
federal environmental cleanups. That transformation only really happened with the
renewal of Superfund in 1986, not with the 1980 bill. Touting the new law’s major
changes in the New York Times, U.S. Representative James Florio, who wrote the original
Superfund law, put increased public participation at the top of that list. Whereas
36
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previously Superfund obligated the EPA to inform citizens of its decisions, the new law,
in Florio’s words, gave people “the right to be involved in the decisions.” That is,
Superfund provided the means to institutionalize the most grassroots environmentalism.
Specifically, the EPA required FERC to address residents’ concerns and, more
importantly, forced MPC to review and respond to “the numerous allegations that the
Bonner Junction residents” made. MPC’s sixteen-page response countered every concern
presented by the homeowners with data about the company’s construction materials and
methods. But that didn’t let the company off the hook.37
The issue hit the newspapers when, nearly a year later, MPC applied for yet
another short extension of its license to operate the dam. The Bonner Junction residents
threatened to derail that process if the company didn’t meet some of their demands
regarding the upland disposal site. With the backing of the Clark Fork Coalition, the
state, the EPA, and, eventually, FERC, residents got MPC to agree to building tree-lined
earth berms to shield their homes from the disposal site. The dam owners also had to
commit $50,000 to study the improvement of fish habitat in the river. This episode in the
Milltown story illustrated how Superfund cleanup remained about mitigating immediate
or temporary hazardous wastes in the course of finding permanent solutions.38
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While MPC came under fire for its temporary disposal site, a permanent fix for
the Milltown site crept forward. By the summer of 1988, the reservoir’s major
responsible party, ARCO, had agreed to its PRP status in general and had begun
participating in the process of completing a feasibility study. ARCO’s consent was the
ideal scenario intended by the recently-revamped Superfund legislation. This
“enforcement lead” option, in which the responsible party pays for work under EPA
direction, saved time and money. ARCO also proved an ideal PRP because the company
did not lack the latter. The company’s first quarter report for 1989 indicated a net income
of $704 million, which was up more than 75% from the previous year. On top of those
gains, ARCO set aside $345 million, part of which was “for future environmental
expenses.” As one of America’s top ten largest energy companies (mostly oil and gas),
ARCO had the deep pockets that the Superfund law aimed to pick in order to pay for
historic environmental degradation. That was especially important as Superfund neared
its tenth birthday. Some of the strongest criticism about Superfund targeted the
program’s inability both to oversee timely cleanups and to make polluters pay. As an
Associated Press story in 1989 pointed out, a recent Rand Institute study reported that of
the 1175 Superfund sites on the NPL, the EPA had declared only 34 fully cleaned in
nearly a decade. Furthermore, corporate polluters had “paid less than a tenth of the cost”
that Superfund had incurred in that time period. With similar critiques of Superfund
failures appearing regularly in the national press, laying responsibility on solvent and
culpable companies like ARCO was important; making that responsibility stick even
more so.39
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Perhaps ironically, ARCO’s deep pockets had little to do with their holdings in
the Clark Fork River basin. When the company bought the Anaconda Company in 1977
it was part of a plan to diversify and grow. ARCO had recently expanded its oil drilling
in Alaska and internationally, as well as increasing its refining and marketing capacity in
the US. The company owned 21% of the Alaska Pipeline, which at a final price tag of
$10 billion was the most expensive private construction project in US history when it first
transported oil pumped from the continent’s largest oil field in Prodhoe Bay, AK, in
1977. Executives hoped that the company could add copper mining to its portfolio with
the acquisition of Butte mines and the smelter works located in Anaconda, Montana.
Under the leadership of CEO Robert O. Anderson, ARCO grew its oil business, but the
Anaconda mining purchase proved a financial burden. By the time the EPA designated
Milltown one of its first Superfund sites in 1983, ARCO had abandoned all mining
operations in Montana due to slumping copper prices and inexperience in the business.
By 1986, new chief executive, Lodwrick M. Cook, began to pare the company’s less
profitable holdings. The strategy of concentrating on high profit operations worked, with
the major exception of ARCO’s Montana properties. Superfund liability made it virtually
impossible for the company to sell its shuddered mining and smelting operations, with the
exception of some of Butte’s open pit mines. Montana entrepreneur Dennis Washington
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Administrative State Site Records, reel 144 and 241, Government Documents, Mansfield
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bought a few such pits for $18 million in 1985. He negotiated the purchase so that
ARCO retained liability and within a decade and a half would turn nearly $1 billion in
profit from the deal. Meanwhile, ARCO had to deal with the mess.40
In addition to putting responsible parties in charge of Superfund work, SARA
encouraged more state participation in the process. In the case of Milltown, the state’s
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences took the lead in providing both ARCO
and MPC with a “Scoping Document,” which outlined a work plan for completing the
FS. That may have increased the advisory role of the state agency but true enforcement
still fell to the EPA. And enforcement was still in order since MPC continued to deny its
designation as a PRP. The dam owners consented to attend meetings, but they claimed,
only because the Superfund process would likely affect their structure, not because they
had any financial obligation. Even when the EPA served MPC an “Administrative Order
of Consent” that outlined its responsibility, the company refused to sign it. In turn, the
EPA politely informed the recalcitrant company of the exact due date for signing and
acknowledging their responsibility, as well as the schedule of work thereafter. In a
November, 1989, meeting, the EPA finally threatened MPC, asserting “its preference was
for a negotiated consent order,” although “if negotiations failed, other options were
available to it.” Those other options included a penalty of up to $25,000 per day if the
company continued to deny EPA orders, or issuing a “unilateral order” to MPC for up to
three times the costs the EPA incurred doing work it deemed the company’s
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responsibility. Either way, the Superfund authority amounted to a big financial stick
wrought in the new Superfund law.41
During this same period, as the EPA encouraged state involvement, the agency
decentralized its own authority. The 1986 SARA bill still contained clauses from the
original Superfund law that vested authority in the US President. In reality, after the
passage of SARA, authority moved in the direction of the EPA regions. On most cleanup
decisions, the president deferred to the EPA Administrator, who, in turn, extended similar
deference to the Director of each EPA Region. Similarly, more money went to regional
offices following the passage of the new bill. Five years after Reagan signed SARA, the
EPA was allocating forty-three percent of its budget to regional offices, up from just
fifteen percent when the original Superfund law took effect. Through these delegations
Superfund oversight became more local. That was especially true for states, like
Montana, that had a sub-regional headquarters. For Milltown that meant that the real seat
of EPA power was the Region VIII office in Denver and the state office in Helena.42
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Even as the EPA tried to shift the financial burden of a Superfund site to PRPs,
the agency had to grapple with its older model of paying for actions out of the public
coffers and collecting from corporations later. It wasn’t until mid-1989 that the EPA
took ARCO to court in an effort to recover some of the $6.3 million the agency had spent
in its emergency responses at Milltown. This was different than suing the company.
Rather, Superfund legislation allowed for “Judicial Consent Decrees” wherein a court
supervised the reimbursement by PRPs to the EPA for work already done. It was still a
consensual contract. And it was a formality, rather than a legal battle with ARCO, since
the company continued to agree to all of its responsibilities at Milltown.43
As the EPA shifted from its older pay-first-collect-later model toward its newer
mandate to enforce work, the agency also began implementing ways to include more
public participation, some of which originated with Milltown. During the summer of
1989, the EPA began holding meetings with a “Citizen’s Advisory Group.” The point of
these meetings was to gather input from the public, as well as keep people informed of
what was happening at Milltown. The citizen’s groups and the meetings were not
original. Superfund included a provision that allowed such groups to apply for grant
money to help affected communities organize, distribute, and collect information.
Through its meetings, the EPA helped the Milltown group apply for three quarters of a
million dollars for those purposes. What was unique and formative about the Milltown
group was its request to observe “the upcoming negotiations with PRPs.” Although the
43
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EPA denied local citizens that right, the agency did begin releasing summaries of all its
dealings with PRPs to the public, through the advisory group. The decision to do so was,
according to the EPA, “innovative” and marked the opening of a process that “used to be
secretive.” Similarly, the EPA’s regional project manager endorsed additional,
innovative ways that his agency would include the public in the Superfund process. In a
letter to the Clark Fork Coalition, Ken Wallace wrote, “EPA is committed to doing its
endangerment assessment work in a public forum – something that EPA has not done
before.” Allowing the public to observe and comment on the agency’s efforts to identify
all the hazards posed by the Milltown Superfund site included designating a special
Endangerment Assessment Committee. Wallace committed the EPA to funding the
committee and “paid advertisements in the paper” in the hopes of attracting public input.
His hope was that “full public involvement will become a routine part of the remainder of
site work.” This change marked one more way in which Milltown increased the
importance and impact of public participation in national cleanups. Or as Wallace noted,
“the manner in which we plan on conducting the endangerment assessment for this site
potentially signals a shift in policy toward much greater public participation in
Superfund.”44
Once again, when it came to public participation, Milltown would reshape the
way the process worked. And that reshaping would take far longer than the anticipated
two-year time period. In early 1990, the EPA wrote a press release encouraging the
public to comment on ARCO’s work plan for a feasibility study. The study was
44
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supposed to be a two-year endeavor at the end of which the EPA would again solicit
public comment on the cleanup options that were the centerpiece of any FS. The EPA
considered the public’s thoughts on the list of solutions the most important part of the
process.45
Anticipating the two-year wait, MPC filed a request with FERC for a six-year
license extension. Foregoing a full relicensing, the company demanded no repayment by
the EPA if the Superfund solution at Milltown reservoir impacted the dam. In fact, in the
permit request, MPC recognized that the reservoir’s designation had “elevated
Milltown’s status from an ordinary dam to an extraordinary dam.” The company also
used the opportunity to take a subtle jab at the federal law that kept thwarting its efforts,
writing that: “From amending its license, to reconstructing the dam, and finally, and
perhaps most tellingly, to relicensing, MPC, state and federal agencies and the public
have discovered the pervasive influence of CERCLA.” Without acknowledging its own
responsibility for the site or the FS, MPC argued that even if ARCO and EPA finished
the FS within two years (by 1992), the company’s license would be on the verge of
expiration and it would not have time to renew it. Thus, it was reasonable to give the
company a short-term extension, which would run from 1993-1999, by which time the FS
should have been completed and a solution at Milltown underway. Of those possible
solutions, MPC mentioned the complete removal of its dam. If that were to happen, it
claimed, a short-term license made perfect sense.
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In some ways, it appeared that MPC was acting with remarkable prescience. No
one at the time was advocating or seriously considering dam removal, yet the dam’s
owners were hedging that bet. This new arrangement met with more approval than
almost anything MPC had done since the issue of their dam repairs and licensing arose.46
In its approval of the six-year extension, the Clark Fork Coalition summarized the
ways in which MPC had met nearly every one of its demands, even if the company
hadn’t yet consented to being a PRP. MPC had addressed Bonner residents’ concerns
about its upland disposal site. It had signed a contract with Montana’s Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks to begin studying fish mitigation possibilities at the dam. And
the company’s application included a clause acknowledging the Superfund cleanup might
affect the way it operated the dam, for which MPC would take responsibility. FERC
granted the extension by early 1990, citing all of those reasons. The extension put off
MPC’s need to apply for a new license until 1994 since FERC required a five-year lead
time for full license renewals. It appeared that the Superfund timeline and MPC’s
machinations over its dam had finally aligned. But that alliance wouldn't last long.
Delays in completing the feasibility study, followed by an unprecedented treble rewriting
of the FS, meant that more than another decade would elapse before the involved parties
came to a consensus over a permanent solution to the Milltown site.47

46

MPC to FERC, “Application of the Montana Power Company for Amendment of
License to Extend the Date for Termination of the License,” 4/10/89, in Environmental
Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel
148, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
47
Letter from Peter Nielsen (CFC) to FERC, 7/7/1989; FERC, “Order Extending Term of
License,” 2/28/1990; FERC, “Application of the Montana Power Company for
Amendment of License to Extend the Date for Termination of the License,” 3/14/1994 in
Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site
129

Chapter 3: Placing the Blame

The longer-than-expected timeline for finding a permanent fix to a major portion
of the nation’s largest Superfund complex had two significant benefits, both of which
came into view during MPC’s early relicensing struggles. First, the methodical nature of
coordinating multiple government agencies and provisions within Superfund combined to
provide the time and mechanisms for ever-greater public participation. As the EPA and
ARCO deliberated over the FS and the dam owners crept through the permit process,
local residents learned more and more about what was happening in and to their major
watershed. Through press releases, newsletters, public meetings, and letter writing (most
of which the EPA and Clark Fork Coalition promoted, if not funded) citizens digested the
basics of the Superfund process, they kept abreast of early cleanup work, and had (or
created) opportunities to voice their opinions. In cases like the wetland, then upland
disposal sites that MPC used, what people opined altered what the company did with its
toxic wastes.
In addition, the environment benefitted for the ever-lengthening Superfund
process. Public inputs also led the way to this second result. While Milltown inched
toward a long-term cleanup plan, the Clark Fork River experienced incremental
improvements. As awareness of the fouled river grew, the city of Missoula banned
harmful detergents and upgraded its sewage treatment plant. MPC’s license extensions
increasingly included provisions for mitigating effects of the dam’s operation on fish and
wildlife. The company had to slow and more closely monitor its drawdowns. It funded
fish passage studies, as well as wetland development projects to make up for its disposal
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site gaffes. In these ways, Superfund’s mandate to cleanup places laid to waste by major
industry bore proverbial fruit, such as a cleaner river, long before even a list of possible
remedies emerged. That is, the process of being a Superfund site improved Milltown,
even as the final product remained unclear.
What did become clear was that the Milltown Dam was going to be a major part
of fixing the toxic reservoir, even if the dam’s owners persisted in denying their liability.
Indeed, MPC may well have been the first to take seriously the idea of removing the dam,
although it would eventually oppose that option just as it objected to its financial
responsibility during the early going. Almost as ironically, ARCO, the company that
most readily accepted its liability at the outset and embraced the chance to study and
write the initial feasibility study, would end up fighting the eventual solution therein. But
before all that came to pass, floodwaters would once again alter the process at Milltown
by threatening to destroy the dam, which raised public concern and participation.
Figuring out a final solution at Milltown took another decade, another flood, and a fish,
among other things. All of these, time, water, and wildlife made people look ever harder
at the dam.
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This is our one chance in history to bring this area back from a century of pollution.
Montana Rep. Mike Kadas, D-Missoula on House
Bill 305 to continue funding the state’s lawsuit
against ARCO (1995).

Shortly after the designation of Milltown as a Superfund site in 1983, George
Ochenski went snorkeling down a stretch of the upper Clark Fork River. Ochenski’s
outing was certainly an anomaly among popular, or even conceivable, uses of the river.
It was less so in the context of the man’s life. As a sponsored mountain climber,
Ochenski had participated in the first ascent of the “west face of Alaska’s Mount Hayes”;
he had taught himself the art of cobbling mountaineering boots in an age of mass
production; and he lived in a marginally restored cabin in a rather remote Montana ghost
town. Yet Ochenski was no hermit from society. A free-lance journalist and autodidactic
environmental scientist, he also worked for the Montana Environmental Information
Center during its campaign to help get Milltown on the EPA’s National Priority List in
the early 1980s. Having published stories about the history of the industrial mining and
smelting that had made a wreck of the Clark Fork River and warning people of the perils
of ignoring that wreck, when Ochenski donned mask, snorkel, fins, wetsuit, kneepads,
and “a fanny pack holding three cans of beer,” he knew what he was getting into.
In addition to knowing the river’s history, Ochenski had river snorkeling
experience. Ochenski had run a number of Rocky Mountain rivers, including a thirtyeight mile pass down the Salmon River in Idaho and a run of the whitewater-filled
section of Montana’s Madison River “famous for biting kayaks in half.” Reflecting on
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the pummeling he took during that latter venture, Ochenski admitted he may have made
“a miscalculation.” Snorkeling the flat water of the upper Clark Fork held a far different
purpose for Ochenski. He hoped to see what lived in the river, rather than simply try to
live through the experience himself.
After hearing about the Montana River Snorkelers Association and its
membership of one, nature writer David Quammen decided to join Ochenski on one of
his obscure outings. The article Quammen wrote for Outside magazine was certainly the
most attention Ochenski’s solo endeavors had ever gained. The article allowed a fraction
more people to gain a fish eye’s view of western Montana’s largest and deadest river.
Still, snorkeling the Clark Fork touched few people’s lives. Few people actually saw, as
Quammen marveled, how “the rocks of the stream bed were largely cemented together
with silt, leaving no habitat.” Few looked in vain for a single fish or aquatic insect. Yet
what the pair of snorkelers saw, or failed to see, would eventually help change the course
of Superfund action along the Clark Fork.
While Ochenski’s method of seeing the river was rare, many other people began
to consider the overall health of the Clark Fork. Superfund required no one to stick his or
her face directly into the river, but it did carry the requisite of research. Just as Ochenski
turned his masked eyes directly on the ecological well being, or poor being, of the river,
others took on the task of looking at that same damaged ecology through other lenses.1
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By the mid-1990s, a growing body of research explained that periodic floods had
washed the toxic sediment from Butte mine tailings and Anaconda smelter works.
Whereas the normal flow of the Clark Fork River carried a trickle of the poisons, it was
massive spring run-off that was responsible for piling heavy metal-laden silt behind the
Milltown Dam and encrusting nearly 120 miles of floodplain. The flood of 1908 that
nearly destroyed the dam had done most of that work.
The same EPA-mandated study efforts also began to reveal a much more detailed
picture of the damage more than a century of industrial mining had had on the Clark Fork
River and the Milltown Reservoir. Under the direction of the EPA and the watch of local
river advocates like the Clark Fork Coalition, the Atlantic Richfield Company continued
to pay for the bulk of this research. Corporate-funded, contract research proved how
corporate pollution had harmed everything from water-borne bugs and earthworms, to
native fish and generations of people. And that damage was not an inert, historic fact.
River users continued to lament the degraded condition of the watershed. In spite of the
human health emphasis within Superfund law, it wasn’t until a decade after federal
designation under that law that citizens began to wonder publically about how the
contamination had actually affected them. And following intense thunderstorms, schools
of belly-up fish floated down the Clark Fork and into the public eye and ire.
The attention and information on how toxic waste had imperiled aquatic
resources, and continued to do so, amplified the first, largest, and most contested lawsuit
of the Superfund process at Milltown. The same year Ochenski snorkeled the nearly
barren Clark Fork River, the state government utilized a Superfund provision to sue
ARCO for damages that western Montana’s legacy of industrialization had inflicted on
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the environment. Trying to recoup the loss of natural resources plunged state agencies
and the major responsible party in the Clark Fork Superfund history into a long and
contentious legal battle, the settlement of which would set the parameters and provide the
funding for the transition from containing toxic waste to restoring the environment. But
it was the attention on overall Clark Fork River ecology that spiked following the death
of a few thousand fish in 1989 that transformed the state’s suit from a rather small
endeavor to a major, restorative component of the river’s Superfund history. Actual
restoration work was a long way off, but its origins lay in allowances in Superfund law
and the ability of the state to capitalize on those allowances.
Detailed study of river health on the Clark Fork came out of a larger transition
within the EPA to streamline the federal government’s efforts to address perennially
strong public concern for the environment. As criticism mounted about the wastefulness
of the nation’s signature toxic waste cleanup program, the EPA tried to rationalize
Superfund law, emphasizing better scientific research, clearer cleanup standards, and a
keener eye for cost-benefit analysis. The case of Milltown illustrated the implementation
of all three of these new, national priorities for Superfund.

Just as the Montana Power Company shored up its relicensing ordeal with a sixyear extension, the Atlantic Richfield Company took center stage in the Milltown and
Clark Fork Superfund process. The company did so in the dual roles of protagonist and
antagonist, continuing to craft the Superfund-mandated feasibility study, which would
ultimately spell out permanent solution options at Milltown, while simultaneously
combating the state’s efforts to recover damages for the historic destruction of its natural
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resources. On the one hand, ARCO was fulfilling the role of cooperative corporate
partner that was the ideal of Superfund. On the other hand, the company embroiled the
state of Montana in the kind of litigation that Superfund critics claimed was the
legislation’s weak point.
In the public eye, the company’s villainous side emerged in the summer of 1989
with the headlines, “Government sues ARCO.” The Missoulian’s report actually dealt
with the EPA’s efforts to get the company to reimburse Superfund for some of the
emergency work already accomplished along the upper Clark Fork, especially the new
Milltown water supply, completed in 1985. That suit was a formality, ARCO having
already recognized its liability for those duties. While it was “the first attempt to recover
Superfund costs in Montana,” the two sides were really only negotiating over whether or
not the EPA had provided “adequate documentation of agency costs.” The federal
government’s $5.7 million claim on the company was for remediation, which Superfund
defined as a host of possible actions “to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment.” Essentially, this meant containing wastes,
or curing the symptoms therefrom. That was the essence of Superfund as it was first
written. Quick, emergency actions, such as replacing the drinking water supply at
Milltown, were also “the unsung success story of the Superfund program,” according to a
thorough analysis of the program by the Brookings Institution. Dwarfing the initial
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federal claim, what the state asked for pointed toward a new and different goal of
Superfund.2
The federal suit pressed ARCO for money it had already spent; now the state
wanted money for future expenditures. Specifically, the state Department of Health and
Environmental Sciences (DHES) had filed a claim against ARCO back in 1983, “seeking
$50 million in compensation for damage to natural resources.” That was the maximum
amount the original Superfund law allowed states to claim against a PRP in lieu of
damaged environments. The new Superfund law passed in 1986 removed that cap and
liberalized federal, state, and local government’s or individual’s abilities to pursue such
claims, as well as emphasized that the money was for restoration. The DHES’s
remunerative demands would soon increase; ARCO would fight the case for years; and,
the issue would come to encompass far more than the dead fish that touched it off.3
Industrial runoff had killed fish in the Clark Fork for a century by the time the
state sued ARCO. But it was only since designation of the river as a Superfund site that
the exact causes and blame for the deaths became well known. In their suit the state
claimed that since at least the 1860s, ARCO’s “predecessors-in-interest” had injured
natural resources, including “fish, wildlife, surface water, groundwater, soil, and
vegetation.”4

2

Bill Wilke, “Government sues ARCO, wrecking firm,” Missoulian, 6/27/1989, B1.
CERCLA, Section 9601, “Definitions,” http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/usc.cgi?ACTION=RETRIEVE&FILE=$$xa$$busc42.pt2.wais&start=15609073&SI
ZE=76006&TYPE=TEXT. Probst, Fullerton, Litan, and Portney, Footing the Bill for
Superfund Cleanups.
3
Missoulian Editorial, “Arco offer is only a start,” Missoulian, 8/18/1989, A6.
4
“1999 Consent Decree in Montana vs. ARCO,” see:
http://www.doj.mt.gov/lands/lawsuithistory.asp
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Once again, what was actually happening in the environment sparked a change.
Fish-killing events amplified general concern about the loss of the state’s natural
resources. “It was Armageddon revisited,” dramatized the Missoulian in July, 1989, in
reference to a thunderstorm that washed enough old toxins off the riverbanks and into the
Clark Fork to kill “thousands of fish” along at least 18 miles of the waterway. As state
FWP biologists tried to assess the exact damages, the Clark Fork Coalition’s Peter
Nielsen recalled that at least seven documented disasters of identical nature had occurred
since 1981, when Milltown had first come to the EPA’s attention.
Ire turned on ARCO. As the local newspaper reported, “area sportsmen said they
were angry that all the federal and state studies have yet to result in any action to protect
the fishery.” The truth was that ARCO had been working to build a “temporary diversion
dam” meant to channel rain water rushing over especially contaminated sections of the
upper river into settling ponds. The dam and the ponds were meant as a “Band-Aid” to
prevent or lessen acute poisoning of the fishery until more thorough and permanent
remediation work commenced, but spring high water had prevented progress on their
building.5
Following the fish kill of 1989, letters from University of Montana scientists, the
CFC, and riverside residents addressed to both the EPA and the DHES lamented the
recurring problem and pressed the agencies for a more permanent solution. These letters
also emphasized how major fish kills were poignant symptoms of a much bigger

5

John Stromnes, “Clark Fork fish kill: Old toxins wipe out trout along 18 miles of river;”
“Arco says high water delayed dam project,” Missoulian, 7/14/1989, A1; 7/15/1989, B1.
Also see: Steve Woodruff, “Clark Fork killer: Biologist says he’s cracked the case of the
dying fish,” Missoulian, 7/28/1987, 1; and Sherry Devlin, “Legacy of Pollution: State
report documents Clark Fork River fish kill,” Missoulian, 6/8/1993, A1.
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problem: a lethally degraded watershed. As CFC director Peter Nielsen put it, aside from
periodic, acute killings, the river suffered from “this low-level leaching long-term into the
water system,” which left the fishery with a fraction of the fish it could support. None of
this was a revelation. But it did lend support to the state’s actions against ARCO.6
The company’s response to the 1989 fish kill was as much an attempt to
ameliorate the $50 million state claim as it was about making amends for the recent
events. In addition to fortifying the temporary dam and building similar berms around
other toxic-laden stretches of the upper river, ARCO offered to contribute $1 million to
state coffers “for use in mitigating environmental problems affecting the Clark Fork
River.” Attached to the funds was a request that the money would be in lieu of further
state action on the matter of the recent fish kill. But the state was more interested in
pursuing a more thorough and expensive claim, of which fish kill incidents were evidence
of a much bigger issue.
Under the Superfund provision that empowered governments to sue PRPs for
losses of natural resources, Montana hoped to restore the upper Clark Fork to its “preEuropean condition.” The laws section on “natural resources liability” specifically
allowed claimants to pursue money “to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such
natural resources” as had been damaged or destroyed. The law offered no definition of
what restoration meant. The Clark Fork Coalition supported the state’s suit but warned
6

Letter from Johnnie Moore (UM) to Donald Pizzini (DHES), 11/8/1989; letters from
Pizzini to Vicki Watson (UM) and Peter Nielsen (CFC), 11/9/1989; letter from Pizzini to
Moore, 11/20/1989; letter from Nielsen to John Wardell (EPA), 5/8/1990; letter from
Cindy Nelson (Deer Lodge Valley Conservation District) to DHES, 5/14/1990, in U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site
Records, reels 565, 602, 602, 565, 565 Government Documents, Mansfield Library,
University of Montana. Also, Butte (AP), “’Chronic’ fish mortality affects Clark Fork,”
Missoulian, 10/15/1989, B5.
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that the agencies involved were underfunded and generally unprepared to pursue their
claim adequately, much less envision a river in “pre-European condition.” Aware of the
magnitude of taking on ARCO, by the fall of 1990 the governor’s office was hiring a
natural resources damage coordinator and appointing a special task force, the Natural
Resource Damage Litigation Program (NRDLP), to oversee the suit. The CFC remained
leery about whether those additions were enough to take on the job of determining the
health of the watershed before mining or Europeans arrived, what a century of damages
amounted to, and what it would take to undo those damages. About the state’s hopes of
moving past remediation, CFC scientist Phil Tourangeau speculated that “(i)n the best of
all worlds the Clark Fork would return to its pre-mining state. Realistically, I don’t know
if that will ever happen.” That work certainly wasn’t going to happen with $50 million,
even if the state managed to win that amount. But that proved to be a long battle, which
didn’t enter the courtroom until 1997.7

As the state slowly moved forward with its suit, the federal government
proceeded at a similar pace with its oversight of remediating the Clark Fork.
Specifically, the EPA and ARCO continued to work toward producing a feasibility study,
on which the fate of the Milltown Reservoir hinged. One of the main reasons it took so
long to produce this important document that listed possible solutions for a Superfund
site was the ongoing concern about public participation.

7

Missoulian Editorial, “Arco offer is only a start,” Missoulian, 8/18/1989, A6. Sherry
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More than any other group or individual, the Clark Fork Coalition pushed the
issue of how, when and to what degree, the public participated in the process. In addition
to keeping an eye on the recent fish kill and counseling the state on its lawsuit, CFC
director Peter Nielsen repeatedly requested that the EPA include more local input, or at
least define the parameters of that input. As the summer of 1989 got under way, Region
8 EPA director John Wardell wrote to Nielsen assuring him that the coalition’s and other
local views of the FS work plan “are being factored in to the final draft.” Wardell also
offered that public input would precede “negotiations with PRPs.” In other words, the
EPA planned to consider people’s thoughts before those of ARCO. Even though federal
and court regulations disallowed the public or the CFC to be part of negotiations with
PRPs, Wardell wrote that “CERCLA regulations and common sense demand that we do
more, by providing information to the public, and by providing for meaningful public
input throughout the process.” In more congenial language, the regional director also
assured Nielsen that, “(i)f you have specific suggestions on how to improve this situation,
I would like to discuss them with you.” Recognizing the importance of the coalition as a
window into public sentiment and a medium of good public relations, Wardell wrote that
“(a)ny help in this effort by your organization would be appreciated.” CFC’s help, along
with public input, left its imprint on both the process and the final product.8
The EPA made efforts to explain the role of public participation to the local
public. In May, 1990, regional administrators held a “Citizens’ Superfund Workshop” in
Missoula. Along with explaining the entire Superfund process from first identifying

8

Letter from Wardell to Nielsen, 6/27/1989, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel 241 Government
Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
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toxic waste sites through supervising remediation, the workshop included a detailed
discussion of “citizen involvement.” In particular, participants learned all the ways in
which EPA both dispenses information to the public and asks for input. The emphasis
was on how the process operates as a two-way street.9
Superfund mandated many of the ways in which the EPA engaged the public, but
the reality of public input was not wholly governed by codification. One Region 8
administrator described the way written law becomes lived reality as, “(h)ere in the
Regions is where the rubber hits the road.” She went on to explain that it’s in local and
regional EPA offices, at public meetings, on job sites, in local libraries or other public
venues where citizens approach federal officials wanting to know whether or not a site is
going to give everyone cancer or produce babies full of birth defects. In other words,
outside the law and outside the formal workshops explaining it, most people understand
Superfund through the lens of very personal concerns. Superfund provides a venue in
which, and personnel at whom, people can direct those concerns.
The EPA realized from early on in Superfund implementation that harnessing,
even institutionalizing, public input was essential. In addition to publishing frequent
articles about the topic, the EPA Journal devoted an entire issue in 1985 to “EPA and the
Community.” In his introduction, EPA director Lee M. Thomas claimed “(i)t is possible
that we attract more intense interest – in the form of letters, phone calls, and attendance at
local hearings – than any other agency of the federal government.” Hence, the agency
needed to manage that interest. While acknowledging that most interest in Superfund is
9

U.S.EPA, Region VIII, “Citizens’ Superfund Workshop,” 5/5/1990, in U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site
Records, reel 241 Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.

142

Chapter 4: Seeing the River

very local and “grassroots” – not entwined with national environmental groups,
Superfund community relations experts wrote that “ a high level of community
involvement in a hazardous waste problem and the development of opposition to
government plans are usually linked to the way citizens believe they have been treated by
the government.” So part of EPA’s goal is public relations, providing clear, accurate, and
timely information to citizens. But “the program aims at two-way communication,”
according to the experts. In fact, the EPA ideal for Superfund is a conflict-free process in
which, “highly noticeable modifications are unlikely because planning can be
continuously responsive to community needs.” Citing numerous examples, EPA experts
emphasized the point that citizen input changes Superfund actions, especially during the
writing and debate over the feasibility study.10
People around Milltown directly benefited from the EPA effort to increase public
involvement. In fact, Superfund encouraged new forms of environmental activism. The
Superfund legislation passed in 1986 funded communities to form technical advisory
committees. These TACs could receive up to $50,000 per year. As an EPA news release
about the formation and funding of the Milltown TAC explained, the money allowed
citizen representatives to “hire an independent technical advisor to help them understand
and comment on technical factors in cleanup decisions affecting the Milltown and
Missoula communities.” These grants were another way that Superfund institutionalized
grassroots environmentalism. The Milltown grant disallowed recipients from using its

10

David Wann (EPA, Region VIII), “On the Firing Line: The Challenge of
Environmental Risk in Region 8,” EPA Journal, (November, 1987): 30. Lee M. Thomas,
“The Challenge of Community Involvement;” Daphne Gemmill and Edwin Berk,
“Community Involvement in Superfund: The Results,” EPA Journal, (December, 1985):
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allotted funds for organizing citizens. Rather, it was explicitly for informing the
committee and encouraging their participation in EPA-designated forums. The groups
would join a host of other “civic and conservation groups” under the umbrella of the
Milltown EPA Superfund Site committee (MESS). MESS, started as a citizens
committee by the CFC in 1986, illustrated the diversity present even in local, grassroots
organizations. It also provided and example of how local environmentalism was not a
reaction to or against national environmental politics in the 1980s, but, at times, a
codified and supported part of them. Superfund encouraged new environmentalists.
MESS chairperson Tina Reinicke-Schmaus knew nothing about the EPA,
Superfund or any of the agencies involved at Milltown until she began wondering about
the backhoes and trucks rumbling through in her neighborhood on the southeast side of
the reservoir. Upon learning that the machines were creating the disputed “upland
disposal site,” she got involved. Writing in the group’s newsletter, she attested that,
“members…came from diverse backgrounds: housewives, homeowners, the state fish and
wildlife department, Missoula City/County Health Department…Trout Unlimited,
MontPIRG, the Clark Fork Coalition and the Milltown Water Users.” In addition to
social diversity, the group dealt with many issues stemming from Milltown, rather than
the single-issue focus attributed to most grassroots efforts. Their focus was the watershed
– a place or ecosystem – not a single issue. Early on, MESS was charged with working
alongside the EPA, the state, and PRPs on various environmental risk assessments of the
watershed.11

11

U.S. EPA news release, 4/5/1991; Tina Reinicke-Schmaus, “A Crash Course in
Superfund,” in MTAC News, February, 1993, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel 397, 601 Government
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Risk assessments were a step toward a completed feasibility study. Meetings and
comment periods ran through most of 1991 in preparation for a FS due in 1992-1993.
Many of the comments addressed the various risk assessment reports that the FS required.
During a spring, 1991, comment period, the Missoula Water Quality Advisory Group,
which consisted of “hydrologists, soil scientists, water chemists, engineers and others
involved in water quality related professions,” addressed each of the initial eleven
recommended remedies for Milltown. In general the groups thought that “clean-up at
Milltown without elimination of the upstream source would be foolish.” These
professionals recognized the interconnectedness of the river’s ecology and, hence, the
need to let the flow of the river (and the toxins it transported) dictate cleanup order. The
Missoula City-County Health Department offered a similar critique. The department
took the long view of ecology, criticizing cleanup options that were temporary or would
allow similar pollution problems in the future, giving some of the first serious
consideration to dam removal, and ending by declaring, “resource protection and the
logistics of a perpetual clean up plan should dictate the solution. Not decades, but
centuries of habitation are envisioned for the Clark Fork River Basin. Ecological
destruction in the last century is a click on the clock compared to future use of the
valley.” The Montana Chapter of the American Fisheries Society touted its membership
of “over 100 professional biologists” before commenting that, among other things, the

Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. Also see: CERCLA, Sec. 9617,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/usc.cgi?ACTION=RETRIEVE&FILE=$$xa$$busc42.pt2.wais&start=16031330&SI
ZE=4725&TYPE=TEXT
145

Chapter 4: Seeing the River

initial reports about remedial alternatives at Milltown ignored “impacts on the aquatic
ecosystem.” Impacts to the whole river thus rose to the fore.12
These concerns about overall environmental health wove together Superfund’s
mandate to remove toxins and the emerging emphasis on fixing a broken ecosystem. It
also fit into what a New York Times article, following the passage of SARA in 1986,
deemed a movement toward thinking about the quality of Superfund cleanups. The
revamped Superfund law included a provision that required the EPA to meet the most
stringent environmental quality standards for each project, whether they were federal,
state or local. As a 1990 retrospective published in EPA Journal summarized the law
“Congress directed EPA to focus on permanent remedies for Superfund sites rather than
simply containing untreated wastes on site.” Hence, cost effectiveness and protecting
public health no longer drove cleanup standards; environmental quality supposedly did.
By the mid-1990s Congress was again tinkering with Superfund. In particular,
Carol Browner, the EPA director under President Bill Clinton, favored a move toward
what she called, “different levels of clean.” What she referred to was an effort to make
Superfund waste cleanup standards match with the projected future use of a site. Current
or proposed residential areas would necessitate much cleaner solutions than prospective
industrial sites, for example. Stringency at all sites was giving way to site specific
solutions. At Milltown and along the whole of the Clark Fork the emphasis remained on
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turning the destructive legacy of industry into a thriving watershed measured by baseline
environmental health.13
Having seen the damaged river up close through his plastic mask, George
Ochenski summed up the emphasis on natural resource problems best. His “two cents
worth” noted how providing new drinking water in Milltown “was merely addressing the
symptoms rather than the cause of the metals pollution.” Similarly, Ochenski deemed the
proposed remedies for Milltown to be symptom relief rather than causal cure. Rather
than just removing or containing the worst sediments, he proposed “actions necessary to
return this river to a healthy and productive waterway.” In fact, Ochenski’s list of
incremental steps for fixing the Milltown problem was eerily prescient. From attending
to upriver cleanup first, to a slow lowering of the reservoir, through sediment removal
followed by dam removal, and concluding with restoring the area to a “river-side
‘confluence’ park” run by the state, Ochenski laid out the basics of Milltown’s future. He
even made one of the key arguments that later came to be an incontestable part of the
plan: “the power generating capacity of the Milltown Dam is strictly ancillary to the main
issue of a permanent clean-up.” For him, solving the problem included bringing the river
back to its natural flow regime by restoring a free flowing confluence of the Clark Fork
and its major tributary. Ochenski even saw that arguments for dam removal and
ecological restoration had to hinge on more than just a healthy environment. In
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conclusion he wrote, “these solutions provide jobs for working Montanans restoring their
environment…Many bright, young Montanans will dedicate their careers to restoring
Montana’s largest volume river to a clean and healthy state.” Ochenski had company in
thinking about the economics of Superfund.14

At the national level, economic criticism of Superfund mounted as the legislation
faced another round of renewal. In his first State of the Union address, President Bill
Clinton echoed calls for the EPA to rationalize its programs, particularly Superfund. By
this the president and an increasing number of experts and politicians meant using
scientific risk assessments to determine when and where to spend money on the
environment, to create clearer national standards for cleanup work, and to heed costbenefit analyses more closely. These goals and Clinton’s appointment of Carol M.
Browner as the new EPA Administrator signaled a turning point.15
During the George H.W. Bush administration, Congress had renewed Superfund
in 1990 with virtual no changes. That did not mean that legislators, or the public, saw the
law as flawless. In a 1991 letter to the New York Times, the EPA’s top administrator of
emergency and remedial responses felt compelled to dispel common criticism about his
agency’s most well-known program. Henry Longest rebutted claims that Superfund was
failing to attend to the nation’s toxic wastes. Though critics routinely pointed to the slow
increase in NPL sites, Longest pointed out that while the EPA had only 1200 officially
designated sites, the agency had screened 33,000 of which, “21,000 have been
14
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determined not to require long-term remediation.” That is, Superfund was quite busy in
its efforts to assess the country’s pollution problem. And to the charges that Superfund
was financially bloated and misspent government dollars, he reminded readers that the
Superfund survived on taxes collected from industrial corporations, not the public dime.
Similarly, the EPA consistently fought of charges that the bulk of Superfund spending
went, not to actual cleanup, but to “transaction costs,” which meant lawyer’s fees.
Though experts on Superfund found most of its criticisms overstated, they agency was
not beyond reproach.16
Carol Browner took her new job fully aware of the calls for change that the EPA
faced. She knew that reforming Superfund had to be part of that change, since the
program accounted for one-fourth of the agency’s yearly $7 billion budget. To the task
of reform she brought a new type of leadership that featured a personal love of the
environment. She grew up exploring the Florida Everglades. After earning English and
law degrees, she helped engineer the nation’s largest ecological restoration project in that
stomping ground of her youth. Upon accepting the EPA’s top position she described her
motivations as wanting her “son to be able to grow up and enjoy the natural wonders of
the United States in the same way that I have.” Browner combined her passion for the
environment with her proven business savvy. Or as a New York Times story announcing
her appointment put it, “Ms. Browner is prominent among a new type of environmentalist
who views economic development and environmental protection as compatible goals.”
In the same article, Browner addressed her priorities of upholding the public desire to

16
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improve the environment and get business on board, saying, “I’ve found business leaders
don’t oppose strong environmental programs. What drives them crazy is a lack of
certainty. We can change that.”17
The changes in store for the EPA and Superfund may have come out of personal
environmental passions, such as Browner’s, or the kind the public expressed in response
to national catastrophes, but those changes meant to favor science over fervor.
Discussing the EPA’s history of addressing environmental issues, a 1993 Times article
reported that “(e)xperts say that in the last 15 years environmental policy has too often
evolved largely in reaction to popular panics, not in response to sound scientific analyses
of which environmental hazards present the greatest risks.” William K. Reilly, one of
Browner’s predecessors at the EPA, called the problem, “agenda-setting by episodic
panic.” Reilly pointed to how the creation of and changes to national environmental
policy had hinged on public outcry over “Love Canal, Valley of the Drums, (and) the
Exxon Valdez.” Browner agreed with Reilly’s (and most experts’) notion that
environmental policy ought to come from and focus on persistent problems and sound
science. The Times dubbed the use of risk assessment and prioritizing through rational,
science-based decisions and cost-benefit analysis “the vanguard of a new, third wave of
environmentalism that is sweeping across America.”18
It may have been an exaggeration to say that a new environmentalism was
“sweeping” the country, but changes were in the making. Between 1993 and 1995, four
of the nation’s most important federal environmental policies were up for renewal,
17
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including Superfund. The focus of the new Democratic policy makers was on making
those laws more methodical and less reactionary. As the 1995 Superfund rewrite
approached, those arguments peaked. Browner led the EPA in recommending that
Congress amend Superfund to fit with the agency’s new approach of favoring risk
assessments, that is, letting scientific studies of exactly how dangerous an environmental
problem is dictate the range of possible solutions. The EPA also was pressing for clearer
national standards for environmental cleanup, but those standards would be based on a
site’s potential future use, rather than being rigid. Congress was looking to relax
regulations on polluters in general and trim the EPA budget, including Superfund. Under
White House pressure, Congressional Republicans dropped their efforts to remake
Superfund into a basic waste containment program or what one DC environmental leader
called “Superfence.” A commentary in the EPA Journal explained the Clinton
administration’s clear victory over a heavily Republican congress elected in 1994 as a
result of the fact that the environment continued to garner overwhelming public support
even among voters who opposed Clinton because of their perception of his liberalism and
failure on issues such as crime and the economy. Exit polls showed that the same people
who voted Democrats out of national and state legislatures in 1994 still supported tougher
environmental laws, not weaker ones. And they, like Browner, thought that the
environment and the economy were not a zero sum game.19
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In spite of all the criticism, studies were beginning to show that Superfund was
leading to swifter, more cost efficient clean ups. In 1987, after the passage of SARA,
which pushed responsible parties to take the lead in cleanup activities, especially risk
assessment studies, those parties lead only 39% of remediation projects. By 1993 that
had risen to 79% because of EPA’s implementation of SARA. ARCO’s willingness to
accept the responsibility of researching and writing the Milltown FS was a case in point.
The same studies that tracked the rise in the percentage of companies leading Superfund
projects also indicated that that strategy made remediation cheaper and more rational.
That is, corporate cleanup with federal oversight seemed to be working. In the fall of
1995, moderate Republicans broke with their more conservative party members and
joined Democrats in pushing a Superfund renewal bill that left corporate liability intact
and strengthened the law’s emphasis on corporate-led, scientifically-driven waste
cleanups. Of course that didn’t mean that there weren’t other, less EPA-friendly efforts
in Congress. House Speaker Newt Gingrich pushed a plan to give liable companies
government-funded rebates for their cleanup costs. That was just one example of how
the Republican party was embracing ever more conservative and ever more hostile
environmental regulations.20
By early 1996, neither party was exactly having its way with the Superfund
renewal issue. Squabbling over the federal budget had shut down debate on nearly every
other issue in Congress. Superfund, much as in the lead up to the 1986 SARA renewal,
was on the verge of a temporary shutdown. A deputy director of the EPA informed the
20
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Times that “unless there is a continuing resolution, we’re going to have to shut down
operations.” In late January, 1996, Carol Browner testified in Congress about how the
budget impasse was damaging her agency’s most vital programs, including Superfund.
She also admonished the legislative body over deeper proposed budget cuts that would
redouble that damage. She singled out the threat to drinking water that slashing the EPA
and Superfund budget would pose. While not claiming a premature victory, Browner and
DC environmentalists sensed that the GOP was backing away from its fiscal hacking of
federal environmental programs. Some even saw those programs as approaching the
status of issues such as Social Security, which were practically immune to Congressional
cutting because “they carry such voltage with voters,” according to the Times. The issue
sparked President Clinton to enter the debate. By early spring, he toured a few Superfund
sites that Congress’s budget struggle had halted. Vowing to veto any legislation that cut
the EPA program that carried great name recognition with voters, Clinton blasted
conservative Republicans for trying to “let the polluters off the hook and make the
taxpayers pay.”21
In April, Congress restored the EPA’s coffers nearly to their previous level of just
under $7 billion. Superfund resumed fiscally intact. But it was a temporary resumption.
Congress still had to pass another five-year extension of the bill, about which Gingrich
rebuffed Clinton with the threat that “I don’t know if we can frankly get to a mutually
negotiated cleanup of the cleanup system.” In spite of that language, the House
21
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Speaker’s vision of a “new environmentalism” sounded very similar to the changes the
EPA was already pushing. Gingrich’s idea of a renewed Superfund included “valid
science, incentives for compliance rather than punishment for noncompliance, rapid
adoption of new technologies, and a search for innovative solutions from communities.”
With the exception of replacing the compliance stick with a carrot, he sounded much like
Browner, and a lot like what was already happening on the ground at Superfund sites.22
Just as the spring of 1996 appeared to be another watershed moment for
Superfund, it was, perhaps, the most important turning point in the law’s implementation
at the Milltown Dam. By the time Congress restored the EPA and Superfund budgets,
the Clark Fork River once again reshaped the view of Milltown. Before that reshaping
happened people were already questioning the path that the EPA and ARCO were setting
for the site.

In the early 1990s, river advocate groups such as the Clark Fork Coalition and the
locally-organized Milltown EPA Superfund Site Committee (MESS) both hinted at the
idea that the dam did not belong in a long-term solution. Specifically, both groups
challenged the idea of containment – keeping sediments in place – because it was not a
long-term solution centered around restoring a healthy ecosystem. As MESS scientist
Phil Tourganeau put it, “the emphasis on the pursuit should be the permanent (in geologic
time) cleanup of contaminated sediment and groundwater to the degree that public and
environmental health is unequivocally protected.” Throughout these comments groups
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aligned themselves with local citizens. As one individual wrote, “keep in mind that the
public has the greatest stake in this cleanup. We live here!” When the dam owners
weighed in they also tried to align themselves with locals. MPC supported dam
engineering remedies and institutional controls for the Milltown problem, claiming that
the dam was “operated and maintained for the customer’s benefit.” The company went
on to identify its ownership of the dam with ecological resources such as “waterfowl and
deer hunting,” for which MPC historically opened its private land. Furthermore, by
supporting the extension of a trail network on MPC land around the reservoir, the
company implied its concern for encouraging a healthy environment. Its hopes for
keeping the dam intact and improving it hinged on the language of an improved
environment, just like proponents of more aggressive cleanup measures.23
Another indication of the extent to which the EPA favored public comment was
ARCO’s reaction. In response to the spring 1991 comment period, a company letter to
the EPA warned “solicitation of a broad range of comments…appears inconsistent
with…discussions between EPA and ARCO.” The company thought that the EPA
should have restricted public comments to ARCO-reviewed and -approved topics in the
ongoing feasibility study process. In particular, it angered the company that the EPA
entertained public comments on different proposed technological fixes for Milltown,
rather than just allowing citizens to register their opinion as to whether that list of
proposals was complete. ARCO also questioned the federal agency’s decision to make
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the company include public comments in its reports. After implying that the company
might back out of its responsibilities if such behavior continued, its letter closed with a
hope that “EPA will cooperate with ARCO in good faith to address the problems
identified.” While the company did not make good on its marginally-veiled threats at the
time, it would later scuttle work-in-progress for similar reasons attached to the state’s
natural resource damage suit. At the very least, ARCO’s reprimand to the EPA
demonstrated the degree to which the agency was extending itself to the public.24
Of course, not all the attention to the current and future health of the watershed
came via public comment or its opposition. Moving toward a feasibility study meant
researching the river system. In an EPA Journal article about the agency’s regulatory
capacity, the authors asserted, “all EPA’s decisions must be based on sound science.”25
Private contractors and state environmental agencies began to produce studies on
everything from aquatic insects and earthworms to waterfowl and fish. These studies,
paid for by EPA and ARCO, factored into the FS, as well as the state’s suit. Not
surprisingly to most observers, study after study completed during the early 1990s
determined that heavy metals from the basin’s mining history had damaged the river’s
natural resources. Soil eating worms accumulated high levels of heavy metals, which
they potentially passed up the food chain when preyed upon by birds or fish.
Macroinvertebrates, nicknamed “benthos,” proved full of arsenic and other heavy metals
as well. These spineless aquatic creatures, including crayfish, snails, more worms, as
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well as a host of insects that spend most of their lifecycle clinging to submerged river
rocks before they hatch into their winged stage (giving them names such as stonefly and
mayfly), are the staple of fish diets. People who fly-fish use imitations of many of these
benthos to entice hungry trout. So too, native fish tested exceedingly high for arsenic,
copper, and zinc. At least those that researchers could find did. Studies showed that
similar Rocky Mountain rivers supported thousands of trout per mile, while populations
in the Clark Fork from its headwaters to Milltown languished at about a quarter of the
expected rate. Many of the surviving fish showed inhibited growth that correlated with a
toxic diet, others had abnormal scale loss, or irritated gills clogged with mucus. As with
the issue of public input, ARCO challenged some of the growing body of research
(research funded by the company) about the river ecosystem, such as contesting that toxic
metals were the most likely cause of the degraded fishery26
Alternately, the Montana Power Company supported the scholarship pointing to a
river degraded by historic contamination. In part, they did so as a way of minimizing the
perception of their dam as the source of a languishing ecosystem. As part of its license
26
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extension, the company had to address the effects the dam had on the river’s fishery and
propose a “mitigation and enhancement plan.” Its assessment emphasized the damage
due to toxic sediment and downplayed the role of the dam in blocking fish migration and
spawning. The fix the company proposed included slower drawdowns of the reservoir to
decrease fish harming sediment flushes, as well as $65,000 per year to help restore
tributary streams feeding the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers important for fish
spawning, to breed and release hatchery fish, and to monitor the effects.27
Whereas most of the research on a collection of organisms that defined the river
ecosystem focused on the historic and contemporary affects of contamination, most of the
concern for human health looked forward. Reports by a Public Health Work Group
working at Milltown evaluated “sources of exposures to humans visiting the reservoir.”
The primary concern seemed to be “projected recreational use of the reservoir.”
Identifying these pathways of human exposure, such as where families got their wild
game, whether or not they ate vegetables from a home garden, or how often they swam in
the reservoir, would help direct future cleanup that, in turn, would reduce future
exposure. When it came out in July, 1993, the EPA-mandated “Baseline Human Health
Risk Assessment” for Milltown served the stated goal of assessing “current and potential
risks to health posed by chemical contamination at the site.” The report included the
results from surveys of Milltown residents determining the pathways by which they
might have, did, or could expose themselves to toxic sediment and water, but it said
nothing about past exposure. The Montana Department of Health and Environmental
27
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Sciences praised the report for its thoroughness and the “unusually open forum” in which
the EPA produced it, including participation by the locally-organized MESS.28
It wasn’t until 1993 that an initiative to look at historic health affects in or near
Milltown arose. And it arose through local public input. In a letter written on
Halloween, 1993, Barbara Bennetts wrote to a member of MTAC asking about what they
knew or were doing about reports of “high incidents of cancer among families living
along the river.” Bennetts included in her concern the spooky anecdote that “(t)here is
one cluster of homes…six or seven in all…where one hundred percent of the households
have a cancer victim.” Before the end of the year the EPA recruited staff from the Center
for Disease Control’s Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and
the state DHES “requesting an investigation into the question of potentially high rates of
cancer around the Milltown Reservoir.” The EPA manager involved, Julie DalSoglio,
also accepted Barbara Bennetts’ offer to act as liaison between agency people and
community members. But as DalSoglio explained, the impending study by MDHES and
ATSDR would be of the state’s tumor registry, which included hospital-treated cases of
cancer. The registry lacked information on cases treated outside a hospital or outside the
state, as well as some specific types of cancer, like that of the skin, which is the primary
risk associated with ingesting toxic quantities of water-borne arsenic. The Missoula CityCounty Health Department asked that the DHES keep it informed of any cancer cluster
28
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studies to come. Meanwhile one of the most important studies of the site that assessed
human health risks dismissed any significant worry about cancer, except in the case of
people drinking groundwater. And since no one was doing so anymore, the report
deemed that risk low. Surprisingly the report said nothing about the historic affects of the
people who had consumed groundwater on a daily basis for years, if not lifetimes.29
The EPA organized a review of cancer in and around Milltown. At a May
meeting in 1994, the agency got representatives from both ATSDR and Montana’s DHES
to agree to initiate a cancer cluster review for the area. They hoped to supplement the
state tumor registry with information collected from residents’ medical records, if they
could get voluntary participation in the study. Over a year later, in July, 1995, the
ATSDR epidemiologist on the case reported that there was “no data to show cancers in
the area…outside normal, expected values.” In a letter to Barbara Bennetts, who had first
broached the subject with the EPA, Julie DalSoglio stated that in the end the study only
included “a review of death certificates.” The letter admitted that the results failed to
address Bennetts’ concerns fully and put the onus back on her to figure out additional
funding for a more thorough study by the ATSDR, funding that the EPA could not
provide.30
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Despite the completion of even more studies, the EPA considered deferring the
feasibility study of Milltown. In a July, 1992, newsletter co-produced by EPA and
MDHES, the agencies publically announced the possibility of delaying the FS at
Milltown “largely because the sources of contamination upstream have not been
addressed.” Like so much in the Superfund process, the decision to delay producing this
vital document by carving the reservoir and dam out of the rest of the Clark Fork River
plans included consultation with local advocacy groups. Even before the public
announcement, the new director of the CFC and Peter Nielsen, who had just taken a job
with the Missoula County Health Department, questioned the EPA about the possibility.
Everyone, including ARCO, seemed to agree about the wisdom of deferring Milltown to
allow more upstream remediation to progress. But that wasn’t the only justification.31
By the 1990s there was an emphasis within Superfund to streamline cleanup
efforts as a way of making them more fiscally efficient. A 1990 edition of the EPA
Journal, a report entitled, “Progress and Challenges: Looking at EPA Today,” recognized
that “(t)he number of abandoned hazardous waste sites has turned out to be much larger
than was predicted when Superfund was created. Furthermore, cleanup has turned out to
be complex, taking more time and resources than expected to complete the job.” In 1982
the EPA listed 418 Superfund sites, including Milltown. By 1990 the agency had over
Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site
Records, reels 885, 885, 821, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of
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1200 active sites, compared to 52 completed cleanups. Milltown was representative of
what was happening all over the country, the vast majority of Superfund sites took
decades to remedy. Most of the “time and resources” were chargeable to the PRP, but the
EPA still had to conduct each Superfund project, and the EPA added more every year on
a limited staff. At a January, 1993, public forum held in Missoula, EPA project manager
Julie DalSoglio recognized those limitation as reasons for delaying the Milltown process,
saying, “EPA has been considering reapportioning staff resources to better address
priority upstream problems.” And a limited operational budget made that decision more
pertinent. At the same time, the final designation of Missoula’s aquifer as a “solesource” water supply lent weight to the wisdom of fixing upstream problems prior to
assessing the future of the reservoir and dam, which, for better or worse, kept the bulk of
the watershed’s contamination out of Missoula’s water. A month later the MTAC
newsletter confirmed the likelihood of the deferral, adding that the decision could delay
work at Milltown for “3-5 years, with actual cleanup more years in the future.”
Unbeknownst to anyone, the longer timeframe for Milltown would allow events to unfold
that drastically changed the final outcome at Milltown. Like so much of the Superfund
process at Milltown, end results hinged on unintended consequences.32
Many places across the West were now beginning to call attention to the
unintended, yet harmful, consequences of the region’s mining history. Milltown felt the
effects of mining far from the tunnels and pits that Butte, Montana, mining companies
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dug in search of copper. Plenty of other Western towns were beginning to deal with the
effects of mining much closer to their sources. A 1993 New York Times article estimated
that water running over old mine tailings had polluted approximately “10,000 miles of
streams in the West.” All those stretches of degraded waterways amounted to the
“staggering environmental cost from industrial development in the United States.” Just
as Milltown had harbored the poisons that resulted from the copper mining that
electrified the country, countless other western environments had born the brunt of
material and technological advancement in America. According to the Times, the West’s
tolerance of that legacy was waning and communities were beginning to demand studies
and remedies for their local environments.33
With a ballooning number of possible toxic waste sites to deal with, the EPA had
to prioritize. Part of the agency’s efforts to do so entailed making risk assessments. In
1990 the EPA’s Science Advisory Board endorsed a report called “Reducing Risk,”
which argued that the agency and Superfund, in particular, ought to focus on identifying
the worst of the worst environmental sites in the country, then commit the most resources
and immediate effort to remediating those places. As William K. Reilly, who served as
EPA Administrator for George H. W. Bush (and in 2010 became Barack Obama’s point
man for investigating the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico),
summarized it for the EPA Journal shortly after the report’s release, “(se)tting
environmental priorities for the whole nation and bringing our Agency’s resources into
alignment with those priorities are supremely daunting tasks.” The way to accomplish
those tasks was to prioritize via risk assessment, rather than being “swayed by the
33
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passions of the moment,” Reilly surmised. And risk assessment meant using “sound
science.” In other words, the EPA’s top administrator was saying that no longer would
the squeakiest wheel get greasing. Instead, the agency would try to oil the hub or
bearings with the worst documented cases of corrosion. The keystones of defining
corrosiveness, or risk, which came from the Superfund’s original system of ranking
polluted sites, remained human exposure pathways and toxicity of pollutants.34
In an EPA forum addressing the science of risk assessment, environmental
scientists admitted that determining risk was itself in the developmental stage. As one
forum member put it, “(r)isk estimates for highway deaths are based on extensive
statistical data. For most chemical carcinogens such statistical data do not exist; EPA’s
cancer risk numbers are extrapolations from high-dose animal experiments.” The former
held much more reliable powers of prediction than the latter. Whether or not a site might
cause people to suffer cancer years down the road was a study in its infancy. In 1993, by
the time the issue of Milltown’s deferral arose, the EPA viewed the science of risk
assessment as more mature. An issue of the agency’s journal devoted to the topic no
longer featured the debate over the efficacy of risk assessment. Instead “Profiles in Risk
Assessment: New Science, New Contexts” contained articles about how the new means
for prioritizing environmental cleanups was working, with titles like, “Breakthroughs in
Cancer Risk Assessment” alongside successful case studies.35
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At Milltown the flow of the river added to discussion of risk assessment. With
arsenic in groundwater at issue, the Milltown portion of the Clark Fork Superfund
complex certainly scored high for risk, but cleaning from upstream downward made a
great deal of sense, especially since the residents were no longer drinking from the
contaminated wells in Milltown. Yet, public opinion trumped these other considerations.
In the fall, 1993, John Wardell, the EPA’s state manager, announced that Milltown would
remain a priority within the river-wide Superfund complex and work toward completing
an FS would continue. The CFC praised the decision and the agency’s “willingness to
listen to the concerns of the Missoula community. We believe that your decision is a
solid one and one that is supported wholeheartedly by Missoula.”
Others agreed. The Milltown Technical Assistance Committee began its first
newsletter of 1994 commending the decision. The county health department praised the
EPA and emphasized recent studies that indicated arsenic-tainted water moved from the
Milltown aquifer into the Missoula aquifer. With “as much as 35% of the recharge to the
Missoula Valley Sole Source Aquifer com(ing) from Milltown,” the health department
claimed, “public interest in the remediation of the Milltown groundwater site is very high
in this community.” Among the many letters that the EPA, state and county health
departments received, one from a resident living downstream from the Milltown Dam
may have expressed common sentiment when he wrote, the dam “is old and leaking. It
sure makes sense to me to continue the studies and planning until we know enough to
decide if deferral is a good idea.”36
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ARCO, on the other had, was quite a bit less happy. The PRP complained that
they had spent considerable money and time proceeding with the upriver feasibility study
under the impression that the EPA planned to defer the Milltown FS. In addition to being
surprised and disgruntled with the agency’s choice not to defer on Milltown, a company
spokesman wrote that the “decision was communicated to special interest groups either
concurrently or before (the) call to me…which has done little to engender a cooperative
relationship between our organizations.” Even though ARCO opposed the decision and
the EPA’s apparent favoring of local advocacy groups, the studies and writing for the FS
crept forward, as did the state’s lawsuit for historic damage to its natural resources.37

The state of Montana intended to use many of the same studies being conducted
for the EPA’s FS to bolster its natural resource damage claim against ARCO. The
attention to and evidence about how contamination had degraded the Clark Fork
watershed emboldened the state. By 1993 the state had contracted Hagler Bailly, an
international consulting firm that, among other things, specialized in natural resource
damage claims. In a fall, 1993 report, the consultant’s scientists reported that the “Clark
Fork River Basin contain(ed) some 9,900 tons of arsenic…99,000 tons of copper, 22,000
tons of lead, and 55,000 tons of zinc.” Those contaminants had led to a nearly lifeless
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river at times during the last hundred years, repeatedly caused catastrophic fish kills in
the last decade, and persisted in degrading nearly all forms of aquatic life in the
watershed, as well as posing on ongoing threat to human health. Hagler Bailly promised
“to assess the monetary value of the injuries, and to establish a framework for the
restoration of (the) resource” within the coming months. But the state’s money and plans
for restoration hinged on what remediation looked like. And finally remediation, or the
EPA decision as to how to deal with the contamination at Milltown, seemed to come into
focus near the end of 1994, at least temporarily.38
In the fall of 1994, the EPA released a Remedial Investigation (RI), which was the
culmination of studies done at Milltown. They soon followed with the first feasibility
study.

Both were still drafts, but they gave the public its first official glimpse of what

might happen at the site. What most people took away from these reports was the fact
that Titan Environmental Corporation, which wrote them, ARCO, which paid for them,
and EPA, which approved them, had narrowed twenty-three possible cleanup solutions to
six. The winnowing process had involved “evaluating short- and long-term aspects of
effectiveness, implementability, and cost,” according to the drafts. The extremes of the
original, longer list included everything from “no further action,” which ranked
surprisingly well in all evaluation critieria, to “Dam Engineering (Dam Removal),” which
only scored minor points for long-term effectiveness.39
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The first of what would be multiple “final” reports came out in early 1995. While
acknowledging that the river was flushing arsenic through the sediments piled up behind
the dam, then through the Milltown aquifer at a rate of “2 to 20 pounds per day,” which
meant that it would take “several hundred years” to deplete the area of that one toxin, the
first report continued to call the health risks “low.” According to the RI, the only grave
danger presented by the contamination was “substantial scour and transport of sediment”
such as in a 100-year flood or dam failure. Even though it would take hundreds of years
for the problem to dissipate on its own, the report ranked a possible centennial flood as
“rare or unlikely events.”40
Nevertheless, the draft reports reduced the list of solutions to six, all of which left
the dam in place. Four of the six, including “no action,” were fixes that left the
contaminated sediment in place as well. With these limited options on the table, the
Milltown Technical Assistance Committee led the way in promoting public participation
at upcoming meetings where EPA and ARCO representatives planned to provide
extensive detail about the six options, set a timeframe for choosing one, and taking public
comment. Therein Milltown continued to exemplify what was happening with Superfund
across the nation. As the director of Montana’s EPA office put it, “while greater and
greater public input is occurring, a more streamlined, more cost-efficient approach is
being mandated.” In an open letter to concerned organizations and the public, John
Wardell went on to write: “Montana is recognized as a national model for public
Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reels
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involvement in the Superfund process, which is a credit to many of you who have
committed much time and talent.” Wardell ended by requesting that people continue to
participate in the process, especially as the FS for Milltown drew near completion. He
got what he asked for.41
Of all the reactions to the shortened list of six possible solutions, the state’s
surprised people the most. Since first filing a claim in 1983 for restoration money against
ARCO the state had spent $7 million on its case in twelve years. Representing Missoula,
where he would become mayor the following year, Mike Kadas asked the 1995 state
legislature to approve another $2.3 million to help fund, as he put it, “our one chance in
history to bring this area back from a century of pollution.” With near unanimity the
legislature approved of the expenditure. But what the recipient organization, the state’s
Natural Resource Damage Litigation Program (NRDLP), envisioned as restoration at
Milltown was inadequate to most local observers. The state tentatively backed the
remedial solution that called for leaving contaminated sediments in place behind the dam
and managing them through “institutional controls.” In the short run, that meant having
MPC maintain its dam, continuing slow drawdowns, and controlling recreational use
around the reservoir so as to limit people’s risk of exposure to toxins. In the long run, it
left the removal of heavy metals to nature. Financially, it relieved ARCO of much
cleanup expense. For the state, it closed the door on actually restoring the Milltown
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stretch of the river to anything resembling a healthy, waste-free environment. And for
Missoula, it spelled a persistent threat.42
The swiftest and strongest reaction to the state’s support for an ‘in place’ remedy
came from downstream of Milltown. Perhaps it’s not surprising that the area’s largest
community, located seven river miles below the Milltown Dam, opposed the idea of just
leaving 6.6 million cubic yards of toxic sediment in place behind an old, leaky, partiallywooden structure plugging up a river prone to flooding. The Missoula City-County
Health Department reacted with a sixteen-point resolution. On February 16, 1995, the
department resolved to “strongly oppose the recommendation of the Montana Natural
Resource (Damage) Litigation Program that no action be taken to remove contamination
sources or to prevent the spread of contamination from the Milltown Reservoir.” Much
of the resolution seemed to reiterate Superfund language, calling for “the most effective
and permanent” solution and requesting “public comment” to help guide the decision.
Individual residents wrote letters echoing the health department’s position. Sent directly
to the state’s NRDLP, many of these letters cited human health and environmental health
concerns, as well as recreation interests in their support for a more aggressive cleanup.
They also saw corporate power at play in the decision. As one person put it, the deal
looked like “a capitulation to ARCO and a perpetual danger to the people (and other
creatures) downstream.” Any kowtowing by the state to the company seemed unlikely
given the legislature’s recent passage of more funding for the NRDLP to continue its
more-than-a-decade long fight against ARCO, but people were angry.43
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Most of the anger over the state’s support of keeping dangerous sediments in
place behind Milltown Dam was borne of fear. In every reaction to that decision, people
wrote of the possibility of the dam collapsing, of a catastrophic flood, essentially of
looming disaster. While hopes for a better environment inspired steady public
participation throughout the Superfund process at Milltown, events or decisions that
invoked a sense of fear resulted in the most public input. Even in a follow-up letter to
city’s resolution, Peter Nielsen, the new Environmental Health Supervisor for the health
department, infused his very measured and scientifically based assertions with the scary
ramifications of a dam failure or other event that could wash arsenic downstream.44
The Clark Fork Coalition and the Milltown Technical Assistance Committee went
a step further in their opposition to the state’s choice of remedies at Milltown. Both
organizations questioned the entire winnowing process that eliminated nearly three
quarters of the original remedial alternatives. MTAC pointed requested that the EPA
revisit that process and pay particular attention to retaining “dam engineering” options,
such as removal. Both groups also argued that the state’s preference for containing the
wastes at Milltown was a poor fit with the overall Natural Resource Damage suit.
The coalition wrote that the suit’s purpose, as dictated by Superfund law, was “to
restore damaged natural resources to ‘baseline conditions.’” CFC charged the state with
failing to define the basic conditions of the river that restoration should achieve, “such as
the plant, fish, and wildlife communities they expect the basin to support.” Unless the
(NRDLP), 2/19/1995, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office,
Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reels 768, 821, Government Documents,
Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
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baseline condition of the rivers’ confluence was a toxic-filled reservoir, then a keep-thetoxins-in-place solution seemed counter to the state’s lawsuit, a suit that had grown to
$635 million by 1995. Some of that money was to go to improving the conditions of the
river at Milltown, even if full restoration of the river to pre-European conditions was
humanly impossible the groups argued. That was only possible if ARCO first paid to
clean up some of the mess. In addition the CFC and MTAC asserted that the state’s
position ran contrary to Superfund’s mandate to favor permanent remedies. In reaction to
the state’s claim that removing Milltown’s toxic sediments ran the risk of flushing some
of them downstream, CFC staff scientist Geoffrey Smith wrote that while “NRDP cites
the potential for downstream injury as a reason not to remove the sediments, (it) fails to
address the potential downstream impacts of leaving them in place.” Again, this
argument hinged on fear of a dam mishap in the hundreds, if not thousands of years it
would take for the toxins to “naturally” disperse. As MTAC put it, thousands of years is
a long time to speculate that there won’t be “catastrophic events involving floods and/or
earthquakes.”45
Just as the Missoula health department offered the earliest opposition to the state’s
support of a virtual “no action” plan at Milltown, the department also put forth some of
the most incisive critiques of that plan. Peter Nielsen confirmed that since the city
designated its sole source aquifer in 1988 and established a water quality district in 1993,
local businesses had spent considerable time and money complying with new regulations

45

Letter from Geoffrey Smith (CFC) to Rob Collins (NRDLP), 3/22/1995; letter from
Brian Sherry (MTAC) to NRDLP, 3/23/1995, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel 821, Government
Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.

172

Chapter 4: Seeing the River

to maintain, if not restore, clean water. As he put it, “the community expectation has
been clearly expressed.” That expectation was that anyone affecting community water
should be held liable, especially a company with the resources that ARCO possessed.
Nielsen also contended that if the state settled for a “no action” alternative at Milltown it
would seriously compromise the public’s ability to sway the EPA toward any other
remedial option. In other words, he charged the state with failing to uphold citizens’
wishes. “When residents…supported the creation of the natural resource damage
program…it was our clear understanding that the program would attempt to seek
restoration of groundwater resources above and beyond the remedial actions taken
through the EPA cleanup process.” The NRDLP was supposed to pursue money to
improve upon Superfund cleanup, not hinder it.
That said, the state wasn’t exactly rolling over for ARCO. In October, 1995, the
state upped its natural resource damage lawsuit by $78 million to $713.3 million total.
ARCO vowed to fight the suit “to the very end.” The company’s stance was not
surprising. Although the company had the proverbial deep pockets that Superfund was
meant to capitalize on, a year earlier ARCO had disclosed to the federal Securities and
Exchange Commission that the $648 million it had set aside for environmental cleanups
was going to be about $1 billion shy of its new estimated expenditures. If Montana’s
natural resource damage claim succeeded, the company would have to re-up its
environmental expenditures by nearly another three-quarters of a billion dollars. Plus, the
Congressional debate in 1995, led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich, still pointed toward
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the possibility that Superfund liability would lose much of its teeth. So ARCO was not
without potential aid in its fight against the state’s claims.46
Money certainly played a role in the debate about remedial alternatives at
Milltown. The EPA recognized that the cost of removing sediments from behind the dam
would be “quite high,” as would the subsequent natural resource damage claims against
ARCO for restoring the area if sediment removal happened. In the drafts of the RI and
FS, ARCO penned the cost estimates for each remedial alternative, as well as ranked the
alternatives based, in part, on their economic feasibility. That didn’t mean that the
company had free reign in figuring its possible future expenditures on cleanup. The EPA
and the state DHES jointly set guidelines for ARCO’s calculations and enforced revisions
along the way. In responses to citizen and local organizations’ concerns about the
remedial alternatives, the agencies indicated no inclination to rule out possible solutions
based solely, or even primarily, on costs. What the agencies did indicate was that local
comments were changing the FS. One change that the EPA and state did not foresee was
agency support for dam removal. The river would soon amend that.47
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Back when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Montana Power
Company a six-year license extension, the agency indicated that if the Superfund process
left toxic sediments in place behind the dam it would consider classifying the structure as
“a high hazard dam.” Throughout 1995 the release of FS drafts and the reactions to them
put the issue of permanently leaving sediments behind Milltown Dam at the forefront of
the Superfund process and the state’s natural resource claim against ARCO. ARCO
supported the “in place” remedy along with institutional controls, as did the state and
EPA. Their reasoning hinged on mitigating short-term impacts of trying to move
thousands of tons of toxic sediment out of a reservoir without washing them downstream,
combined with proposals to maintain the Milltown Dam indefinitely. Local opinion took
a much longer view. Individuals and organizations emanating out of Milltown and
Missoula thought that short-term risks paled in comparison to the long-term possibility of
failure to maintain a safe, stable dam. The issue of whether or not the EPA should
require sediment removal was tied up with the NRDLP’s suit against ARCO. The way
that EPA required the company to remediate would set the stage for the degree to which
the state could restore the river. Leaving sediments in place left very little restorative
possibility. Again, local opinion leaned heavily toward a much more thorough cleanup.
All the study and observation of the river that the Superfund process and long state
lawsuit had entailed had helped people see a severely damaged watershed, even if few
people donned masks and snorkels to emulate George Ochenski.48
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Just before Christmas, 1995, the EPA invited the public to offer another round of
comments on the ongoing FS process. Earlier criticisms had pushed ARCO to rewrite the
feasibility study and the EPA opened a window for public input on the new product from
December 26 through March 15, 1996. ARCO released yet another draft of the FS in
April, 1996. The list of remedial alternatives had increased from six to eight. Two of
those eight included removing the sediments behind the Milltown Dam. But the
company had changed its assessment very little. In their final analysis, ARCO
recommended the same option that they had before: leave the toxic sludge in place, use
institutional controls to keep people out of harm’s way, monitor the site indefinitely, and
wait for nature to do the cleaning. But the April report was too late. Nature had already
played its hand. During the comment period that preceded the release of the new draft
FS, the Clark Fork and Blackfoot rivers made the thought of permanently leaving
hundreds of tons of toxic sediment behind the dam obsolete. It would take awhile, as
everything at Milltown seemed to do, for that obsolescence to become reality. But one
day during the winter of 1996 the rivers flowing into the Milltown Reservoir once again
forced the issue of their own cleanup.49
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Another River Runs Through It
Paul and I fished a good many big rivers, but when one of us referred to ‘the big river’
the other knew it was the Big Blackfoot. It isn’t the biggest river we fished, but it is the
most powerful, and per pound, so are its fish.
Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It
The reason I came out here today to make this announcement is because I wanted to find
the place – the one place in the West – that I thought told the most powerful story about
the possibility for restoration.
U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, on the
Blackfoot River, 1998.

In the fall of 1992 Robert Redford’s film A River Runs Through It premiered in
Montana. Redford’s film was an adaptation of a novella by the same name written by
Norman Maclean in 1976. Maclean’s semiautobiographical tale of a family growing up
in Missoula began with one of the book’s two most quoted lines: “In our family, there
was no clear line between religion and fly fishing.” In the story that follows, the
Blackfoot river is the scene of familial struggles, the religious zeal coursing through those
struggles, and the love and art of fly-fishing. The Big Blackfoot River, as people called it
in the novel’s early 20th century setting, inspired Maclean’s characters with the fortitude
to stay those struggles, as well as match that zeal. The year after its publication,
Maclean’s short story collection was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize, although the prizegranting board ultimately declined to pass out its illustrious award that year.
Nevertheless, the story was legend in the fly-fishing community, especially in western
Montana. Even before the movie’s production or release, it was common for newspaper
stories about “Norman’s river” to begin with quips like, the book “has kindled a national
love affair with the Blackfoot River.” But in 1992 it was the movie that catalyzed
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support for the story’s real life river and its legendary “high jumping” trout. The deeprooted, as well as the newly gained notoriety of the Blackfoot helped shape the fate of the
Milltown Dam Superfund site in the late 1990s.1
The United States Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt paid a visit to the
Blackfoot River in early June 1998. Plying the waters of the Clark Fork’s biggest and
most celebrated tributary for trout was as symbolic as it was genuine sport for Babbitt.
He cast a dry fly on top of the current, which onlookers speculated had little chance of
attracting a fish, but made for better television footage than trolling under the surface
with a nymph. Rather than an actual trout, Babbitt was angling to allay fears that his
agency’s decision to apply the Endangered Species Act to bull trout would not kill
recreational use of western Montana’s prized fishing grounds. In 1985 the U.S. Forest
Service had deemed the bull trout a sensitive species, making it eligible for protection
under the ESA. After thorough studies of the fish and its remaining habitat, a coalition of
Montana-based environmental groups had petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
to list the species in 1992. Now, six years later and with much political and courtroom
haggling under the proverbial bridge, Babbitt disclosed the choice to make bull trout a
“threatened” species, meaning that his department would consider the fish for full
protection as “endangered” within a year.
Babbitt’s trip to western Montana was actually as much about the Blackfoot River
as it was about one of its signature species. The secretary’s choice of river to backdrop
his announcement that compelled federal agencies to “conserve and restore” bull trout
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populations in the Columbian and Klamath River systems both acknowledged the fame of
the river’s recreational use and celebrated its revival. Babbitt told a crowd of government
workers, area residents, and conservationists, “(T)he reason I came out here today to
make this announcement is because I wanted to find the place – the one place in the West
– that I thought told the most powerful story about the possibility for restoration.” He
was referring specifically to the efforts of a coalition of people, known as the Blackfoot
Challenge, which had been behind most of the restoration work and study of the river for
the past decade. That Brad Pitt had recently plied the waters of a Hollywood version of
the Blackfoot certainly helped make the river’s story more powerful.
While Babbitt’s visit was symbolic, his department’s decision to list the bull trout
as a threatened species, with the potential to join the federal endangered species list
looming, was real. That 1998 listing included the warning that the federal government
might add cutthroat trout to the list of threatened species within a year. Those
announcements shone a harsher light on the Milltown Dam’s role of wrecking havoc with
both fish’s ability to survive in western Montana.2
In addition, the bull trout listing and Babbitt’s visit to the Blackfoot was one of
the seminal events that placed this Clark Fork tributary at the center of the Milltown
story. During the 1990s the Blackfoot’s health and future garnered as much local
concern as those of the beleaguered Clark Fork. By 1996 the Blackfoot made itself an
undeniable part of the Clark Fork and Milltown Superfund process. Coinciding with the
2
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listing of bull trout, Superfund-related studies of the Milltown Dam’s effect on fish also
drew a strong link between the structure and the Blackfoot. These events marked the
turning point at which the remedy of leaving the dam and sediments in place at Milltown
gave way to discussions of sediment and dam removal. In the bigger picture, what
happened at Milltown because of the Blackfoot River and the attention it drew illustrated
the flexibility within Superfund law, the permeability of Superfund sites, and benefits of
a long and sometimes sluggish Superfund process.

By 1996, the biggest worry about leaving thousands of tons of toxic sludge in
Milltown Reservoir was the dam’s stability. Everyone involved in finding a permanent
remedy for the Milltown Superfund site knew that the river had battered the dam
repeatedly in the nine decades since it was built. Risk assessments noted historic flood
levels and predicted the maximum water level that the dam could withstand. Locals held
up the dual inevitabilities of spring high water against an aging, man-made structure, and
worried.
If leaving the sediments it trapped in place was to be a viable solution, just as
surely as everyone knew that the Milltown Dam would have to withstand more centuries
worth of flood waters, , they spoke of the Clark Fork River as the harbinger of disaster.
But in the winter of 1996, just as the debate about such a tenuous solution heated up, the
Clark Fork watershed made its own emphatic point. It was not the Clark Fork proper that
did so. Nor was it rushing water that inflamed the discussion. What focused new
attention on the dam was the Blackfoot, and ice.
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The flood of ice that churned down the Blackfoot River toward Milltown in early
February scoured the banks, drew crowds of onlookers, left one family homeless, and
ultimately forced the EPA to reconsider its Superfund fix. The Blackfoot ice jam of 1996
also came at a time when the attention on the ecological health of that river was high.
Some of the same people who stood along the river road to watch massive ice chunks
grind, pop, and crunch past, had been holding meetings to discuss the long-term problems
of the Blackfoot river fishery for years. Soon they came to see the Milltown Dam as one
of the ongoing problems for fish in the Blackfoot, particularly a fish that the federal
government was about to put on the endangered species list. The ice jam and the
attention to the Blackfoot River fishery, especially its endangered bull trout, delayed and
altered the Superfund cleanup remedy for the Milltown Site. And in many ways it
illustrated the incongruities between the realities of a major Superfund cleanup project
and national debates about the law itself. On the national level Superfund suffered
criticism for its slow pace of implementation, locally that pace allowed for a radical
rethinking of cleanup.
The 1996 ice jam, the high point of years of attention to the Blackfoot’s fishery,
and the federal listing of the bull trout on the endangered species list coincided to make
taking down the dam a real option at Milltown. Bull trout evolved in colder water than
most of their salmonid relatives. They spawn and rear in the chilliest waters a stream can
provide, near springs or mountain-fed tributaries. Yet as adults they migrate through a
wide and complex variety of riparian cover, from tangled nests of driftwood, to deep
pools and shady, undercut banks. Bull trout, like most fish, have many specific needs
within these various environments. A long incubation time means that bull trout require
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stable gravel and sediment beds at the right time of year. But as much as these fish need
specific microenvironments, they need to be able to move between those environments.
That is, they need to migrate. Biologists have found that some bull trout travel over 100
river miles between where they were born and return to spawn and where they spend
most of their adult lives. The upper Clark Fork was ideal bull trout habitat for millennia.
The icy waters of the Blackfoot and other mountainous tributaries provided ideal
spawning grounds. The main river’s warmer waters offered many miles of adult habitat.
Where colder waters joined warmer ones were particularly important. The Salish Indian
name for the confluence of the Rattlesnake Creek with the Clark Fork in Missoula meant
“many bull trout.” “More bull trout,” or more commonly, “place of the big bull trout”
was their name for the confluence of the Blackfoot with the Clark Fork. The Milltown
Dam severed a migratory path that bull trout had evolved along. But its building had not
erased the evolutionary memory of that path. Fish wanted to get past the dam.3
People wanted fish to get past the dam, too. Fish passage meant better fishing and
a healthier tributary river. The ESA required that fish get past the dam. The past delays
and seemingly sluggish progress at Milltown allowed for the intersection of these three
things. Hence, the evolving solution for this Superfund site benefited from the elapse of
3
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time, rather than floundered because of it, as was one of the complaints about Superfund
nationally.

On February 9, 1996, Peter Nielsen was driving toward Milltown from his office
in the Missoula health department up the Clark Fork. Early that Friday morning he
planned on collecting a few water samples from untested community wells. Heading east
with the Clark Fork River in view out his passenger-side window, Nielsen listened to a
radio report about a major ice floe coming down the Blackfoot. When he reached the
Milltown Dam, where the Clark Fork and Blackfoot converge, he saw “stunningly silvergray water coming over the dam,” which he thought, “very odd.” Out of curiosity he
took a small sample of water from below the dam. Then he followed the Blackfoot
northward for about a mile above the reservoir to check out the reported ice. Along with
“scores of drivers” and a film crew from the Montana Power Company, Nielsen watched
what the Missoulian later described as “crusty tundras of ice and snow that made the
Blackfoot River appear solid from bank to bank.”4
But the river wasn’t solid. Where Nielsen and others watched from the banks the
slow but steadily moving crush of frozen water had temporarily backed up at a sharp
bend in the river. Later that evening, a section of the ice floe swept a century-old home
and woodshop off their foundations, ruining both. As one local resident, Richard Frank,
put it, “(w)hen it starts to move, there is nothing that can stop it.” That’s what worried
the dam’s owners. Although MPC spokesman Cort Freeman later claimed “we never
expected the dam to fail at all,” the company took immediate steps to minimize any
4
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damage that the ice might inflict. Engineers opened some of the dam’s flow gates,
quickly dropping the water level in the reservoir. The sudden drop in water level stalled
and collapsed the miles of ice battering its way toward Milltown, propelled by a river
flowing at about 14,000 cubic feet per second or nearly ten times the Blackfoot’s average.
Colder temperatures in the following days further stabilized the moving mass, as well as
diminishing the early spring run-off that was swelling the river. People’s immediate
attention turned to other statewide flooding, including the drowning of a Missoula area
student who fell into the Clark Fork and got trapped under the sheets of ice that lined its
banks.5
In the days following Nielsen’s trip up the Blackfoot to collect water samples
hundreds of National Guard troops along with resident volunteers mucked out ditches,
stacked sandbags, and hauled valuables to contain or minimize the damage from
widespread flooding around western Montana. The day or so of excitement near
Milltown faded as quickly as the Blackfoot’s diminishing flow undercut the ice jam,
breaking it apart and floating it downstream in smaller chunks.6
By the first of March some of that excitement returned in the form of concern
over effects stemming from how the Montana Power Company had tried to halt the giant
jam. The day after the ice jams drew attention, the Missoula health department
resampled water below the Milltown Dam and discovered what Nielsen described as
“enormously high levels of copper” in the water. The news of how the rapid drawdown
of the dam that staved off the ice jam had fouled the river generated huge public concern.
5
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After the local newspaper printed Nielsen’s review of health department samples that
contained forty times the state standard for waterborne copper, ten times that of zinc, and
five times that of arsenic, people reacted. Nielsen called the heavy metal numbers
“serious” and “quite a bit worse than any data I’ve been able to find.” The Clark Fork
Coalition’s staff scientist, Geoff Smith, saw the event as a concern for the “biological
integrity of the Clark Fork and the safety of Missoula’s aquifer.” While both men praised
MPC for protecting the safety of the dam itself, they also recognized that preserving the
dam with all the toxic metal behind it was a permanent problem, not a permanent
solution. Nielsen broached the question that would soon reanimate the debate about what
cleanup meant at Milltown when he asked, “Are we going to leave those sediments in
place? Could this sort of thing happen again?”7
People began to weigh in on that question immediately. Montana Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks fisheries manager Dennis Workman reasoned that as long as the Milltown
sediments were in place the river would periodically flush them downstream. But, what
happened in February 1996, was, he thought, “a major event.” Workman estimated that
the event killed “loads” of fish, even if the stuff Nielsen had wondered about as it poured
over the dam made it impossible to see. Like someone breathing heavily contaminated
smoke that irritates their lungs, fish exposed to that quantity of sediment, let alone
sediment laced with heavy metals, produce so much mucous in their gills that they
literally drown in it. More fish would die throughout the year as they ate metal poisoned
insects, Workman predicted. 8
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Just as the ice jam had fascinated onlookers, its consequences angered them.
According to Nielsen, “the EPA received more phone calls and letters about Milltown
that any other Superfund site following the ice jam. The reaction was triggered by fish
kills and it was trout fishermen.” Summarizing local sentiment, the Missoulian printed
an editorial entitled, “Milltown toxins must go.” In answer to Nielsen’s query about the
ice jam being a recurrent problem, the editorial read “(i)t’s easy to imagine river flows
and ice conditions that might create far worse problem.” Although no one knew it at the
time, the winter of 1996 would pale in comparison to that of the following year. Nobody
needed to be able to predict an individual flood or ice event to foresee that over time the
river would threaten the dam.9
The thought of a flood or dam failure was hardly new. But the reality of such an
event changed the fate of the site more than the hypotheses. And the reality contrasted
with previous estimates of what the dam could withstand. In 1996 the ice-choked
Blackfoot flowing at 14,000 cfs had paled in comparison to the “probable maximum
flood” levels that MPC estimated their dam could withstand. If 14,000 cfs caused minor
structural damage and forced the company to dump reservoir water that resulted in
alarmingly high levels of downstream toxicity, what would the 271,400 cfs do that MPC
claimed the structure could tolerate? Looking back at the 1908 flood, which peaked at
48,000 cfs and nearly wiped out what was then called Clark’s Dam, a river running more
than five times that volume was an absurdity. The last time that much water had flowed
through the canyon where the dam stood was probably at the end of the last ice age, over
10,000 years earlier. An independent contractor supposed that the dam could withstand a
9
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“100-year flood” of the more modest level of 50,000 cfs. More importantly, they pointed
out that even if the dam held, “(t)hese flows will cause scour and transport of the trapped
sediments that are located throughout the Clark Fork River basin and also those that are
trapped in Milltown Reservoir.” The EPA had shared concerns of this nature, too. As
early as 1992 the agency compiled a literature review of “dam-breaks and sediment
releases following dam-breaks,” as part of the Milltown site risk assessment “to identify
similar dams that have failed and document the consequences of failure, especially with
regard to sediment released from the impounded reservoir.” Their most pertinent
discovery was of a 1991 dam failure on Idaho’s Middle Fork of the Boise River. There, a
normal spring flood washed out a dam of similar age and construction as Milltown’s,
along with a quarter million cubic yards of sediment contaminated with heavy metals
from a century of upstream mining. The parallels with Milltown were uncanny, except
that the Kirby Dam was much smaller and its sediment load a fraction of what Milltown
impounded. And no Missoula sat immediately downstream of the dam.10
The events of 1996 hardly compared to a complete dam failure. But they made
many people realize that catastrophe was a real possibility. By April, the Missoula CityCounty Health Department released the official results of its Clark Fork River water
sampling from the previous two months. The report confirmed Nielsen’s earlier
assessments. It also gave the public and involved parties some more tangible ways of
seeing the events of February than the rather abstract counts of heavy metal molecules
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per million. The ice jam measured “10 foot high, 40 feet wide and five miles long.” The
result of its movement down the Blackfoot at about “8-10 miles per hour” were, among
other things, “approximately 6 inches of sediments…on the bank” of the Clark Fork
below the dam once the water level receded. Along with charts showing the specifics of
the contaminants the ice floe had flushed downstream, the report made it clear that the
event had essentially extended the Milltown Superfund site downstream of the dam.
Calls for a different solution than leaving sediments behind Milltown Dam accelerated
throughout the spring of 1996. But those calls emphasized the need for patience.11
Nationally the EPA received plenty of criticism in its first decade and a half for
implementing Superfund projects too slowly. But a close look at Milltown revealed that
taking more time, not less, resulted in a more thorough cleanup. And while local people
may have urged the EPA to implement some solutions as quickly as possible, they also
understood the need for patience in achieving the best long-term solution to the pollution
problem. The local chapter of Trout Unlimited exemplified as much when they penned a
letter to EPA Director Carol Browner stating, “we ask you to delay your decision and to,
please, select another alternative than leaving the sediments in place untreated. Milltown
has been on the National Priority List since 1982 so there is no need to rush now.”
Within a month of the ice event, the Missoula City Council teamed up with Peter
Nielsen and the health department to write a resolution requesting a more permanent fix
at Milltown than leaving sediments in place and resolving that the EPA should delay its

11

Missoula City-County Health Department, “Water Quality Sampling Associated with
Ice Scouring and Flooding, Milltown Reservoir and Clark Fork River,” 4/1/1996, in U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site
Records, reel 932 Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.

188

Chapter 5: Another River Runs Through It

decision. When the City Council passed the resolution on March 21, 1996, it included
the argument that local businesses and municipal facilities had to abide by water quality
standards so the Superfund remedy should as well. Predictable violations of those
standards, such as happened in February because of sediment scouring, were an
unacceptable solution for Milltown. So too, the group resolved that the EPA should not
cap the price tag of a solution. And, their resolution ended with a request for a delay in
the process. The EPA fielded similar letters from Milltown and Missoula citizens,
including one from a high school science class. Another letter co-signed by fifteen
people ended with the request that the agency avoid hurrying and instead “continue” with
“careful planning to get the best result.” The Missoula City-County Water Quality
Advisory Council, “a group of 20 water resource professionals from industry, research,
local agency, and citizen groups,” framed its request for a delay around the question they
posed to regional EPA director John Wardell as to “why your agency finds that this
structure (Milltown Dam) is secure for the 100-1000 year time frame of the alternatives”
currently on the table.12
The EPA responded. Wardell let the local Trout Unlimited group know that his
agency had “received several comments…requesting delay of the feasibility study and
decision for the Milltown Reservoir Site. In light of this public comment and the
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February ‘scouring episode,’ we are taking this request very seriously.” Peter Nielsen
recalled that in a private conversation with the city-county commissioners, Wardell said,
“We’ve decided to re-examine our thinking.” Knowing that the regional director often
resorted to understatement, Nielsen recognized that this meant sediment removal and
possibly dam removal were viable options. Wardell’s comment appeared in the local
newspaper on May Day 1996, although the paper reported him as saying that the EPA
was unlikely “to recommend removal of the 6.6 million cubic yards of metals-polluted
sediment in the reservoir.” The estimated $134 million price tag was prohibitive. What
the EPA did do was to delay the feasibility study, just as so many people had urged. That
delay aimed at addressing how the Milltown Site was affecting the river below the dam
and what solving that added problem entailed.13

Support for delaying a Superfund site on the National Priority List, especially one
that was part of the largest such complex in the country, ran counter to the national
dialogue on toxic site cleanup at the turn of the 21st century. Mostly it was a partisan
dialogue and both sides advocated faster cleanups. By a few key indicators, such as
number of toxic sites identified, remedial actions taken and completed, as well as site
expenditures – the Clinton years were the high point for Superfund. During most of the
1990s the EPA added sites to the NPL list more rapidly than during any other period. So,
too, the agency remediated and removed sites from that list at a faster rate than before.
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And the cost of site cleanups dipped. The EPA gave credit for these signs of success to
their emphasis on prioritizing, using risk assessments to drive listing, and cleanup
decisions. National news stories and analysis touted faster and cheaper cleanups as an
improvement in Superfund implementation.
One reason for such success was the Clinton administration support of EPA
funding. Threatening to veto any general budget bill that cut the agency’s funding,
Clinton forced Congress to leave the EPA pocketbook intact during heated negotiations
over the federal government’s spending throughout the 1996 legislative session, when
Superfund was up for renewal. According to the New York Times, the executive victory
on environmental issues was one of the few things the White House could “crow about.”
Regardless, Congressional Republicans, such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich,
continued their barrage of criticism, charging that “Superfund…is one of the most flawed
programs ever designed in the name of environmental protection.” Using selective
statistics, Gingrich added that “(o)ver 16 years we have spent $15 billion and cleaned up
fewer than 100 sites out of 1,600.” The speaker failed to account for the tens of
thousands of sites the EPA had cleaned up without ever listing them on the NPL, as well
as the fact that most of the 1600 or so on his list were deep into the cleanup process.
From another perspective, “(t)wice as many cleanups have been completed in the five
years of the Clinton Administration than in the previous 12 years,” reported the Times in
1998. And as Milltown illustrated, in some places people advocated patience over haste
when dealing with their waste. Yet what Gingrich and other critics most conflated was
the issue of Superfund expenditures. He and other critics implied that the EPA was
wasting public funds, when, in fact, nearly every cent of the Superfund budget came from
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special taxes on polluters or liability suits against PRPs. The “polluter pays” still reigned
at Superfund. And despite the sharp contrast of opinions of how to change Superfund,
Congress renewed the program with virtually no amendments through the 1990s, mostly
by simply reauthorizing its funding scheme. And against stiff opposition, Clinton
oversaw a continuation of Superfund’s primary principle of the polluter paying for toxic
cleanups.14
Republican lawmakers tried and failed to undermine the tradition of corporate
responsibility in Superfund in a variety of ways. A 1997 defense bill included a
provision that “would have exempted W.R. Grace & Company, the former operator of a
Federal Superfund site, from further liability for cleanup costs” at a site where the giant
international chemical manufacturing company had paid only $800,000 of an expected
$120 million bill. In an example that reverberated throughout Montana, Republican
leaders exempted the Clark Fork River from a provision of their Superfund renewal bill
that limited states’ abilities to sue PRPs for natural resource damage claims. They did so
because Montana’s $765 million suit against ARCO was still pending and Republicans
needed the support of Montana Senator Max Baucus, the ranking Democrat on the
Environmental Committee that was vetting the bill. According to the Times, “if Mr.
Baucus was impressed by the gambit, he did not show it at the hearing.” The bill failed,
leaving all states with the opportunity to press for restoration funding from responsible
parties. Through the end of the Clinton administration, the president, Congressional
14
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Democrats, and EPA administrators combined to keep Superfund intact. And the EPA
fostered a more efficient program by most measurements through administration choices.
One such choice continued to be integrating public opinion into each stage of the cleanup
process. That was certainly true when it came to how the EPA responded to the
aftermath of the 1996 ice-scouring episode at Milltown.15

The EPA’s first effort to find a new solution to the downstream contamination
caused by the partially-frozen Blackfoot was to divide the Milltown Site into two cleanup
decisions. One would address the contaminated aquifer; the other, the problems of
downstream contamination. By doing so, the agency hoped to salvage the first feasibility
study with its option of leaving sediments in place as the solution to the aquifer problem.
Then they would consider a different solution to fix the troubles below the dam, such as
skimming the most mobile sediments off the top of the reservoir’s 6.6 million cubic yard
load. The agency began by requesting public opinion.16
With one notable exception, people opposed the idea of breaking Milltown’s
cleanup into two parts. The Montana Power Company supported the proposed split. A
month later, in October, 1996, the EPA sent ARCO comments on the Draft Feasibility
Study due for official release in December. The comments therein indicated that the
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agency assumed its Milltown splitting proposal would gain public approval. They were
wrong. The CFC wrote in mid-November opposing the plan. Restating its request for a
delay, the organization’s director, Meg Nelson, emphasized their belief that the worry
about downstream contamination was linked to the entire Milltown site, not just the top
layer of easily mobile sediments. The group favored a single, thorough solution that
would address all the risks posed by the dam and its sediments. The Missoula Board of
County Commissioners seconded that opposition and the views substantiating it. The
MTAC weighted in similarly.
On December 23 the EPA announced that such comments had swayed it against
separating the site into two parts. Instead, the agency would delay the whole process
while it, the state, the PRP, and other concerned organizations pursued a new “focused
Feasibility Study to address the release of sediments from the Milltown Reservoir” as
well as the groundwater. The new timeline predicted that the focused study would
culminate “between January 1997 and early 1998.”17

On May ninth and tenth, 1996, 650 sixth-graders from Missoula and the
Milltown area attended class on the banks of the Clark Fork River below the Milltown
Dam. They spent their two days of open-air study learning about water. Activities and
workshops helped them visualize the movement of individual water molecules through a
17
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seemingly endless cycle of evaporation, transpiration, condensation, and precipitation.
They gained an understanding of their local watershed by playing games in which each
student took on the role of some major aquatic components. Some kids acted like clean
water helping guide their classmates, who mimicked native fish, through the perils of
those approximating rocks, log jams, toxic chemicals, and a dam. The watershed became
an obstacle course of friends and foes. Amy Michels recalled playing an insect that “had
to die because of the pollution or chemical we were killed by.” A special section of the
Missoulian devoted to area students featured Hank Schewe’s acrostic poem about one of
western Montana’s native fish. Reflecting some of the things he’d learned, Schewe
wrote:
Becoming extinct
Underwater life
Lives by eating bugs
Lives a life of danger
Trout family
Really hard to tell the difference
Over dams
Under rocks
Trouble.
The fact that hundreds of grade-schoolers were becoming well acquainted with the perils
of life in their local rivers, especially the lives of bull trout, was more than the product of
an isolated day out of the classroom.18
The truth was, in the 1990s the Blackfoot River got a great deal of attention. And
as with so many environmental efforts and issues, a single species came to symbolize a
place’s problems and people’s hopes for its future. In the case of the Blackfoot, that
species was the bull trout. A host of local, state, and federal environmental agencies,
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businesses, and organizations sponsored the Watershed Festival that gathered Michels,
Schewe and their peers to the Clark Fork. With sponsors like the U.S. Forest Service,
Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, the local natural history center and city health
department, as well as Montana Power and the local mall, the event indicated the range of
interests at stake. Its emphasis on children revealed community-wide interest and the
degree to which concern about the watershed’s problems were becoming common
knowledge. And the content of the festival left no doubt that one of the key things to
know about the local river system was that it had problems alongside great potential. The
most frequently noted symptom of those problems was fish, or their lack. Summarizing
this focus on fish, Montana FWP wrote to John Wardell in May, 1996, that “(t)he demand
for wild trout fishing is growing but our ability to increase opportunities is limited.”
Potentially, the letter continued, “(o)ne of the ways we could accommodate more demand
is to improve fish populations in the Clark Fork where they are depressed.” Before and
after 1996, FWP along with other organizations had been trying to make those
improvements, especially by attending to the nationally-famous trout stream, the
Blackfoot River.19
The efforts to improve the Blackfoot River’s fishery were connected to the
Milltown Superfund site. By early 1997 the EPA had a list of the initiatives it had taken
to address the “1996 ice scouring event which was the incident that brought the potential
severity of such events to light.” Almost all of their efforts aimed to curtail the death of
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fish downstream from the dam. That work resonated with what had been happening on
the Blackfoot for years and would soon directly involve the Milltown Dam.
What had been occurring on the Blackfoot became a clear example of the
principle of unforeseen consequences in Superfund sites. In the early 1990s the decline
of the Blackfoot’s fishery garnered growing attention, which eventually led to studies of
how the Milltown Dam impacted that river and not just the Clark Fork. The historical
and cultural importance of the Blackfoot inspired far more people to get involved with
the Superfund decision at Milltown than was the case when the Clark Fork was the
dominant focus. The other river that ran through the Milltown site made a bit difference.

Historically, studies of the Clark Fork showed that the biggest reason that a
modicum of fish managed to survive in the river was due to its tributaries. While mature
fish, whether native or not, had very little tolerance for the rates and kinds of pollution in
the main river, young fry had even less. So most of the viable spawning habitat that
regenerated the Clark Fork fishery was in the colder, faster moving streams and rivers
that fed it. Above Missoula, the Blackfoot was the largest of these. In fact, historical
averages show that the Blackfoot, at 1606 cfs, carried more water than the Clark Fork’s
1369 cfs. For most of the year, including at flood stages, the Blackfoot more than
doubled the size of the Clark Fork at the same point that it gave up its name, somewhere
beneath the Milltown Reservoir. By burying the confluence of both rivers, the dam and
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reservoir were degrading the Blackfoot’s ability to regenerate its fishery. Or as Hank
Schewe put it, “over dams…trouble.”20
People began considering how to mitigate the dam’s effects on migrating fish
during the Montana Power Company’s efforts to relicense their dam in the 1980s.
Because of pressure by groups like the CFC over fish passage, the license extension that
MPC finally attained included requirements that the company study and fund fish
mitigation.21
At the same time, the Blackfoot River came under organized scrutiny. In 1988 a
new chapter of Trout Unlimited formed on the Blackfoot River and launched “a fiveyear, $220,000 study.” The chapter, formed by concerned fishermen, raised money to
help fund the work of state FWP fisheries biologists hoping to “pinpoint why fishermen
have been reporting declining catches of trout in the Big Blackfoot the past few years.”
FWP biologist Don Peters speculated that the river’s recent lack of fish had multiple
causes, including elevated levels of silt from soil erosion caused by excessive logging
that in the basin, heavy metals from historic mining in and around the Blackfoot’s
headwaters, and the river’s popularity among fishermen, or overfishing. Within a year,
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Peters’ speculations proved fairly accurate. The continual industrial uses of the river
basin were damaging water quality; what remained, people loved to death.22
The first solutions that FWP biologists suggested were to regulate fishing and fix
some of the Blackfoot’s tributaries. Don Peters proposed making cutthroat and bull trout
catch-and-release to help keep breeding fish in the river. According to studies of what
Peters called “the crash” – the decline of the Blackfoot fishery since the 1970s – the two
native fish, cutthroats and bull trout, were probably at all time population lows.
Averaging 1.8 cutthroats and 0.2 bull trout per thousand feet, the river wasn’t providing
many opportunities to anglers anyway. The new policy would require the very deft or
lucky fishermen who actually caught a native trout to throw it back. The strategy aimed
to keep breeding fish in the river. Along with more fish, the river needed mending.23
The Big Blackfoot chapter of Trout Unlimited led the effort to restore its
namesake river’s tributaries. After Peter Nielsen began directing the CFC he hired Bruce
Farlin, who like Nielsen, had come to Missoula with an interest in rivers and
environmental science. His job at CFC was to combine his science background with his
graduate degree in journalism from the University of Montana to begin informing the
public about what was happening in the watershed. After six years with the coalition,
Farling became the director of the state’s branch of Trout Unlimited. Recalling the
efforts in the late ‘80s to revive the Blackfoot, he said that most of the tributary work
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hinged on good personal relationships as much as anything. “A bunch of them were
friends of mine,” was the way Farling described members of environmental organizations
like the National Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited, the Clark Fork Coalition, and the
Blackfoot Challenge, the latter a group of land owners who organized to help protect both
the wild and working heritage of their watershed. As a newspaper special on Blackfoot
restoration work put it, “(t)he state, with help from its friends, wants to repair some
damage.” In fact, land owners completely funded the first tributary restoration project on
the river, which “served as a training ground for FWP biologists in reconstructing trout
streams,” according to a Missoulian feature. Friendship and good personal relationships
are rarely noted as the drivers of historical changes, but according to Farling and others
who worked on the Blackfoot, those were important forces for that river and for the
whole of the Clark Fork in the late 20th century. 24
In the next few years studies revealed very few surprises about what was harming
the Blackfoot fishery and steps to fix it began to succeed. Logging plagued the lower
river. Since before William Clark funded the Milltown Dam, whole logs had choked the
Blackfoot’s lower stretches. Spring high water floated thousands of winter-cut trees
toward the lumber mills located at the Blackfoot’s confluence with the Clark Fork,
ravaging the river’s bed and banks for miles and devastating spawning runs. Sediment
from cut-over soil rushed into the river along with the seasonal thawing of mountain
snowpack, clogging the river’s gravel beds where trout laid their eggs and the insects on
which they fed spent most of their lives. Modern logging substituted roads and trucks for
the river. During the 1970s and ‘80s the United States Forest Service built 340,000 miles
24
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of road, mostly in western national forests. At eight times the length of all interstate
highways, that effort made the USFS the country’s most prolific road-builders. It also
enabled modern, corporate logging on public lands. Through the 1980s logging roads in
the Blackfoot gave industrial logging companies access to tens of thousands of acres,
which they commonly clear-cut, leaving denuded hillsides and road cuts behind, both of
which accelerated sedimentation into the river below. In his book Last Stand, about
illegal clear-cutting practices in the Blackfoot Valley, Missoulian journalist Richard
Manning described how “(s)ilt gathers in the spaces between rocks where trout deposit
eggs, smothering both the eggs and young trout. In a few years, once vibrant trout
streams become sterile ditches, broken by the work of carrying topsoil away.” He based
that description on what he, scores of trout fishermen, and a growing contingent of
fisheries biologists had observed in the Blackfoot River.25
The upper river suffered from its mining legacy. In particular, an old dam that
held back mine tailings and heavy metal-contaminated water burst in 1975. By 1988
studies showed that native fish populations were still “20 times less than in a 1973
study.” What few fish remained in the whole river bore the brunt of heavy fishing.26
By 1991, great effort had improved the Blackfoot. As one story in the local
outdoors section of the newspaper speculated, all the press about how poor the river was
fishing in recent years might have helped keep anglers away. Fewer fishermen, alongside
Don Peters’ creel limits on native fish, combined to help more fish live and reproduce,
especially in some of the waterway’s newly-mended tributaries. With a few high water
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years to wash out some of the sediment accumulation in the main channel, Peters
predicted, the river might rival Rock Creek, a nationally-renowned trout stream that feeds
the Clark Fork above its confluence with the Blackfoot. “It’s better big-fish habitat. The
bug life is there, the deep holes, I think it’s going to produce big fish consistently,” he
said. That prediction was about to be tested. But the Blackfoot was also about to gain a
much larger audience, most of whom cheered its recovery.27
In the spring of 1992 American Rivers, the nation’s largest all-purpose river
advocacy group, named the Blackfoot one of the country’s ten most endangered rivers.
The group made special mention of the river’s devastated native trout populations,
especially that of the bull trout. By then the Montana legislature had declared the upper
Blackfoot a state Superfund site, but scheduled cleanup work for 1995 at the earliest.
Well before that, a different and much wider sort of recognition contributed to the
concern for the imperiled Blackfoot.28
In A River Runs Through It the Blackfoot River was too lame to play itself. The
first showing of Redford’s creation was in Bozeman, MT, a three-hour drive east and
over the Continental Divide from Missoula. The choice to screen the movie outside of
Missoula followed from the earlier choice to exclude the real Blackfoot from the making
of the film. When producers toured the river that ran through Maclean’s tale they
deemed it too degraded to star on the big screen. So, they shot the movie’s many
dramatic river scenes on the Gallatin River south of Bozeman, Montana, on the
headwaters of the Missouri River rather than those of the Columbia. While that irked
27
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many people in western Montana when it came time to debut the movie, they seemed to
understand. The Blackfoot was not pretty enough for Hollywood. But they also hoped
that its portrayal by a worthy double might help repair it. A month after the premier, the
Big Blackfoot chapter of TU, the CFC, and a local fly-fishing shop sponsored a benefit
screening of A River Runs Through It in Missoula to raise money for the river restoration
projects they were helping to organize and oversee. Nationally, the movie paid
immediate dividends to the real Blackfoot as well. By the spring of 1993, the river’s TU
chapter received nearly $200,000 from donations collected by Orvis, an outdoor gear
company that specializes in fly-fishing equipment. The company had advertised the
Blackfoot’s problems and needs in national outdoor magazines and offered donors of
more than $150 “a special edition copy of Norman Maclean’s book.” Anyone giving
double that amount received a copy of the book The Making of A River Runs Through It
signed by Robert Redford. The Orvis money helped TU toward its goal of $400,000 for
the Blackfoot projects, which would trigger the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to
contribute another $200,000.29
Meanwhile, the same people were involved in deciding how money should be
spent to deal with fish at Milltown Dam. In late October 1992, the Montana Power
Company released a draft of its “Milltown Fisheries Protection, Mitigation, and
Enhancement Plan,” which its license extension had required. The Westslope chapter of
Montana’s TU, the CFC, and the state’s FWP all consulted with MPC on the plan, along
with numerous other federal, state, and local agencies. The crossover of these groups
29
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would soon seem obvious as the dam became integral to the issue of fish in the
Blackfoot. At the time, most of the emphasis was on the Clark Fork. The draft plan
estimated that the dam blocked passage of spawning fish for “56.7 miles of the Clark
Fork River…and 13.5 miles of the Blackfoot.” Mostly the dam impeded upstream
migration of fish spawning either in the spring (rainbow and cutthroat trout) or the fall
(bull and brown trout). But those estimates lacked solid data on actual fish; they were
guesses based on comparing the rivers flowing into Milltown to other rivers in Montana.
The proposed solution of slowing dam drawdowns, funding hatchery fish to replace the
estimated spawning losses, transporting some fish over the dam, restoring tributaries on
both rivers to improve spawning habitat, and, of course, more study, would all cost MPC
$65,000 per year.30
Within a year the price tag had risen and the emphasis was more squarely on
research. For an additional $50,000 the company offered to fund a fish ladder that would
allow biologists to trap migratory fish and, in particular, “separate bull trout from other
species and tag them to track their migratory behavior.” Dennis Workman, a state FWP
fisheries biologist who had worked closely with Don Peters for years studying fish in the
Clark Fork watershed, praised MPC’s efforts saying, “(y)ou can’t ask for much more.”
Although most environmental groups ultimately opposed the idea of enhancing the rivers
with hatchery fish, as well as establishing a fixed financial obligation for MPC in
perpetuity, the rest of the plan continued to meet approval. As the CFC put it in a letter
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to MPC, “(e)mphasis in the plan should be placed on natural habitat improvements not
artificial quick-fix approaches.” The one interesting exception was ARCO. The
company commented that MPC’s study methods were flawed and that the Clark Fork
suffered from so many environmentally degrading uses that lack of passage around the
dam could not possibly account for the paltry number of trout in the river. In essence,
ARCO seemed to be trying to diffuse the blame for the fishery’s troubles.
Nonetheless, the plan was one more way that people began to connect the dam
with the Blackfoot, a connection that would later change the course of the Superfund
solution at Milltown. In spite of estimates that the dam was preventing “from 75 trout to
750 trout” per river mile pursuing their instinctual migrations, Don Sprague, manager of
MPC’s environmental department, said that dam removal was “not an option” due to the
sediment it harbored. At least not yet it wasn’t.31
Although MPC averred dam removal, in spite of that solution’s inclusion in
ongoing FS for Milltown, the company did court broad comment. In a letter announcing
the release of its final plan, MPC noted that it was required to include only comments
from a limited number of state agencies, but it had voluntarily solicited and incorporated
“full participation,” which allowed it to “reach substantial agreement on many issues.”
31
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One of the newest participants was the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
(CSKT).32
The tribe’s participation in the Superfund process at Milltown would grow to
include joining the state’s suit against ARCO and restoration work on tribal lands, but it
began with concern over fish. Along with A River Runs Through It, the most commonly
known cultural reference locals made about the Blackfoot came from tribal history. Long
before the Milltown Dam drowned the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork to
produce electricity, Salish speaking people used the area during their seasonal ventures
from the valleys radiating out from Missoula to the bison hunting grounds of eastern
Montana. As they traveled up the Clark Fork, bison hunting parties crossed the river’s
junction with present day Rattlesnake Creek, which they called Nł?ay(cčstm) or “place of
the small bull trout.” A few miles upstream from there they left the Clark Fork and began
following the Blackfoot at N?aycčstm. This “place of the big bull trout” offered a fine
camping spot where the Salish stopped to fish the waters of the confluence before their
journey over the Continental Divide.33
Although the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork was a unique place in
Salish tribal history, it was less unique as a general environment for bull trout. In spite of
their common name, bull trout are actually not trout. They are subgroup of salmon
known as char. Their taxonomical misrepresentation as trout stems from a long history
of refining the biological boundaries of different fish species. True arctic char, like bull
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trout, lack the teeth in the roof of their mouths that true trout possess. Through that long
process of distinguishing distinct fish species and naming them, bull trout acquired the
Latin name Salvelinus confluentus in the mid-19th century. The English translation of the
Linnaean genus and species appellation is roughly “brook trout” and “flowing together.”
The former refers to the bull trout’s early lumping with trout, the latter its preference for
spending most of its mature life in larger waters, especially the confluence of rivers that
provide access to cold spawning grounds and warmer wintering ones. The Salish and
Latin name for the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork told of the relationship
between place and species.34
Tribal involvement in the Milltown Superfund process hinged on their historic use
of places like the rivers’ confluence. The Hellgate Treaty of 1855 had pushed a
confederation of Salish, Kootenai, and Pend d’Oreille tribes onto a reservation north of
the Clark Fork River in Montana. The founding of the Flathead Reservation also
preserved the tribes’ access to traditional hunting and gathering grounds in western
Montana, including the “place of the big bull trout.” So in 1993, when the CSKT
commented on MPC’s plan to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish at their dam site, they
were asserting “legal interests to all aquatic resources associated with the Clark Fork
River.” In a letter to MPC, tribal council chairman Michael T. Pablo accepted most of
the company’s plans, but argued that the “commitment must be for a long term,”
34
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especially in regard to bull trout. The long history the tribe had with the Milltown area
and what was becoming its signature species, the bull trout, would soon dovetail with the
most thorough study of the dam’s effects on fish and the listing of the bull trout as an
endangered species by the federal government. All of these shaped Superfund decisions
at Milltown. This was one of those times when the letter of the law could not have
predicted what was going to happen. Rather, the process unfolded because local
conditions triggered or emphasized particular provisions within the Superfund law,
including its provisions demanding public input, according tribal sovereignty, and
accounting for other environmental laws, such as the Endangered Species Act.35

In the past, when people had taken fish out of the Clark Fork River and put them
in a cooler, those fish were most likely destined for a dinner table or freezer. In the
spring of 1995, coolers full of fish started helping Clark Fork fish survive, rather than
become a meal. With MPC money, Montana FWP biologists rigged the company’s dam
with a trap meant to catch native fish on their upstream spawning runs. As part of the
MPC mitigation plan, biologists used the trap to capture trout and transport them around
the dam in coolers because there were so few spawning-quality tributaries below the
structure and so many good ones above it. Biologists doing the work termed bull trout
“at risk of extinction throughout their historic range, and westslope cutthroat are ‘a
heartbeat away.’” The Missoulian article that first covered the story mentioned the
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importance of the rivers’ junction in Salish history, as well as the electro-tagging of
captured fish that would allow researchers to study their future.
The project of moving fish around a dam was hardly unique. At the same time
that dozens of fish traveled around Milltown Dam in plastic coolers, the federal
government was requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to spend hundreds of
millions of dollars a year to barge endangered salmon around a few of its dams on the
Columbia River. But riding in coolers in order to reach spawning grounds was a first for
fish on the Clark Fork since the dam’s erection 88 years before.36
Fish making it around Milltown Dam with a little help from biologists were meant
to help the ongoing efforts to revive the Blackfoot, as much as they were a part of the
Clark Fork Superfund process. A 1995 retrospective on those efforts celebrated the work
of Blackfoot Valley residents in raising money and awareness, which had amounted to
the restoration of hundreds of miles of the river’s tributaries, wetlands, and main channel.
That work began in the late 1970s with a loosely-knit group of valley landowners who
came together with ideas about how to enhance the Blackfoot watershed’s natural
resources, as well as its rural character. By 1993 the partnership named itself the
Blackfoot Challenge. Remaining locally organized and gaining national renown, the
Challenge has managed to foster the reintroduction of wolves and grizzly bears into the
basin, while also maintaining its ranching heritage and tailoring logging practices toward
better forest health. On the river itself, its members have worked with government
agencies and environmental groups to create log and debris dams meant to replicate what
beavers once did to establish a diverse ecosystem that favored trout reproduction.
36
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They’ve helped more beavers survive. Repairing tributaries from overgrazing, keeping
cows and logging out of the most sensitive riparian areas, and making irrigation more
efficient so more water stays in the river are all examples of their efforts. Most of that
work aimed to undo what a century or more of mining and its symbiotic industries of
logging and agriculture had done to the river. But garnering support for the Blackfoot’s
restoration also made people more willing to accept restrictive fishing regulations that
helped reverse the overharvesting that had resulted from the waterway’s popularity. In an
ironic but much needed twist, Redford’s movie and the resurgence in popularity of
Maclean’s book had helped charge support for the Blackfoot’s health, which decades of
overzealous fly-fishing had helped diminish.37
But celebrations of the Blackfoot’s future were, perhaps, premature. While the
history of mining had driven much of the damage done to the river, mining in the river
valley was not just history. In 1996, just after ice threatened to take out Milltown Dam,
the national environmental group American Rivers placed the Blackfoot River on its
annual list of the nation’s most threatened rivers. Four years earlier the same group had
listed the Blackfoot as one of the nation’s most endangered rivers. The leap from being
one of many endangered rivers, which meant that it had an “imminent risk of
destruction,” to being the most threatened, signifying its position at the “brink” of
demise, was due to mining. Just as things were looking better for the Blackfoot, a major
gold mining proposal threatened to turn back those efforts. Plans for an open pit mine
located above the Blackfoot’s headwaters near Lincoln, MT. (which had acquired its own

37

Ginny Merriam, “Bringing Back the Big Blackfoot,” Missoulian, 11/9/1995, C1. For
more on the Blackfoot Challenge, also see their webpage, which includes links to new
stories on the group’s history and achievements: http://blackfootchallenge.org/Articles/
210

Chapter 5: Another River Runs Through It

sort of fame when the FBI arrested Ted Kaczynski, aka the Unabomber, in his handcrafted cabin outside Lincoln in early April, 1996), included the practice of pouring
cyanide over heaps of raw ore to extract the precious metal. That threat got the Blackfoot
listed above such major watersheds as the Florida Everglades, the mighty and maligned
Mississippi River, and the urbanized Hackensack as it ran through New Jersey and New
York.
National prominence for the Blackfoot’s contemporary challenge came from local
effort. It was the Montana Environmental Information Center that nominated the
Blackfoot for American Rivers’ yearly “award.” And it became a mostly local effort to
protect the river against the mine proposal. The state’s governor at the time, Marc
Racicot, had put together a bull trout restoration team two years earlier to aid in the
revival of the Blackfoot. He did so because of local encouragement in the face of the
USFWS’s unwillingness to create a federal plan for the species. Montana’s bull trout
restoration plan was one of the first and most well regarded state-sponsored efforts on
behalf of the fish. It, along with western environmental organizations, helped push the
federal government to apply the Endangered Species Act to the bull trout. As Glen Marx,
the director of the state team, put it, “We want to prove we can managed bull trout…The
bull trout affects our economy, our quality of life, our recreation. Why shouldn’t we take
the lead in its recovery?” Marx hit on the trilogy of motives that infused most
environmental organizations by the 1990s, as well as pointed in the direction of local or
watershed management that many of those same groups favored. But this wasn’t the
fruits of a state’s rights movement, such as the Sagebrush Rebellion of the Reagan years.
Local groups and state agencies consistently looked for support within a federal
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framework. Racicot’s team ranged from the Bonneville Power Administration and major
timber interests to the CSKT, numerous state agencies, and environmental organizations.
In addition to helping restore bull trout, the team aimed to push the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to consideration of the species for listing under the ESA.
With the Blackfoot River and bull trout restoration at stake, Racicot joined a
chorus of concern over the proposed Seven-Up Pete mine. The CFC and others
denounced the mine’s proposal in an editorial to the Missoula newspaper that urged
people to go see the proposed mine site for themselves. The group asked the public to
imagine a “600-foot stack of waste rock, 895 acres of cyanide heap-leach pads, (and) an
almost square-mile wide pit” marring the recuperating Blackfoot’s upper reaches. Of
most prominent concern was the river’s rebounding fishery.38
The first major study of the mine proposal determined that the Blackfoot’s
headwaters were its richest spawning grounds and the ones most imperiled by the
proposed mine. In general, the river’s richness in terms of fish increased with distance
from the Milltown Dam. So, even as people fought against a near-future threat to the
river, they recognized its biggest ongoing problem.39
In 1997 American Rivers relisted the Blackfoot as one of the country’s most
threatened rivers, with the Missouri River replacing it in the top spot. Even so, the
Blackfoot’s cause was about to gain a very important ally in the form of more federal
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environmental law. Just as with the Superfund process that was beginning to tie the
Blackfoot more securely to the fate of Milltown and the Clark Fork, the designation of
the bull trout under the Endangered Species Act hinged on local efforts. By century’s
end, ongoing local efforts along with damning environmental impact statements would
stop the Seven-Up Pete mine proposal. That was no small victory for advocates of a
clean Blackfoot. Phelps Dodge owned the Blackfoot mining venture and poured $2
million into a campaign that killed a 1996 citizens initiative vote in Montana that would
have made cyanide extraction of gold illegal. In his book on the history of the Blackfoot
and that particular initiative, journalist Richard Manning quoted the state’s Trout
Unlimited director, Bruce Farling, as saying, “We could have come up with an initiative
that said ‘Don’t rape grandmothers.’ If those guys opposed it with $2 million, it would
have lost.” But losing the fight to ban cyanide heap leach mining outright failed to kill
the more specific effort to disallow the actual mine. That was largely due to what
Manning referred to as the maturity of local environmental groups like the CFC, groups
that focused on whole regions or watersheds rather than single issues; that grew rather
than wilted through transitions in leadership and staff; and that worked, by and large,
with stable, government agencies rather than at odds with them.40
Beginning in 1997, local environmental and governmental efforts coincided to
support the listing of the bull trout on the Endangered Species list. That effort, along
with the ice jam of 1996, made the idea of maintaining the Milltown Dam as part of the
Superfund remedy substantially less tenable. At a summer public comment session on
the issue of bull trout’s ESA listing held in Missoula by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
40
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Service, only two of eighteen speakers opposed the measure. Both were timber industry
representatives. Those in favor were, according to the Missoulian, “conservation
organizations, including Friends of the Wild Swan and Alliance for the Wild Rockies
whose lawsuit forced the…Service to propose the listing.” These and other Montana
environmental advocates saw listing the bull trout not as simply a way to save a single
species, but as the means to protecting an entire ecosystem. As Alliance director Mike
Bader put it, “We think listing the bull trout would have many benefits…because it is an
indicator species of clean water supplies, [and] by protecting it, many other species
would benefit as well.” A fisheries biologists for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
shared that assessment. In fact, the use of endangered species as a tool to preserving
ecosystems had become the ESA’s most powerful and unexpected ramification. Indicator
species such as the bull trout stood in for the well being of their native environments, like
the Blackfoot watershed.41
Studies detailing the importance of the Blackfoot for bull trout spawning began to
pile up. A lot of that work was due to Montana FWP fisheries biologist Don Peters, who
vigorously opposed the plan to mine gold in the Blackfoot valley and leach it out of ore
with cyanide. His best weapon in fighting the mine was getting his agency to produce “a
thorough and ongoing analysis of fish populations in the upper Blackfoot and
its…tributaries.” He reasoned, according to the Missoulian, that “We’ve put half-amillion dollars a year into projects designed to improve habitat…in the Blackfoot…And,
in fact, it (the mine) has the great potential to harm a lot of our good work.” By April,
1998, the Blackfoot was on American Rivers’ list of most endangered rivers once again,
41
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with upstream mining the major worry. But by June, the presence of a single fisherman
casting a dry fly into the river about halfway between the proposed mine location and the
Milltown Dam would greatly lessen the gold mine’s chances. Bruce Babbit’s
announcement that the federal government had, after nearly a decade and a half of
indecision, listed the bull trout under the ESA, helped do just that.42
But for many people, a fish named “Pollywog” did more than anything to bring
attention to the connection between the Blackfoot river and the Milltown Dam and to
erode the idea of leaving the dam in place. And Pollywog was a product of Superfundrelated research at and on the dam. The story of Pollywog further demonstrates the
importance in Superfund implementation of corporate funds, science, individual efforts,
and public perception.

Like Peter Nielsen, David Schmetterling came to graduate school at the
University of Montana because of its location in western Montana as much as for its
academic offerings. In particular, both men loved the school’s proximity to rivers.
Schmetterling grew up in Maryland where he spent as much of his youth as possible
playing outdoors, “catching things,” especially fish. He remembers using field guides
and encyclopedias to make a list of all the fish he wanted to catch in their native waters as
a way “to explore different places and the country.” That list included cutthroat and bull
trout. After pursuing an undergraduate degree in architecture at Cornell, Schmetterling
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gravitated back to his childhood loves and that unfulfilled list. In the early 1990s he
moved to Montana in pursuit of both a master’s degree in fisheries biology at UM and the
state’s native fish.
After graduating and catching his share of fish out of the local rivers, Schetterling
began working for the state’s Fish, Wildlife, and Parks in 1995 out of the agency’s
Missoula office. As he remembers “apropos to Milltown, it was a really interesting
time.” His initial work was “with native species in the Blackfoot and Clark Fork Rivers
and understanding ways that anthropogenic influences across the landscape were
influencing fish like cutthroat and bull trout.” In the midst of that work, “Milltown Dam
kept coming up even though we weren’t looking at it,” he said. In terms of how it
affected fish, “there was very, very little information on the dam.” Schmetterling
surmised that the lack of information was because “it just seemed like a hopeless
situation.” His work soon changed that perception.
In 1998 Schmetterling started a research project on the dam. He asked what he
thought were a few basic questions. Was the dam still impeding fish migration almost a
century after it was built? If so, what fish was it affecting? Was fish passage necessary?
He asked these questions just as MPC was finalizing its fish mitigation plan. The plan
concluded that the dam altered fish life cycles for a fifteen-mile stretch of river at most.
Schmetterling’s findings forced a radical shift in that reasoning.43
What Schmetterling proved was that even with all the metals contamination and
other human changes to the Blackfoot and Clark Fork, they should support far more
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native fish. And the dam was to blame. At different times of the year, fish like cutthroat
and bull trout swam downstream from their breeding grounds over the Milltown Dam
using its spillway. But they never returned. Schmetterling “ultimately estimated that two
hundred thousand fish had their migrations annually impeded by the dam.” In the fall of
1998, David McEnvoy, one of the UM graduate students that Schmetterling was
mentoring through his study of the dam, told the local newspaper, “We estimated there
were 8,000 suckers in the pool one day. It was kind of disgusting. You could hardly
walk across the pool there were so many of them stacked up in there.” The urge to spawn
was driving those fish to the dam’s base. Essentially, the dam was blocking the
reproductive capacity of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork Rivers well into their headwaters
on the Continental Divide. Whereas the Clark Fork provided warmer water in which
many fish overwintered, the Blackfoot offered the best cold water spawning grounds.
Schmetterling was amazed that even after ninety years of running up against this
impediment, those fish still followed their evolutionary instinct to get past the dam. “One
brown trout’s been around here for three months trying to get over the dam. Almost
every time we come out here we catch him again,” marveled Schmetterling. Similarly,
many of the fish he observed stuck below the dam had abrasions all over their bodies
from launching themselves repeatedly against the nearly forty-foot tall structure. These
were Maclean’s “high jumping” trout, failing to clear a nearly century-old obstacle.
After fruitlessly flailing against the dam “they probably won’t spawn again,”
Schmetterling said. Bruce Farling credited Schmetterling’s work with connecting many
of the dots between the dam, fish passage, the Blackfoot’s health, and the ESA. Once
people understood that the dam prohibited bull trout spawning, it became “an illegal take
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of a listed species” because the dam prevented the fish from fulfilling “its life history
strategy, which is to move upstream and spawn,” said Farling. As a result, Farling
remembered, “what really pushed EPA over the edge to go, ‘removal is going to be a
serious option’ was that ice event and bull trout. The ice event freaked everybody out
and then bull trout was sort of an issue that was icing on top of that.” By the late ‘90s
everyone paying attention knew that the fish in the Salish name for the rivers’
confluence, “the place of the big bull trout,” as well as hundreds of thousands of other
native trout, should be populating Norman Maclean’s now-famous river.44
All those fish piling up under the Milltown Dam recast the understanding of the
structure’s effect on the rivers’ fisheries and strengthened the argument for fish passage.
But it was the fish that made it past the dam that really piqued public interest. The
Superfund process at Milltown resulted in MPC having to fund research, such as
Schmetterling’s that studied fish passage issues at the dam. With the hopes of connecting
communities to his research, Schmetterling started an “Adopt a Trout” program. He
figured that “the best way to discuss these issues…and invite people to see what we’re
doing…was through the eyes of children…(I)t really changed a lot of people’s
perceptions.” By 2001, Schmetterling had about a dozen elementary and high schools in
the Blackfoot and surrounding areas involved in tracking native fish that he had
implanted with radio transmitters. He gave students weekly updates on where their fish
were moving since he’d helped them over the dam. Delighted with the immediate
interest, Schmetterling recalled that “we’d go on field trips to the dam so they could
watch their fish being captured and implanted and then we’d…look at places where those
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fish are [sic] spawning…People got to learn about the history of the dam…Most…had
never been to the dam.”
The Seeley Lake Elementary school located on the Clearwater Creek tributary in
the middle reaches of the Blackfoot Valley named its adopted cutthroat trout Pollywog.
Pollywog found her way up the Blackfoot to Gold Creek, a particularly popular cutthroat
spawning tributary. She then returned downstream and hung out in Milltown Reservoir
for most of the summer, unable to get over the dam. One day Schmetterling got a call
from a man claiming to have caught a radio-tagged pike out of the reservoir. In the late
‘90s northern pike had moved down into the reservoir from the chain of lakes along the
Clearwater River where they had been illegally introduced. By 1999 fisherman reported
catching them regularly in the reservoir where they throve in its warm, stagnant water,
devouring the native fish. According to Schmetterling, the natives hadn’t yet learned to
recognize pike as predators, although they were very aggressive ones, especially during
spring run-off when cutthroats and bull trout moved downstream through the reservoir at
the same time that northern pike go through a “post-spawning…feeding frenzy.” When
he first heard the tale of a tagged pike, Schmetterling disbelieved the man since he hadn’t
tagged any of those non-native species, but the man’s father, who was a former director
of UM’s Wildlife Research Unit, got on the line and confirmed the fish story. When the
father and son read him the radio tag information, Schmetterling realized what had
happened. The pike and tag were “all that remained of Pollywog,” he concluded. The
story made the Missoulian and, as Schmetterling remembered, “(t)he kids were outraged.
The parents were outraged that this cutthroat trout had been eaten by a northern pike.
(They) could not believe that people weren’t doing something more to stop this.” During
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the course of the “Adopt a Trout” program, Schmetterling encountered many other
instances where participants were amazed and angered by how the dam and reservoir
were affecting their fish.
Suddenly a whole new contingent of people saw the need for a different solution
to Milltown than simply leaving the dam in place. That began to include MPC. With the
number of fish Schmetterling had trapped and counted below the dam, along with the
newer concern over pike eating native and threatened fish, “fish passage was going to be
really costly,” he emphasized.45
Schmetterling never explicitly advocated dam removal, but ultimately that was
the message people took from his work. Had he simply shown that the dam impeded
migrating fish, especially the threatened bull trout, a fish ladder or some other means of
transporting native species over the dam might have solved the problem. Combining
statistics on the large number of native fish the dam halted in their reproductive cycle,
habitat for predatory non-native species, and, finally, the expense of transporting fish
around the dam, made on-going mitigation seem untenable to an ever widening
community of people.

The ice jam of 1996 killed fish downstream of the Milltown Dam. In doing so, it
essentially perforated the notion of a contained Superfund site and made the remedy of
leaving the dam and sediments in place far less viable. It also helped delay the decision
process by forcing a reevaluation of the feasibility study for Milltown. That delay
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Schmetterling, OH-428-06,. Also see, Sherry Devlin, “Trout by trout: Biologists
carrying cutthroats up and over Milltown Dam to help embattled fish complete their
spawning cycle,” Missoulian, 5/27/1999, C1.
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allowed for the unfolding of other events that put the Blackfoot River at the center of the
Milltown problem. Schmetterling’s work, and the specter of having bull trout on the
Endangered Species list, “really brought a lot of attention to the dam,” according to the
biologist. It all happened at a time when the Blackfoot River was in the news and on
people’s minds. The river’s rebounding fishery, along with the movie that helped revive
its popularity and concern for it, and a raft of study and restoration efforts, all meant that
Norman Maclean’s river was seeing more traffic than it ever had. By the turn of the
century, the Blackfoot had a new set of regulations in place meant to preserve its
struggling fish population and manage its human usage. With western Montanans
leading the effort, the Blackfoot had also survived a proposal to mine the gold from its
headwaters. Federal listing of the bull trout combined with Schmetterling’s research
made the dam culpable for taking the lives of an endangered species.46
In essence, between 1996 and 1998 the Blackfoot River came into the spotlight of
the Milltown Superfund process. An ice jam, a major Hollywood movie, the study of
native migratory fish, and a fish called Pollywog placed the Blackfoot at the center of the
solution for the contaminated reservoir under which it joined the Clark Fork. In
particular, those events attracted enough attention to give life and eventual success to the
next major campaign to alter the permanent remedy at Milltown. Following from these
events, the first substantial call for removing the Milltown Dam would drown the idea of
leaving it all in place. What happened in connection with the Blackfoot River was about
to lead to a whole lot more people looking at the place where Milltown Dam and its
46

Sherry Devlin, “A river run ragged,” Missoulian, 3/14/1999, B1. Devlin, “Protect
Blackfoot River but keep it open, agency told,” Missoulian, 3/17/1999, B1. Land
Lindbergh, Guest Column, “Restrictions on recreation may be wisest course to save the
Blackfoot,” Missoulian, 4/6/1999, A5.
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reservoir were and considering that, perhaps, there should be an more natural river
running through it.
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Chapter 6
The Campaign:
“Remove the Dam. Restore the River.”

Peter Nielsen never imagined the September eleventh terrorist attacks would
reverberate through the Superfund process at Milltown. Yet barely a year after the
destruction of the twin towers in New York City, the fear of further terrorism in the U.S.
and the federal government’s efforts to prevent it provided one of the last proverbial nails
in the coffin of Milltown Dam.
Just before Christmas, 2002, Nielsen was sitting in his office at the Missoula CityCounty Health Department making a routine check of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s website. To his surprise, a seismic study of the dam popped up. It
described large cracks, massive leaking and the structure’s vulnerability to earthquakes.
Nielsen called FERC for an explanation. As he put it, “somebody didn’t get the memo at
FERC and they were posting documents that were supposed to be classified…about
the…vulnerabilities in our nation’s infrastructure.” By the next day a TV cameraman
from a local station visited Nielsen’s office, hoping to film the documents on FERC’s
website. With camera’s rolling, Nielsen logged on to the FERC site only to find that the
agency had pulled the information, labeling it classified under the auspices of “national
security.” As Nielsen later learned, part of the federal government’s efforts to prevent
future 9/11-like attacks enabled FERC to “put the clamps on certain things so terrorists
could not get in there and get diagrams to Grand Coulee” dam, for example.1

1

Sherry Devlin, “Milltown messages removed from FERC site,” Missoulian, 12/24/02,
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The story of FERC withholding safety information about a seriously
compromised dam that held back contamination in part of the country’s largest Superfund
site made national news, including a retelling in the Washington Post. A number of
Freedom of Information Act watchdog websites covered the story. In Missoula, it
prompted County Commissioner Barbara Evans to call the dam’s owners and convince
them to release the reports. “At the end of that conversation,” according to Nielsen, MPC
“decided they’d rather take their chances with terrorists” than with Evans. FERC issued
Evans a formal apology and agreed to provide the city and county with any information
they wanted about the dam. And, the incident helped push Montana’s Republican
Governor Judy Martz to come out in support of dam removal. The mistake at FERC,
which associated the Milltown Dam with 9/11, dovetailed with a local campaign that had
dramatically raised awareness about the Milltown Superfund site. The result was a flood
of public support for the removal of the dam and the site’s contaminated sediments.2
More than anything, the unlikely contingency of a FERC employee mistakenly
posting a classified document about the Milltown dam and Nielsen happening to see it
while “dink(ing) around on the computer” during his lunch hour raised people’s fear of
leaving an old and damaged dam in place by associating it with the national fears
surrounding terrorism. But legitimate fear of keeping the Milltown Dam in place as a
Superfund solution was only one of the reasons that the site garnered a record number of
public comments during the EPA’s efforts to pick a cleanup remedy. In the first few
years of the new millennium, people bombarded the EPA with comments about the site
because of their fears, their economic concerns, and their sense of fun. Those comments

2
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reflected and reiterated the Clark Fork Coalition’s advocacy campaign about the
Superfund site. The CFC’s campaign to remove the dam and restore the river
transformed the Superfund process. The campaign and resultant public outcry combined
Superfund’s original mandate to remediate contaminated places and its new dimension of
restoring environments.
The success of the campaign and the reaction of its opponents revealed a powerful
new direction for Superfund and environmentalism, as well as a case study in how
struggles over the environment are not a winner-take-all prospect. In his essay
“Reflections on a Spare Tire: SUVs and the Postmodern Environmental Consciousness”
environmental historian William Rollins delved into the complex ways that advertising of
automobiles has co-opted the language of environmentalism. And in a complementary
turn, late 20th century American consumers have included buying products, including
SUVs, as a significant display of their environmental values. With respect to the power
of advertising to sell goods because of the environmental values they purport, Rollins
concluded, “in the postmodern, media-saturated age, representation is nine tenths of the
truth.” Whereas he focused on media and material goods, the Clark Fork Coalition
employed the power of representation to sell knowledge and promote action. The CFC
used commercial modes of communications – advertising primarily – to educate and
engage the general public in an environmental cause, rather than to sell a product. Those
efforts led to the first time that Superfund remediation meant removing a dam.3
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Nielsen, OH 428-08. Kurt D. Cline, “Influences of Intergovernmental Implementation:
The States and the Superfund,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, V.3, No.1, (Spring
2003): 66-83. William Rollins, “Reflections on a Spare Tire: SUVs and Postmodern
Environmental Consciousness,” Environmental History, (October 2006). This argument
also contrasts with Andrew Kirk’s claim that since the late 1960s and the success of the
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In 1988, Tracy Stone entered the Environmental Studies Program at the
University of Montana. She had fallen in love with Missoula on her first visit and
decided, “if I get in, I’m coming. If I don’t, I’m coming.” In addition to a passion for the
place, she had convinced herself that environmental studies was a perfect way to put her
undergraduate degree in media studies to work. As she put it, people had “been duped
into over-consuming with advertising, perhaps we can be duped through advertising into
living more sustainably.” Her MA thesis, “Into the Heart of the Beast: A Case for
Environmental Advertising,” explored this new mode of environmentalism.4
Following completion of her degree at UM, Stone worked for various
conservation organizations and eventually became a board member for the Clark Fork
Coalition, as well as marrying environmental journalist Richard Manning. In 1999, when
the director’s position opened, she applied. One of her terms for hire was that the
organization “expand and change how we do conservation.” In particular she wanted the
CFC to “be about community” as much as it was “a science-based advocacy group about
water quality in a river.” The board embraced her vision.

Whole Earth Catalog American environmentalism has been infused with the notion that
new technology and green consumption are the solutions to restoring the planet. In the
CFC campaign and at Milltown in general, dam removal and river restoration advocates
operated under no such grand ideologies. Rather they provide a convincing account of
the practicality and immediacy of environmental advocacy. See: Andrew G. Kirk,
“Appropriating Technology: The Whole Earth Catalog and Counterculture
Environmental Politics,” Environmental History, V.6, No.3, (July, 2001): 374-394; and
Counterculture Green: The Whole Earth Catalog and American Environmentalism,
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
4
Tracy Stone-Manning, OH 428-03, Archives & Special Collections, Mansfield Library,
The University of Montana-Missoula.
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Stone-Manning began her directorship by making the Milltown Dam the
Coalition’s signature project. She asked, “why aren’t we advocating for cleaning it all up
and taking out the dam?” By February, 2000, the coalition launched a campaign they
called: “Remove the Dam. Restore the River.”5
When Stone-Manning met with Sean Benton about doing an advertising campaign
about Milltown, she knew the CFC couldn’t afford much. What she had not imaged was
that Benton and his colleagues at Partners Creative would offer to do the work pro bono.
One of the Missoula-based marketing firm’s core principles was that its work should
“make the community that we live in better.” The company also hoped that doing free
work would allow it the sort of creative freedom that could help distinguish Partners
Creative in the competitive ad business. Being pro-environment coincided with growing
the business. Looking at the research emboldened Stone-Manning and Benton to ask for
dam removal in hopes of creating enough “public will that would push it [removal].”6
The new campaign used multiple media to educate people about the major issues
surrounding the Milltown Superfund site and the forthcoming decisions about its cleanup.
It drew on support from around the community, especially small businesses, and it was
meant to be fun, even funny. Stone-Manning hoped that balancing humor with serious
issues would entice people who didn’t consider themselves environmentalists to support
an environmental issue. It worked. The campaign got people involved in shaping the
outcome of federal public policy by educating them with advertising. Most of that
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education centered on recreational interests, the idea of restoration, and the fears
surrounding Milltown’s Superfund site.
People who had been paying attention to the Milltown site already had fears about
it before the Coalition’s campaign. So, it wasn’t surprising that the advertising effort
drew on those fears. In particular, the campaign and people’s responses centered on fear
for the dam’s safety, of the toxins it withheld, and about the responsible companies.
Fear of a catastrophic failure wasn’t new in 2002 when FERC accidentally posted
information about Milltown Dam’s instability. Locals had feared the dam would collapse
as far back as during the flood of 1908 and as recently as the ice scouring event of 1996.
In 2001, one of the group’s local TV advertisements began with a soundtrack reminiscent
of Darth Vader’s breathing, followed by a series of dissonant, industrial tones. The ad’s
only visual was a white liquid infiltrated by a surge of black ink that swirled and filled
the screen as the narrator spoke about the “poisoning” and “threatening” affect of the
Milltown sediments. Newspaper advertisements included the image of a skull and
crossed bones with the word “POISON” underneath.
One of the CFC’s signature messages, which headlined newspaper advertisements
and appeared on a Missoula billboard, read “Not All Time Bombs Tick.” More than
anything else in the campaign, this slogan fit the national trend of politics and advertising
playing on post-9/11 fears. The billboard featured a black and white photo of the
Milltown Dam’s downstream face – the view from Missoula. The dam’s spillway and
gates were caked in ice and snow, as were the wooded mountainsides in the background,
which was a visual reminder of the 1996 ice-scouring event that nearly destroyed the
structure. Newspaper ads equating the dam with a bomb threat was a potent, post-9/11
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symbol. Referring to the Milltown Dam as part of “one of the largest Superfund sites in
the nation,” a 2001 New York Times article reported that local residents “all along the
political spectrum” were beginning to “portray the dam as a toxic time bomb.” Like most
CFC ads, the Times detailed the contents of the proverbial bomb in terms of heavy metal
quantities and the vulnerability of the dam.7
When it came to playing on fear of toxins, Milltown’s problems made it fairly
easy to create copy. “Arsenic is bad. Had it been something that nobody knew (about)
behind the dam, it would have been a lot harder. But everybody knows arsenic,”
remembered Benton. One study found that 68,000 tons of metal-laced sediment flowed
through and over the dam every year. That was a steady trickle compared to what a
flood-wrecked dam might cause. The campaign tried to make the figure of 6.6 million
cubic feet of contaminated sediments as common a local knowledge as the ounces of soda
in a can. In the buildup to the EPA’s final decision on Milltown, virtually every letter the
agency received in favor of dam removal addressed the tandem worry of an old, unsafe
dam and the toxins behind it. Many quoted the statistics the Coalition’s campaign made
so widely known.8
Whereas environmental realities made the campaign’s message about toxins
accessible, timing did so for its focus on fears about the responsible corporations. During
the first few years of the new millennium, as the EPA and ARCO worked through a
second and third feasibility study necessitated by public and organizational input, the
potentially liable parties began changing hands. As early as the summer of 1997
7

“Montanans Weigh Options on a Toxic Legacy,” The New York Times, 5/7/2001, A12.
Benton, OH428-05. All advertising material created by Partners Creative. Copies in
possession of author. Sherry Devlin, “Toxics, trouble mounting behind dam,”
Missoulian, 7/11/1997, B1.
8
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Montana Power Company was trying to rid itself of the dam. Within a year, MPC was
selling its hydropower plants and trying, as the company VP put it, “to get out of the
power generation business.” The company knew that it would be hard to sell the dam
because it produced very little power and was entangled in Superfund. The Missoula
City-County government and other observers, like the CFC, worried that if MPC sold the
dam the trail of liability would become longer, more complex, and more tenuous. In
November, 1998, MPC sold all its power generating facilities, except the Milltown Dam
to PP&L Global Inc., just as ARCO was finishing a Focused Feasibility Study, a revision
of the original FS that the EPA demanded because of people’s unsolicited comments
indicating that they “didn’t believe that the dam removal option was given proper
consideration.”9
MPC’s financial role at the site was uncertain, whereas ARCO’s appeared integral
to the possibility of a polluter-pays cleanup. When BP-Amoco sought to buy ARCO for
$25 billion in March, 1999, EPA spokeswoman Pam Hillary had to assure Montanans the
new owners “won’t be off the hook.”10 In fact, the purchase, which created the world’s
second largest oil company, would eventually facilitate the removal of the Milltown
Dam. But at the time, the worry was that the liable company at the site would become
even less amenable to environmental cleanup. As the sale was happening, ARCO settled
9

Russ Forba, personal communication with the author, notes in author’s possession,
6/18/2011. Letter from Phyllis Flack (ARCO) to EPA; letter from Russ Forba (EPA) to
Phyllis Flack (ARCO), 11/20/1998; 12/16/1998, in U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel 1147,
Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. Sherry Devlin,
“Milltown Dam a liability for MPC sale;” “Engineer confirms leaks in Milltown Dam;”
“Milltown dam remains MPC’s liability,” Missoulian, 5/8/1998, 2/13/2001, 11/3/1998,
A1, A1, A2.
10
John Stucke, “BP Amoco to purchase Arco for $25 billion,” Missoulian, 3/30/1999,
B1.
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with the state of Montana’s Natural Resource Damage Program and the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes over natural resource damage claims for $260 million.
Culminating a sixteen-year court case, the settlement was only about a third of the $765
million the state once sought. Advocates for river cleanup thought that the money was a
boon for the Clark Fork’s future, but also a sign of ARCO’s intention to pay for as little
of that future as possible.11
In July, 1999, BP and ARCO were nearly finished sealing their deal. That deal
included, as the Missoulian front-page reported, a $63 million severance package for the
seller’s “top five officials.”12 In the same month, EPA received a draft of ARCO’s
Focused Feasibility Study.13 Upon review, the agency forced the company to make two
major changes. Both pointed to the company’s preference for minimizing its costs. First,
according to the EPA, ARCO had underestimated cost information for dam safety
improvements and fish passage construction for the option of leaving the dam in place.
Second, ARCO had overstated the risks of sediment and dam removal, thereby making
that option appear more risky and expensive than the agency deemed it. ARCO preferred
a solution that would cost less than one out-going executive’s severance package.14
ARCO came in for additional suspicion about its commitment to cleaning up the
dam site the following spring. In the midst of another round of license extension requests
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from the Montana Power Company to FERC, which nearly everyone paying attention
opposed, ARCO struck a private deal with the dam owners.15 MPC reported that it had
agreed to join ARCO in support of a “dam-in-place and sediments-in-place remedy for
the Milltown Reservoir.” Calling it a “Stewardship Agreement,” the companies
committed to “search for a third party to assume local control of the dam into the future”
and to create an operating fund for the prospective owner. The deal promoted shoring up
the aging dam with an “inflatable,” “rubber structure” along its crest and leaving all the
toxic sediment where it was, then handing the whole thing over to the locals.16
As the Missoulian reported in early May, 2000, “the response was quick and
critical.” It was also fearful. Local government agencies worried that the deal would
“leave a mess for us to deal with in this community.” Peter Nielsen saw the move in the
context of Superfund sites nationwide, which he worried were getting incomplete
remediation and being left for local governments to wrestle with. Since the Clinton era
Congress failed to maintain the taxes that targeted industry and funded such “orphan
sites,” those sites were receiving ever-decreasing support from the federal government.
While private industry had paid for cleanup at roughly two-thirds of Superund sites since
its enactment, funding for the other third “dwindled from a high of $3.8 billion in 1996 to
a projected $28 million” by 2003,” according to The New York Times. The Bush White
House made no effort to reinstate a corporate tax to support Superfund sites without
liable parties – that orphaned one-third. As the Superfund shrank, orphan sites depended
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increasingly on general appropriates from Congress for cleanup money. At Milltown,
Nielsen saw an orphan site in the making. “The further away you get from the companies
…the less likely it is that you’ll get anything out of them…Arco is being swallowed up
by BP-Amoco and Montana Power is going away. And now they’re talking about
turning the whole thing over to a nonprofit group. Get real.” Seconding Nielsen’s
unease, the Missoula County Commissioners released a report called “Case for Removal
of Milltown Dam,” which expressed fears that the community would take on the burden
of future problems if the dam stayed and its former owner disappeared.17
Along with keeping attention on dam safety concerns and toxins, the Clark Fork
Coalition campaign kept the responsible parties in the spotlight. All of the Coalition’s
newspaper advertisements that encouraged public participation summarized corporate
responsibility, or lack thereof. One ad reminded readers, “EPA has requested a cleanup
proposal from ARCO, the company liable for this mess. But this subsidiary of
multibillion dollar conglomerate BP seemingly intends to do as little as possible.”
Another ad pointed out the small financial burden that dam and sediment removal would
entail and, hence, the pettiness of corporate refusal to embrace that option. It estimated
“(t)he entire cleanup would…cost $100 to $150 million. That’s a lot of money to us, but
it’s only about 1 percent of the net profit BP made in 2000.” The Spring 2001 edition of
the CFC newsletter, “Currents,” reiterated that point with the metaphor that “(F)or this
company, $130 million is the household equivalent of, say dinner and a movie.” In other
17
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words, by opposing the removal option, the responsible party was being cheap, if not
greedy.18
The public’s reaction to the corporations reflected the CFC dam removal
campaign. When the local newspaper ran a four-part serious on the dam, including an
entire section devoted to the CFC and his firm’s campaign, Benton knew that “(s)uddenly
the discussion became [one] around the issues that we were putting out there.” All their
campaign ads encouraged people to contact the EPA and express their support for dam
and sediment removal, as well as restoration.19 People responded. And they often did so
by reflecting the campaign’s language of fear. In the end, the federal agency received
about 10,000 public comments on Milltown, which was a Superfund record.
Many commenters charged the company with both past grievances and
obstruction of the current cleanup. Voicing his hopes for dam removal in an email to the
EPA, Missoula resident John Adams opined “(W)hen I hear company reps whine about
the cost, I can only think back on the billions of dollars of profits they took out of
Montana in creating this problem.” Catherine Price-Alick and Claude Alick emailed an
even more vitriolic message to the EPA, equating Milltown’s history with “(B)ig greedy
corporations” that “have stolen Montana’s wealth for years, killing people, destroying the
earth, and then leaving us, poor taxpayers who didn’t ‘benefit’ from the theft, to clean up
the toxic waste ourselves.” In reference to the company’s campaign to support keeping
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the dam and sediments, Dane Durham charged “ARCO’s ads are designed to mislead the
public.”20
Sometimes the influence of the local environmental campaign was even more
obvious. Numerous people quoted campaign literature verbatim when they equated BP’s
ability to pay with a date-night expenditure. At the same time, the companies tried to
allay people’s fears with a few of their own.21
ARCO’s president of environmental remediation, Sandra Stash, voiced the
company’s worries about dam removal. She claimed to be “frustrated by that whole
discussion,” calling the idea of taking down the dam “impractical.” In 2001 Stash told
The New York Times that removing the dam would “do more harm than good.” Penning
the company’s official response to the Missoula County resolution supporting dam
removal Stash summarized that prospect as carrying “extremely severe practical
problems and risks.” Similarly, Montana Power spokesman Jim Williams equated dam
removal with “crossing an interstate blindfolded.” Their attempts at raising counter-fears
seemed to pale compared to the “ticking time bomb.” When details of the closed-door
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deal between MPC and ARCO came to light, along with reports that MPC had hidden
more information about leaks in its dam, fears of a superficial cleanup seemed justified.22
Due to public pressure and the Clark Fork Coalition’s use of Montana’s sunshine
laws, ARCO and MPC had to release the details of their agreement for public scrutiny in
early 2002. Their deal limited the dam owner’s liability to $10 million, as long as MPC
coordinated all of its efforts in support of ARCO’s cleanup choice, which was the least
expensive method of keeping the dam and sediments in place. ARCO’s threat to sue
MPC explained why the power-turned-telecommunications company had abruptly
switched from trying to decommission the dam to applying for another series of license
extensions. Apparently MPC saw the deal with ARCO as a safer and cheaper bet than
relying on the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act provision that
tentatively released the dam owners from liability. As CFC attorney Matt Gifford
gleaned from the legal provisions of the deal, “when Montana Power says it wants to
keep the dam,” even though it’s a money-losing prospect, “that’s ARCO talking.”
What ARCO was talking about was exactly what the Coalition and local
government had feared – spending as little money as possible and walking away. In each
of its three feasibility studies the company did its best to favor dam retention, whether
that meant distorting the expense and their ability to implement cleanup, or simply
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offering its opinion and coercing MPC into following suit. But in the long and tedious
process of writing a feasibility study acceptable to the EPA, the company faced the
steadfast scrutiny of local environmental advocates, an equally engaged local citizenry,
and a national press that kept and eye on the situation.23
As with many turns in the Milltown story that revealed the details of Superfund
implementation, public input was key. And in the case of the fears surrounding corporate
buyouts and liability, environmental marketing helped inform public input, which flooded
EPA project manager Russ Forba. Along with individuals, organizations petitioned the
agency. The CFC rebutted many of the findings in ARCO’s FFS, especially its
underestimating of risks and costs associated with the cheap fix of leaving the dam and
toxins in place, as well as inflation of costs and risks linked to dam and sediment
removal. The Missoula City-County Health Department submitted the exact same
complaints to the EPA. The Clark Fork River Technical Assistance Committee, the
Superfund-funded information outlet for the site, trebled those observations, explicitly
stating “the analyses are cursory and subjective, aimed at finding the cheapest alternative
without regard for what is best for the river.” Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks agreed.
Arvid Hiller, the VP and General Manager of Mountain Water Company, which provided
Missoula’s drinking water, feared that the remedies outlined in the FFS provided
23
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insufficient safeguards for the downstream sole source aquifer. The US Department of
the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service added its fear that an in-place solution would fail
to protect the threatened bull trout. Also from the federal level, the US Army Corps of
Engineers commented that ARCO’s draft FFS underestimated “implementability” of
removing sediments.24
At the behest of the EPA, the Corps conducted studies of dredging scenarios for
the Milltown sediments and found that they amounted to common earth-moving ventures,
which carried little danger of polluting the river or downstream aquifer. Based on its
growing experience with dismantling such obstructions, the Corps returned a much lower
cost estimate for dam removal than ARCO. By April, 2001, EPA engaged ARCO in a
thorough rewrite of the draft FFS, especially with regard to cost estimates and
“implementability” of various options.25 The final product, a “Combined Feasibility
Study,” the last assessment of cleanup options leading to an EPA decision at Milltown,
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analyzed costs and downstream impacts more rigorously. And it, too, lessened the risk of
implementing dam and sediment removal.26
Although the EPA’s official public comment period was supposed to follow the
release of the Combined Feasibility Study, people continued to speak up ahead of
schedule, and they repeatedly drew on the environmental campaign’s language to do so.27
Fear of corporations surfaced most consistently. After comparing the responsible parties
to the mining companies she had watched pollute Lake Superior, Rosanne Davis
lamented that if the EPA failed to enforce a full cleanup, including dam removal, “the
people/taxpayers end up being responsible for the arrogance and greed of the mining
industry.” She ended her letter by scolding the EPA that “(t)o continue to dance to the
tune of the mining industry and gambling with our health is unconscionable. It’s about
time that Atlantic Richfield took responsibility for the wealth it extracted from Montana
and the destruction it left in its wake.” Although Davis, like many other people, confused
the fact that ARCO harbored liability not because they had done the mining and polluting
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but because they bought the company that did, her anger at the past and fear of the future
in regard to corporations was commonplace.28
With MPC contractors using sand and grout to plug cracks in the dam that
measured up to four inches wide, with the dam up for sale and MPC getting out of the
power business, with ARCO and MPC coordinating their efforts to back a minimal cost
and minimal cleanup option, with ARCO being folded into the world’s second largest
energy company, and with the site’s risk assessments reporting plenty of problems with
leaving the toxic sediments in place, perhaps public input that focused on fear was well
placed. Post-9/11 it was certainly not surprising. What was surprising was a seamless
blend of fear with fun in the dam removal campaign.29

Play is the way many people know the environment. That was certainly true for
Sean Benton. He first forayed west from Kansas City on overnight drives to Colorado,
leaving his first marketing job behind on a Friday so that he could lash his fly rod at
mountain streams first thing Saturday morning. Moving to Missoula and getting Partners
Creative started in 2000 helped shorten his drives from business to pleasure.
Thinking back about the advertisements he helped design for the Clark Fork
Coalition, Benton mused, “It’s a commercial world and that’s the way it works… I’m not
a big fan of seeing a billboard on my way to Glacier National Park either, but they’re
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there. They can have a message about Miller Light or they can have a message about
Remove the Dam. The billboards that we did wound up being some of the things that are
most recognized.” Like Stone-Manning, Benton believed that commercialism had a role
to play in environmentalism beyond selling green products.30
Along with the toxic time bomb billboard, the one that got the most attention
read: “Ski Milltown! It’s Toxic!” If the message was surprising, the image it overlaid
was more so. In shades of green the color of an algae-choked lake, the billboard featured
four smiling women clad in matching tutu-style bathing suits and tiaras. The quartet
appeared to be water skiing barefoot with their right legs tucked under them like
flamingoes and their right hands placed on the next skier’s shoulder in a chorus-line pose.
The image conjured a 1940s Palm Beach water show far more than it was akin to
anything that might unfold at Milltown Montana, which people knew for its solitary blue
herons rather than flocks of showy pink birds or water skiers. It was also a new tactic by
the Clark Fork Coalition.31
The message dutifully referenced the real toxicity of Milltown. Underpinning the
“It’s Toxic” text, the color of the billboard spoke of polluted water in a watershed prized
for its clear, cold trout streams. The promotion of water skiing tapped into the pervasive
connection between the area’s rivers and recreation, while the retro image made light of
that particular form of recreation in a river environment. The reservoir itself was out of
place by implication. Most importantly to the ad’s creators, it was funny.
The Coalition retained its emphasis on the serious problems at Milltown by
keeping toxicity in its ads. That was especially effective since the EPA passed a more
30
31
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restrictive law governing arsenic in drinking water in the midst of the dam removal
campaign.32 In May, 2000, The New York Times announced the Clinton administration’s
proposal for the EPA to lower the allowable amount of arsenic in drinking water by
ninety percent. Within a month, CFRTAC wrote to the EPA about how a change in
arsenic standards might “affect the plume boundary in the Milltown area.” If far less
arsenic in water posed a health risk, than far more water supplies would be considered
unhealthy.33 Upon taking office, President Bush promptly suspended the Clinton
initiative, which began months of public reaction and agency pressure. He recanted
eventually, just as he came to support Milltown Dam’s removal after having delivered a
campaign speech in 2000 supporting retention of Snake River dams that faced
environmental challenges due to their obstruction of salmon passage, as well as using the
opportunity to promise that “removing dams would not be on the table in a Bush
presidency,” as the Seattle Times paraphrased it.34 In February, 2001, the Missoulian ran
a front page article on the EPA’s decision to abide by new research showing that
ingesting even small amounts of arsenic increased people’s risk of cancer and other
deadly ailments. CFC director Stone-Manning connected the national shift in
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environmental regulation with the local issue, observing “EPA’s tougher stance on
arsenic pollution is just one more reason why Milltown Reservoir needs a radical
cleanup.”35
Nearly every campaign ad quantified the reservoir’s toxic load. One used the
headline “Tons of Incentive to Speak Out” to point out that “19 tons of arsenic” flowed
downstream annually. A Coalition-sponsored local TV clip showed underwater footage
of a pair of trout swimming upstream while a male narrator described the poisonous
water that was killing those fish as long as the dam stayed in place. The message about
heavy metals was clear.36
The use of water skiers and trout in these advertisements was meant to speak to
recreationalists as much as anyone. The research Benton and Partners Creative did
before designing their advertisements for the Clark Fork Coalition proved that the
watershed was home to plenty of people who cared about the river’s fishery because they
fished for sport, which was especially true of tourists the area attracted. Between efforts
to clean up tributaries on the Blackfoot, Redford’s film version of A River Runs Through
It, FWP fisheries biologist David Schmetterling’s work on fish passage at the Milltown
Dam, including the story of a reservoir pike eating the trout Pollywog, and the
Department of the Interior’s listing of bull trout as threatened, both local and out-of-state
people who fished were paying attention to the Superfund process in one of western
Montana’s most coveted recreational watersheds.
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Anglers weren’t the only ones thinking about recreational opportunities in
association with remediation at Milltown. By early 2001 the Missoula County
Commissioners had drawn up a proposal called “Two Rivers Restoration and
Development Project.” The proposal looked past dam removal to “environmental
restoration and recreational development.” The county’s “once in a lifetime opportunity
to do something very special for our community” included an extended nature trail,
footbridges, “Riverside Park,” and “construction of whitewater features on both the Clark
Fork and Blackfoot Rivers.”37 The Missoulian ran a feature on the proposal in which one
of its designers, Gary Lacy, envisioned how “this project would bring the rivers back
into…a natural appearing whitewater stretch that is attractive for all the reasons why
people like rivers” such as “deep pools for fishing and paddling…waves and drops and
white water.” Those same features would benefit fish, too, but recreation or outdoor fun
was helping to sell the idea of dam removal and restoration.
Sporting organizations like the Montana Chapter of the American Fisheries
Society, The American Whitewater Association, and the Missoula Whitewater
Association, as well as owners of local sporting goods businesses and many Missoula
residents approved of dam removal. Missoula Whitewater Association president John
Anderson wrote to contribute his members’ support and to send the EPA copies of a
Paddler Magazine article about the popularity and economic success of whitewater parks
that western towns and cities had created in recent years. Brian Daly, the owner of a
local software development company, wrote to EPA state director John Wardell that
37
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“[A]lthough I am one of the staunches [sic] Republicans you’ll ever find…the plan for a
“Whitewater Park” at the confluence of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot rivers [sic] makes a
lot of sense to me.”38 Of the thousands of letters supporting dam removal that the EPA
eventually received, many mentioned recreation.
In the fall of 2001, the CFC published a book titled The River We Carry With Us.
The anthology included poetry, old news clippings, photos, historical accounts and
essays. Author Ian Frazier’s contribution, like many of the book’s offerings, paid tribute
to the fun that rivers provide. He admitted, “I should thank the river – throw wads of tens
and twenties into it, not just pennies – for all the pointless fun it gave me. Smashing ice
with my son for example.” Although Frazier’s was a personal expression about intimate
experience, it contained some of the most significant attributes of the larger story at
Milltown. Lots of money was going to be spent on the Clark Fork in compensation for
the way people had used it. And many people thought that that expenditure ought to
benefit recreational uses.39
In fact, the demographic of river recreationalists was prevalent enough that
Partners Creative and the Coalition opted not to make harm to recreational fishing an
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explicit part of their campaign. Simply having fish in their ads and talking about the
detrimental affects of Milltown to the fishery would attract the constituency that Benton
identified as “forty plus and they’re male and they like to fish.” In other words, the ads
only had to imply or hint at the recreational aspects of the rivers to attract the support of
fisherfolk, boaters, riverside hikers, or ice-smashers. And the implication of the “Ski
Milltown!” billboard was, “in a very cheeky way,” according to Benton, that the reservoir
was “not a flat-water resource” worth keeping. Rather, it was something that could be a
true river recreation resource.40
Stone-Manning ventured that the “cheeky” aspect of such ads would draw
unlikely support for the campaign. Tired of seeing environmental groups continually
fighting against things or always saying “no,” she wanted to advertise the positive. She
also chaffed against environmental organizations tendency to “preach to ourselves.”
With the goal to “get people excited” about the dam removal, humor became one of the
campaign staples.
When Stone-Manning saw the first samples of the “Ski Milltown!” image she
thought “it was funny!” Wanting to gauge its appeal to a new set of people, especially
non-environmentalists, she began showing it around. When a very conservative county
auditor laughed, Stone-Manning asked, “You don’t think it goes too far? You don’t think
it is too cheeky?” The woman responded, “That’s the problem with environmentalists.
They don’t laugh enough.” With that, Stone-Manning knew it was time to run the
billboard. As she recalled, “I want to capture this woman and all of her friends.”41

40
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A sense of fun about this serious environmental issue peaked when the Clark Fork
Coalition sponsored some actual playtime on the river. The temperature reached 104
degrees in Missoula on July 13, 2002. Sweltering summer heat on a Saturday meant
heavy traffic on the local rivers – families and college students floating in tubes, anglers
rowing rafts, and the occasional lone kayaker. But temperature and weekend free time
could not have drawn the number of people drifting toward Missoula on the Clark Fork
that day. It was the work of the Coalition’s campaign to remove Milltown Dam.
“Ideas came from the community,” Stone-Manning remembered about the origins
of some aspects of the campaign. Her favorite was from a CFC member. Jack Moyer
spotted Stone-Manning’s tall, thin frame and curly red hair in a grocery store, walked up
to her and said: “Do you know what you need? You need a big flotilla from the dam into
Missoula!” “We totally need a big flotilla from the dam into Missoula,” she responded.
So the Coalition advertised the first “Milltown to Downtown” float in support of
removing the dam. Or more precisely, they attempted to organize it.
The Coalition staff rounded up about fifteen friends who had boats to
accommodate the dozens of people Stone-Manning expected to show up. By the time
temperatures were peaking, more than 150 crafts and an estimated 500 or more people
were on the water. And that didn’t include the scores of dogs. “It was crazy! It still
makes my eyes water” confessed Stone-Manning. She recognized only a fraction of the
people there. She thought, “Who are these people[?]...I love them.” It was, according to
her, “not those environmentalists from Missoula…it was grandmas, babies, and frat
boys…it was a very cool expression of people saying, ‘this is what we want!’” Some
wanted dam removal because of fish or drinking water concerns, others so that they could

247

Chapter 6: The Campaign

recreate more safely, and some because of the economics of recreation. Whitewater
guide Morgan Valliant warned, “Do not underestimate the economic force of
recreation…taking the dam out of this river would be huge because it would restore the
native fish migrations. Fishing guides would really benefit.” As Stone-Manning’s raft
cruised into Missoula she looked up at one of the bridges and saw John Wardell, the
EPA’s state director, “with a big grin on his face.” She knew that he saw the same thing
she did, overwhelming public support for his agency’s option of removing the dam.
County Commissioner Barbara Evans got out of the river slightly wet, but her excitement
was far from dampened. “This ought to show the community concern,” Evans quipped to
a reporter. As the Missoulian reported, the only opposition present was a riverside sign
imploring: “Keep the Dam, Kill the Hippie.” To Stone-Manning and Benton seeing the
opposition riff on their slogans, especially in a funny way, confirmed that the campaign
was really working.42
The second annual Milltown to Downtown event drew nearly 3000 people. More
importantly, the EPA received an estimated 10,000 public comments about the Milltown
decision, largely as a result of the advertising campaign. It was this flood of public
comment that helped sway the EPA. People’s comments reflected fear of leaving the
dam in place, as well as fear of being left with the cleanup bill by the responsible
companies. They spoke of recreational connections to the Clark Fork and Blackfoot
Rivers and the recreational potential of the watershed. Many reiterated human and
environmental health concerns. In addition, they nearly all linked restoration with dam
removal.
42
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Diana Hammer saw Milltown for the first time in 2001. Compared to other
Superfund projects on which she’d worked as the EPA’s community coordinator,
Milltown struck her as “really beautiful.” Yet Hammer knew that when it came to the
beauty of some Superfund sites, especially the ones she’d seen in Montana, “your eyes
can fool you.” She also knew that it was the CFC campaign, along with the EPA grantfunded Clark Fork River Technical Assistance Committee that “did a ton of leg work” to
get people involved in the Superfund education and comment process. Those comments,
according to Hammer, prompted the EPA to make dam removal one of two final options
in the CFS. As a lifelong student of the environment and a river rafter, it “was a really
quite exciting time” for Hammer. In addition to personal interest, she knew that
Superfund had no history with dam removals. Milltown, if it happened, would be a
first.43
The Milltown Superfund site also gained an historic reputation for public input.
At Milltown, as with any Superfund site, the EPA has guidelines for public comment
periods. Probably the most important of those periods surround the feasibility study, or
in the case of Milltown, the Combined Feasibility Study, which public input had already
altered outside the confines of regular comment periods. After the release of any FS, the
EPA solicits “public review.” This review and the input of the site’s state government
(essentially the governor’s office) are the last two significant factors the EPA uses to
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chose a cleanup option from those listed in the final FS.44 A 2001 study of Superfund
implementation showed that in making cleanup decisions, the EPA prioritized the
involvement of “concentrated private interests, such as liable parties and local
communities,” over even costs or contaminants.45 A similar 2003 study suggested “the
importance of state-level factors in Superfund implementation.”46 At Milltown, people
and organizations had submitted comments throughout the CFC dam removal campaign,
well before the release of the CFS. And they did so in record numbers. Those numbers
helped sway the state.
The Clark Fork Coalition’s campaign emphasized the importance of people
speaking their minds. Print ads both served as educational primers on Milltown and
emphasized empowerment of citizens. Enlarged messages such as, “Your voice,” “Can
the Impact of Your Opinion Take Out a Dam,” and the inclusive “Let’s Make the
Contamination History…” headlined campaign material. People heeded the call.47
The campaign encouraged pushing Superfund beyond remediation and toward
restoration. The original Superfund Act said nothing about restoration, but on the Clark
Fork its implementation was making it an intended outcome. Restoration was not a new
idea at Milltown; in 1999 the state’s Natural Resource Damage Program won a $260
million lawsuit against ARCO, which would help fund “recovery” of the Clark Fork
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environment. But the campaign linked river restoration to dam removal. Every
billboard, print ad and TV spot included the paired commands: “Remove the Dam.
Restore the River.” “You couldn’t just take down the dam and see what happens” said
Sean Benton of the decision to link toxic cleanup and restoration. As the mantra of
restoring Milltown gained momentum the term lost its simple definition of trying to bring
the confluence of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers back to a pre-European condition,
to the time when people knew the area as “the place of the big bull trout.” Rather, people
embraced a very practical definition of restoration, which included a free-flowing river
system and reconnected trout migration routes, as well as “redevelopment” of the local
economy. Specifics of what restoration actually meant developed only after the decision
to remove the dam was made.48
Removing the dam as a catalyst to developing new financial opportunities in the
Milltown area was, in large part, a product of opposition to dam removal. Just as
remove-and-restore advocates were winning overwhelming public support, opponents of
that option shaped the debate about what would happen to local people if the rivers ran
free. As such, Milltown became an example of a new direction for Superfund and
environmentalism, as well as a case study in how struggles over the environment are not
a winner-take-all prospect. As such the “really beautiful” Superfund site that Diana
Hammer saw was the site of that law’s first dam removal, as well as its move toward
restoring environments and stimulating economic redevelopment for the communities
that surrounded them.
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As EPA’s project manager for the site, Russ Forba confirmed “(I)t’s not a vote,
but what the public says will influence what we say.” Hoping that the public’s say would
be heard, CFC board president Geoff Sutton encouraged “(I)f the community yells loud
enough, FERC and EPA will listen. But we’ve got to yell.”49
The “yell” of support for dam removal that Sutton sought came in many forms.
Emails and letters addressing Milltown continued to arrive in the EPA’s state office. So
did the results of a few community studies. In early 2001, the University of Montana’s
Sociology Department conducted a survey of Missoula county residents that revealed
68% of people surveyed supported full cleanup of the reservoir, with a strong correlation
between people’s level of knowledge about the issue and their support for cleanup. Dam
removal supporters began to sway local government. At the end of March, Missoula
county commissioners passed a resolution in favor of dam removal in reaction to public
input. At the same time the Missoulian editorial threw its support in the same direction50
Support for dam removal by the county commissioners brought important bipartisan support to the issue. Leaders of the conservation community and local agencies
involved at Milltown all point to the importance of Commissioner Barbara Evans’s
decision to advocate for dam removal.51 Evans, a Republican, came to that decision
because of her worries about long-term human and environmental health issues, such as a
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tainted Missoula aquifer. As a fiscal conservative, she was wary of county citizens and
county government having to pay for future cleanup needs if the liable corporations
funded an incomplete or faulty remediation. When ARCO released the CFS and backed
its own plan of placing a synthetic extension on the top of the dam, Evans criticized it as
the “rubber hot dog” fix. Because Evans was a conservative Republican with a long
history in local politics, her support “made it a bipartisan thing right away…it became…a
community issue” said Tracy Stone-Manning.52
Montana’s Trout Unlimited director Bruce Farling agreed about the influence of
Evans’s support, which he remembered came out of her personal interests in the
environment as much as her politics. Farling said of the commissioner, “she’s not an
environmentalist. But she has…affection for frogs. She’s really into frogs. When she
found out that this contaminated eggs…and high metals kill frogs, she started paying
attention.”53 In 2000 Evans revealed her environmental interests when she told the
Missoulian, “I want that reservoir cleaned up, so it is a safe place for people and for fish
and for the frogs.” Evans and her fellow commissioners wrote an opinion to the
newspaper featuring an illustration of three men trying to maneuver a boat through a
large crack in a dam. The opinion defended a resolution the commissioners adopted on
March 28, 2001, calling for dam removal. The resolution and subsequent opinion
invoked the bi-partisan community support for dam removal and restoration.54
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The evolving solution at Milltown represented a national trend toward solving
environmental problems concerning rivers through a non-partisan, whole watershed
approach. The diversity of watersheds and people’s use of them seemed to necessitate a
move away from the divisively partisan attitudes about the environment that had
flourished in the 1980s and ‘90s, according to historians. As Tim Palmer wrote in about
groups like the CFC in Endangered Rivers and the Conservation Movement, “new groups
sought to include representatives from all different points of view, each member a
‘stakeholder.’” Once Milltown was designated a Superfund site, no one opposed
environmental cleanup. Rather, liable parties sought to limit their financial obligations
and the majority of public participants, and local and state agencies, pushed for thorough
remediation. Not whether, but how cleanup should happen, was at issue, and antagonistic
political parties seemed to play little or no part in that decision. Rather, the notion of
cleanup teetered between containment – the original Superfund model – and restoration.55
With the release of the CFS and opening of a new public comment period, people
were supposed to voice their preference for one of two remedial options – 2A or 7A.
They certainly did that. But they also pushed beyond the scope of remediation in
favoring restoration and redevelopment of the confluence. Steven E. Bristol provided a
very representative email when he wrote that as a Clark Fork watershed resident he
thought that all the evidence indicated “(T)he dam needs to be taken away and the river
returned to its natural state.” Jeff Rolston-Clemmer agreed that “(A)s a resident of
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Missoula…I think removal and restoration of the Milltown Reservoir is the only safe and
permanent solution.” Many others concurred.56
Meanwhile, plenty of people included economic development, or what came to be
called redevelopment, in their opinions. Brad Robinson, part owner of Missoula’s Big
Sky Brewery, emailed the EPA and governor that “the economic benefits to the greater
Missoula area will be tremendous.” He foresaw that “(R)ecreational tourists will travel
from great distances to use this new free flowing and clean river” and “will increase the
number of people who…stay in Hotels and eat in Restaurants,” as well as, perhaps, drink
the local beer. Not surprisingly, some calls for using the removal of Milltown Dam as a
jobs project were labor groups. In a letter entreating Governor Martz to favor dam
removal, Montana State AFL-CIO considered option 7A “a potentially huge economic
development opportunity for Montana.” Whether urging removal because of anticorporate feelings, care for the future, recreational aspirations, economic benefits, hopes
for restoration or any other reason, an increasing number of people wrote to governor
Martz, or forwarded her their correspondence with the EPA.57
The Clark Fork Coalition campaign helped inform people of the necessity to gain
the state’s voice in their collective “yell” for dam removal. That meant getting Martz, a
Republican, who had once referred to herself as the “lapdog of industry,” and had a poor
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environmental record according to the state’s conservation community, on board. When
the inaugural Milltown to Downtown float took place in July, 2002, “community
acceptance” of a solution for the Superfund site was pretty clear. By that time the state’s
EPA office had received “8,312 comments on the Milltown cleanup, a number unheard of
for a Superfund site – particularly one that does not yet have a proposed cleanup plan,”
reported the Missoulian. The EPA’s Diana Hammer called the “7,801 comments – or 94
percent” supporting dam and sediment removal, “pretty impressive, and very unusual.”
Copies of most of those comments sat on the governor’s desk.58
On November 5, 2001, the EPA released its Final Combined Feasibility Study.
The agency also announced it would propose a cleanup plan by “early 2003.” Diana
Hammer, the EPA community coordinator for Milltown, told the Missoulian “(T)his is
the time for people to tell us what they want…This is when public comment really
counts.” In the fall of 2001 it was clear that local conservation organizations, local
government and an increasing and vocal portion of the public supported dam removal.
The EPA was set to hear more of that support. It had also become clear who opposed it.59
ARCO touted the cost efficiency and innovativeness of the “rubber hotdog” fix,
as County Commissioner Barbara Evans called it, while dam removal advocates feared
both those reasons – one as a cheap fix, the other as a dangerous experiment where a
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permanent solution was the goal. The CFS estimated ARCO would spend $20 million on
the rubber solution and up to $319 million on dam removal. Outside the company,
people who championed keeping the dam tended not to address the rubber dam at all.
Rather, proponents of alternative 2A fretted over what they saw as the negative impacts
of removing the dam. They, too, spoke in terms of permanence, fear, and environmental
and economic concern.60
The Bonner Development Group formed in the mid-1990s as a community
advocacy organization in the Bonner and Milltown area. Local residents and business
leaders came together to help promote and carry out small community development
projects and advocate for their towns within the county government. By 1996 the group
considered accepting “financial assistance from ARCO to staff and operate the
organization.” Jerry Tavegia, one of the state’s economic development officers for the
Montana Department of Commerce, advised the groups that “accepting start-up funding
from ARCO” would not lead to compromising the group’s independence. Rather,
corporate funding would be “a tool to enable the organization to mature,” instead of it
regressing “to a social club.” The group’s most active leaders, Gary Matson and Bruce
Hall, accepted that advice.61
By early 1999, Bruce Hall was the executive director of the BDG, whereas Gary
Matson had ceased to support the group. Hall’s organization became the most prominent
60
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public opponents of removing the Milltown Dam. As Hall articulated it, BDG opposed
removing the dam because for Milltown it was “an important piece of the town’s
economy.” In newspaper articles and letters to the EPA the group repeated the statistic
that the dam contributed “$200,000 – or about 15 percent – of the local school funding
base.” Taking out the structure would also destroy the “wetlands and recreational
opportunities” that it had created and maintained for generations. Furthermore, the
group’s members and their community supporters expressed fear about the damage dam
removal could cause to the downstream watershed, or what Bruce Hall called “a
Pandora’s Box of unexplored and highly questionable unknowns” in a letter he wrote to
gubernatorial candidate Judy Martz in 2000. In essence, BDG used many of the same
arguments for keeping the dam that supporters of removal made – fear for the watershed,
recreational use of the area and care for wildlife, as well as economic concerns.62
The BDG position inspired and was reflected in letters to the EPA and the
governor. In mid-December, 2000, Missoula resident Dorene Tompkins sent the EPA a
handwritten note stating that she and her husband thought: “(T)here is a wonderful park
and wildlife refuge behind the dam. We think to remove it would pollute more
downstream, all the way to the Columbia.” A postcard survey that BDG conducted of its
members in early 2001 “revealed strong voter support, 79%, in favor of keeping the
Milltown Dam in place.” The survey stated its purpose was “to determine membership
support for preserving the Milltown Dam (bold in the original).” Then it offered
62
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participants the BDG board of directors’ opinion about “keeping the dam in place in
order to conserve valuable wildlife habitat, retain existing recreational opportunities,
preserve local history, and protect the economic health of the local tax base” before
instructing them to check their preference on a pre-printed postcard. The BDG survey
demonstrated how dam removal opponents used the same rhetoric and methods as their
rivals.63
Dam removal opponents echoed BDG’s arguments for keeping the structure in
their own letters and emails to the EPA and governor. Some, like Missoulian Daniel
Monroe, reminisced about their recreational outings on the reservoir and the wildlife they
encountered. In an hour of sea kayaking, Monroe recalled “spotting an eagle, blue heron,
and a moose,” plus other recreationalists such as “canoeists…and…a double skull team.”
In his email he made the point that most people who wanted the dam to remain also
wanted the EPA to clean up the water, just not by draining the reservoir and getting rid of
a viable power source. Don Wibracht wrote to the agency to point out that the dam “has
created a habitat that nurtures a dense and diverse flora and fauna. Removal of the dam
would result in the diminishment of a remarkably fecund wetland.” Elden Inabnit of
Missoula wrote to the Missoulian that a lifetime of living in the area had shown him that
nobody was dying or suffering from toxins and that “(T)he area above the dam on the
63

Letter from Dorene Tompkins to EPA, 12/9/2000; letter from Bruce Hall to Forba,
2/4/2001; letter from Board of Dir., BDG to Bonner Development Group Members,
2/20/2001; Board of Directors of the Bonner Development Group, “Milltown Dam
Survey,” 2/27/2001; letters from BDG to Missoula County Commissioners, Forba (EPA),
and BDG members, 3/11/2001, 3/12/2001, 4/2/2001, in U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel 1331, 1524,
1331, 1331, 1331, 1331, 1331, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of
Montana. On the history of people’s appreciation for the natural environment at created
places see: Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the
American West, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
259

Chapter 6: The Campaign

Clark Fork looks like the ‘Garden of Eden’ every summer with boaters, moose, deer,
birds and critters up the gazoo.”64
Not all opponents of dam removal made arguments that mirrored those of the
issue’s supporters. Just as anti-corporate sentiments motivated many proponents of
taking out the dam and restoring the rivers, anti-environmentalism found its way into the
rhetoric of many BDG supporters. Leroy Zent emailed governor Martz from Great Falls
to propose that if the EPA decided to remove the Milltown sediments every
environmental “activist must adopt and take home at least 100 Lb.s (sic) of sediment and
take care of it” and “dig into their own pocket and contribute the sum of $1,000.00 to
help off-set the cost of this project.” In an email to the EPA, Gary Bray charged that he
was “tired of all the damn dam liars…Eviro (sic) groups the worst. They find one
stinking fish on river bank a fisherman threw there and they cry ‘Fish Kill.’” His outrage
over the situation ended with the supposition that “If telling lies were against the law
there would be no Enviros. They would all be in jail!” Other anti-environmentalist
sentiments were less accusatory. And in the end, there were far, far fewer opponents than
supports of dam removal, but they existed and included locals at the site of the dam.65
The Bonner Development Group tried to discredit the flood of support the EPA
received for dam removal. In response to the EPA’s receipt of thousands of letters
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favoring option 7A, Bruce Hall asked John Wardell “(W)hat legitimacy does the United
State Environmental Protection Agency place on the receiving of form post cards and
petitions…?” While disparaging the postcards that the CFC wrote, printed and
distributed as part of its “Remove the River, Restore the Dam” campaign, Hall ignored
the fact that his group had mailed out “1100” postcards to conduct their survey months
earlier.66
Methods aside, the EPA received more comments on Milltown than on any
previous Superfund site. Most people credited the Clark Fork Coalition’s campaign. As
this public “yell” swelled into 2002, historian Stephen Ambrose donated a quarter million
dollars to the Coalition and Trout Unlimited to help them further fund their dam removal
campaigns. He argued that the Army Corps of Engineers “don’t build many new dams
these days, but are beginning to use their expertise to restore rivers and streams.” Putting
his money where the organizational mouthpiece was also signaled that Ambrose
understood the importance of public education and public input when it came to this
historic shift in managing watersheds.67
Such widespread public support for a thorough, permanent cleanup was critical to
the Superfund process. That was certainly what the “Mother of Superfund,” Lois Gibbs,
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thought when she came to Missoula to talk about the law, its history, and future. Gibbs
admitted that Superfund had struggled since she helped birth it by fighting to get the
federal government involved in making the Hooker Chemical Co. clean up her hometown
of Love Canal, NY. Yet, looking at the Milltown Dam issue, she reminded a crowd at
the University of Montana “(W)hen communities have been able to move it politically,
Superfund has worked.” Having followed the history of this Superfund site, she thought
it was “headed for a solid, healthy cleanup” due to public advocacy. Spring high waters
were set to fill the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers and, like Gibbs, most commenters on
the Milltown site filled their letters with more visions of renewal for the watershed.68
Following such leads, state support for a decision seemed to be heading in favor
of dam removal. In January, 2002, the Missoulian reported on a meeting of state
officials, including the attorney general, wherein “every elected official in the room –
Democrat and Republican…agreed…The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency should
order the removal of Milltown Dam.” While reiterating all the familiar reasons for
removal, such as recreation, economics, fish and safety, the state AG, Mike McGrath,
assured those at the meeting and the public that he would help make sure MPC’s sale of
the dam to Northwestern Energy and its parent company, telecommunications giant
Touch America, would not leave the city or state government liable for the structure’s
fate.69
By March, 2002, Republican Governor Judy Martz’s office hinted for the first
time that the state was leaning toward dam removal. In a letter to the Rocky Mountain
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Chapter of Montanans for Multiple Use, a group that supported state over federal
authority in general, and favored keeping the dam in particular, Martz countered the
economic arguments for keeping the structure with the conclusion that “the Milltown
Dam is currently an encumbrance for any corporation, agency, or group trying to
generate electricity and revenue.” The governor also forecast the state’s leanings by
writing about how removal would succeed. As if the decision were already made, Martz
wrote that during dam removal “releases will be minimal and the Missoula aquifer will
not be contaminated.” The EPA effectively admitted a similar bias by the end of the
month when John Wardell announced that his agency was going to begin sharpening “the
cost estimates” for dam removal, according the Missoulian. If that wasn’t definitive
enough, Wardell admitted “from a personal perspective the removal option is where I am
leaning.” By that time Wardell had nearly 10,000 postcards and personal letters that
weighed heavily in favor of option 7A.70
The support of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes pushed the state
toward dam removal as well. Because the tribes were around before the state and
because the 1855 Hellgate Treaty both carved out a reservation for the tribes and granted
them rights to traditional hunting and gathering grounds, including “the place of the big
bull trout,” tribal chairman Fred Matt believed that “the tribes have ‘a little more’ right to
– and responsibility for – the Clark Fork than does the state of Montana.” While
maintaining a focus on the importance of bull trout recovery and habitat restoration, the
tribes added the renewal of a spiritual resource to their reasons for supporting dam
70
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removal. Having gained official position as a “trustee” for the site by the Department of
the Interior in 1995, the CSKT’s claim to rights and responsibilities carried weight within
Superfund law. But the tribal government was participating in the implementation of
public policy beyond the confines of the reservation for more than just tribal reasons. In
a letter to Governor Martz, Matt articulated CSKT’s support for dam removal as a way of
preserving a subsistence tradition, as a guarantee of treaty rights, and as “Montana
citizens” seeking “to preserve the right under the Montana Constitution to a clean and
healthful environment.” The tribe was also acting within their Superfund rights.71
Aside “public participation,” Superfund law contains only one section dedicated
to a specific group. Under section 9626, the law gives “Indian tribes” the “same
treatment as a State with respect to the provisions” of Superfund. In particular, the law
includes tribal “consultation” in the choice of a cleanup action. At Milltown, CSKT
exercised that right over an environment that was not on its reservation and an issue that
was of a public, not just a tribal, interest.72
Listening to the public, local government and the tribe, the state seemed ever
closer to throwing its support behind dam removal. That decision rested mostly with
Governor Martz’s administration and the Department of Environmental Quality. While
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they deliberated through the spring of 2002, other state agencies, like Fish, Wildlife and
Parks, had already approved option 7A, both publically and in letters to the DEQ and
Martz. As the state and Martz remained noticeably uncommitted, the EPA further
forecast the possibility of dam removal.73
In July, 2002, the EPA added to the momentum of turning Superfund cleanup into
environmental and economic renewal. In a news release entitled “EPA announces $1.3
million in Superfund funding to return contaminated sites to productive use,”
administrator Christie Whitman confirmed her agency’s new commitment to turning
some of the nation’s worst waste sites into healthy, financially-productive places.
Milltown was one of 19 communities being offered funding.74
The $40,000 Milltown was to receive as part of the new Superfund
Redevelopment Pilot Program seemed to strengthen the possibility of dam removal.
Nationally, the initiative indicated that Superfund was evolving into more than just a
hazardous waste containment or cleanup policy. Just like traditional cleanup efforts, the
Pilot Program would award money from a viable PRP or the EPA, if no PRP existed, to
help local governments and community organizations plan and carry out post-cleanup
ecological restoration and economic redevelopment. Funding for such efforts, which
Milltown received at the end of July, 2002, would become a standard part of Superfund
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implementation nationally. The program enabled communities to turn toxic waste sites
into everything from “wildlife sanctuaries” to “manufacturing facilities.”75
At Milltown, the Pilot money helped give Bonner and Milltown residents more
direct participation in the Superfund process and outcome. Although the Bonner
Development Group opposed the decision to award the money to the county, even though
that was what the program was bound legally to do, members of the group joined the
project. In fact, it was BDG’s attention to how dam removal would undermine the
community’s tax base that kept local economic interests in the spotlight of restoration and
redevelopment. The influence of BDG was one more way in which Superfund
implementation was a coordination of many competing interests, rather than a winnertake-all outcome. And the redevelopment committee that formed to direct the pilot
project was one more indication that things were moving toward dam removal and river
restoration.76
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More than just opinions and planning pointed in the direction of dam removal.
By summer’s end, the EPA had ordered a slow drawdown of the Milltown reservoir to
allow federal and state agents to test the toxic sediment. These tests were meant to help
“refine…cost estimates of several cleanup options,” although testing sediment so that it
could be left in place behind a rubber-fortified dam seemed unlikely. Keith Large, an
EPA site manager, told the Missoulian that the drawdown would also answer questions
that spoke to removal, such as: “What construction techniques could we use to load
sediments onto rail cars? How much excavation could we do versus dredging?” The
month-long drawdown also allowed Montana FWP biologists to kill as many of the
reservoir’s illegally-introduced, trout-eating, non-native northern pike as they could net,
hook or strand on dry land. Eradicating invasive species appeared to be part of a bigger
plan to recover native ones.77
By mid-August, 2002, the EPA had also eliminated another argument against dam
removal. The agency released its plan for cleaning up the Clark Fork River between
Butte and Milltown. Funded by ARCO, the $100 million effort included removing the
worst of the streamside contaminants. Many of the people who opposed dam removal
argued that the dam prevented upriver contaminants from polluting the Clark Fork below
Milltown. The plan to remediate and restore the upper river seriously weakened that
argument. This “turning point,” as Tracy Stone-Manning called the plan, for the upriver
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portion of the nation’s largest Superfund complex, was a nudge in the direction of
restoration for the reservoir portion.78
Public comments kept nudging the EPA in that direction as well. By early fall,
2002, the EPA counted more than 9000 public comments on Milltown. A growing
number of those comments came from Bonner-Milltown area residents who now favored
dam removal. Most of those writers spoke of a silent local majority being out “yelled” by
the BDG. As Mary Erickson offered, “we are part of a large but perhaps less vocal or
financially motivated group of citizens that want to see the whole ‘dam’ mess cleaned
up.” She admitted having cancelled her membership with BDG due to the influence she
thought ARCO was having with the group.
By October, Erickson and many other locals raised their voices by forming the
Friends of Two Rivers group with the explicit purpose of countering BDG in the BonnerMilltown community. And on the eve of Halloween, the new group’s efforts were part of
more than ten thousand comments received by the EPA, which Diana Hammer, who
directed the site’s public relations, called “very rare, unheard of actually, to get this kind
of response outside of a formal public comment period.”79

78

EPA, “Environmental News: EPA Proposes Cleanup Plan for the Clark Fork River,”
8/15/2002, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown
Administrative State Site Records, reel 1473, Government Documents, Mansfield
Library, University of Montana. Matt Gouras, “EPA unveils Clark Fork cleanup plan,”
Missoulian, 8/16/2002, A1; Sherry Devlin, “Healing at hand,” Missoulian, 9/12/2002,
C1.
79
Email from Diana Hammer (EPA) to EPA, 9/10/2002; letter from Mary Erickson to
EPA, 10/8/2002; letter from Gary Matson to EPA, 10/12/2002, in U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative State Site Records, reel
1524, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of Montana. Sherry
Devlin, “New group to back Milltown Dam removal;” “EPA offices flooded with public
comments on Milltown Dam,” Missoulian, 10/24/2002, 10/30/2002, B1, A1. Greg
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In December the EPA announced that it would release its cleanup proposal for
Milltown “in late January/February 2003.” Because the proposal needed “State and
Community Acceptance,” the agency wrote that it “looks forward to learning what the
State and Community think about the Proposed Cleanup Plan during the public comment
period.” The comment period was a Superfund formality. The EPA knew what the
public thought. And that had been one of the major thrusts of the CFC campaign. As
Stone-Manning put it, “(W)e did sort of a pre-comment period campaign so that they
(EPA) knew they would have public support.” The governor, however, had opted for
public silence on the issue.80
The CFC and other dam removal advocates fretted about the governor’s position.
Referring to George Bush’s campaign promise, Stone-Manning recognized that Martz
was “a Republican Governor under President Bush…who on the campaign trail said there
would be no dams coming down under his watch and who believes in state’s rights.” In
fact, after Bush had defeated Al Gore in 2000 and Martz had won the Montana
governorship, the Milltown project manager had called Stone-Manning and asked if her
organization was going to continue its campaign. She told Forba and the Missoulian that
the national and state turn in politics was simply motivation to “ramp up” the campaign.
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The plan was to trump Republican opposition to dam removal at the state level with
public support. The Coalition didn’t imagine turning such opponents into supporters.81
Yet, in answering letters from dam removal advocates and opponents, Martz was
beginning to intimate her decision. Responding to concerns expressed by BDG about the
local economy, the governor detailed the high cost of stabilizing the Milltown Dam and
its poor prospects for turning a profit. She also admitted working closely with other
agencies on the issue, such as the state FWP, USFWS, and the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, all of which supported option 7A.
In her State of the State address on January 21, 2003, Martz made the surprising
announcement that she and the state would support dam and sediment removal. She said
that safety issues, which had gained attention when FERC had classified the dam as a
possible post-9/11 terrorist target, had swayed her. The recent organization of the
Friends of Two Rivers had also helped Martz recognize that there was ample local
support for option 7A. The next day the Missoulian reported that the EPA had come to
the same conclusion. In February the agency would make public a “$90 million
proposal” that specified “reconfiguring the Clark Fork River’s channel, restoration of the
confluence of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot rivers, and a slurry pipeline that delivers
contaminated sediments to a permanent repository on high ground south of the river.”
Even President Bush made an exception to his blanket support of dams by giving the
Milltown Dam removal a symbolic nod.82
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In the three years between the beginning of the CFC campaign and Martz’s public
embrace of dam removal, Tracy Stone-Manning had a dream about the confluence of the
Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers. Admitting that it sounds “goofy” for someone who is
not “New Agey,” she recalled falling asleep and simply hearing the sound of the freeflowing rivers converging. When she woke she told her husband, “it is going to happen.”
But it wasn’t until Stone-Manning heard Martz’s address, in which the governor
“sounded like she was reading off our website,” that “there was champagne.” Listening
to Martz reiterate the rhetoric of the campaign confirmed the message of StoneManning’s dream confluence. It was “going to happen.”83
More support for making it happen quickly followed. The state’s congressmen
made visits to the dam to express and publicize their position in favor of its removal.
Martz revealed that the state had been in secret negotiations with ARCO, the dam’s
owners and the EPA, which pointed to the companies’ acquiescence to the proposed plan.
“They could have fought us and paid for attorneys from here to forever,” said Martz of
the liable parties’ willingness to accept the EPA decision. She knew that did not
eliminate the possibility of problems along the way to a cleanup plan. In a letter to the
Missoula county commissioners, she wrote “(D)ifferences of opinion will occur and
tough decisions will need to be made.” But the path seemed set.84
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The buyout of ARCO by BP in 2000, which frightened many people concerned
about Milltown, helped facilitate dam removal in the end. Trout Unlimited’s state
director, Bruce Farling, recalled meeting a small group of BP scientists and executives
for the first time as the feasibility study process came to a close. He and Tracy StoneManning explained their case for dam removal to the BP representatives, who, as Farling
intimated, thought “we were like these loony, crazy people.” With ARCO environmental
remediation director Sandra Stash looking on and defending the dam-in-place logic,
Farling saw the BP “guys” experience a sudden “attitude shift.” They realized that
Milltown was, according to Farling, “this annoying pimple thing” and they were a “multizillion dollar company.” Stone-Manning saw the shift, too. As opposed to what Stash
had been telling them, the BP “guys” suddenly understood that removing the dam would
erase a “tiny liability…off our books.” Getting the Superfund site off BP’s books
permanently also coincided with the EPA’s increasing preference for permanent
remediation.85
Perhaps it was fitting that the EPA released its plan for Milltown on Tax Day,
2003. Just as April 15 piques arguments over the federal government’s revenues,
opinions about dam removal began to differ. One of the most contested elements of the
plan was where to put the contaminated sediment. Yet such struggles were part of a new
debate. How to remove the dam and restore the river rather than whether to do so
became the central question at Milltown.86
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With a Record of Decision designating the final remedy due out within the year,
the EPA fostered public comment on its plan more than at any other time during the
process. The comments came in a steady trickle compared to the surge that preceded the
agency’s decision. Most writers praised the option to remove the dam as a good,
foregone conclusion and directed the EPA to supervise a thorough cleanup and
restoration. Both acknowledging the precedent Milltown set in the public participation
schedule and the need for that engagement to continue, John Wardell told the Missoulian
“(T)his effort has been unique because we’ve gotten so much public comment in advance
of the release of the proposed plan. But we need to hear from people now as well.”
Diana Hammer later acknowledged that Milltown became a model for how her agency
engages the public in the Superfund process, like commencing official comment periods
earlier.87
Hammer also recognized that the EPA was expanding its definition of Superfund
cleanup. “When the Superfund program first started, we were dealing with…oozing
messes or leaking barrels and drum,” she recalled. With Milltown as an early and
successful example, Hammer acknowledged that her agency “should be thinking about
how that land could be re-used in some beneficial way.” Until the EPA started the
redevelopment Pilot Project and places like Milltown looked to a usable, economically
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viable future, simply containing wastes “just didn’t seem like we had finished the job” to
Hammer.88
The path to dam and sediment removal at Milltown furthered other changes in
environmentalism as well. The Clark Fork Coalition’s campaign spoke of a new mode of
environmentalism. The group created surprising images of environmentalism as fun,
funny, and, even, “sexy” as Tracy Stone-Manning put it. Such playfulness in a media
campaign advocating an environmental issue allowed the group to entice, educate and
motivate people outside its usual audience. And those people participated in the
Superfund process, altering its course in historically large numbers. Emails were quickly
taking the place of traditional letter writing. In addition to the tone and style of the
Coalition’s campaign, it promoted the idea of pushing Superfund remediation into the
realm of restoration. The motto “Remove the Dam. Restore the River” connected
Superfund’s original mandate of basic waste cleanup with the new direction of ecological
regeneration. And the emphasis that opponents, such as Bonner Development Group,
placed on the local economy as a Superfund consideration coincided with the EPA’s
fledgling efforts to promote redevelopment along with remediation. As the agency’s
public information arm, the Clark Fork Technical Assistance Committee, deemed it, the
“project now underway at the Milltown Reservoir is one of the nation's most challenging
and ambitious environmental cleanups,” due to its size, as well as its integration of
restoration and economic development with cleanup. At Milltown and elsewhere, this
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would come to be known as the “three Rs” of Superfund: Remediation, Restoration and
Redevelopment.89
The drinking of champagne in celebration of the EPA’s decision at Milltown
hardly ended the Superfund process. A week after its announcement a Missoulian
editorial cheering the proposal concluded that “(A) decade from now, when the dam is
gone and the river is cleaner, people will look back in amazement that we ever agonized
over what course of action to take with Milltown Reservoir.” In the following ten years
the dam came down to many rounds of toasting and festivities, and the agonizing did
seem to abate. The river began to regain some of the character that had once earned it the
name “Place of the Shining Waters” in the Salish tongue. The EPA, state of Montana,
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, and local government helped promote new
economic opportunities associated with the free-flowing confluence. Restoration and
redevelopment also spread far beyond the place where the rivers meet and the dam once
stood and did so in some very unexpected ways. The whole process settled into another
chapter in the area’s and Superfund’s history. And as it did, two of the truly unique
features of the final stage of the Superfund process at Milltown – the actual work of the
three Rs – were the rise of corporate ecological restoration and the directions people
pushed restoration.90
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The Three Rs of Superfund: Remediation, Restoration, and Redevelopment
Restoration is about having the power to visualize, to say that we can imagine a
landscape that we don't see today, that we can create, or recreate, a landscape that was
seen by Lewis and Clark…We can look to the past, and by understanding the past,
visualize the future. And then engage communities and conservationists in the act of
restoration. That has a lot of magic and power.
Bruce Babbitt, on the theme of his time as Secretary of the
Interior.1

Spring runoff from the Clark Fork River had threatened repeatedly to breach the
Milltown Dam in the century it stood. When that breach came, the history of floods
imperiling the dam was one of its many justifications. But heavy machinery, not high
water, did the actual work.
On March 28, 2008, a few hundred people stood on a bluff overlooking the dam
site. With high noon sunshine melting the snowpack off the surrounding mountainsides,
Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer hollered, “Let ‘er run!” A stream of muddy river
water flowed in a new channel past what for a century had been the north end of the
Milltown Dam. Construction workers, public officials, environmental advocates, and
local citizens all cheered. From the bluff above the confluence’s south side, people spent
the next few hours watching a trickle swell into a modest waterfall that tumbled over the
twenty-foot drop where the dam used to be. They snapped photographs, listened to short
speeches, pointed out curves in the river’s new channel, as well as remnants of its
creation; berms, piles of riprap, orange pylons and plastic fencing, earthmoving
machinery, and a nearly 200-acre expanse of muddy ground that had been underwater for
1
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a hundred years. County Commissioner Barbara Evans offered that it was “really a
historic occasion.”
If dynamite and a massive wave of water played no part in the river’s first
uninhibited run past the dam in a century, no one seemed let down. Speakers reminded
the crowd that after thirty years of Superfund designation, the celebration was about the
culmination of a long, tedious, sometimes contentious, but very methodical process. It
was also about the future. The first breaching of the dam was one of many riverside
ceremonies commemorating the many small steps that marked fixing one of the nation’s
largest Superfund sites. It would take at least another year just to get rid of the rest of the
dam so that the Clark Fork could truly run free.
The same kind of planning, bureaucratic oversight, corporate negotiations, and
public input that had brought about the decision to removal the Milltown Dam and its
load of toxic sediment prevailed in the years actual dam removal took. Numerous
celebrations marked milestones of both the paper and shovel work of Superfund
remediation at Milltown. School groups toured the dam’s powerhouse before it closed
for good; workers cheered for the first bucket of sediment scooped from the muddy
floodplain; and on any given day, people trekked to the site’s overlook to watch the earth
moving, jackhammering, or machines carving a new river channel. Most days onlookers
would have had a hard time distinguishing cleanup from river retooling, much less the
goal of making the project an economic boon to the area. Yet the integration of
remediation, restoration and redevelopment made Milltown “really” historic as Evans put
it.
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As EPA community coordinator for Milltown, Diana Hammer saw how the
process of implementing a Superfund solution at the site helped make it a model of the
law’s evolving emphasis on “the three Rs.” As she awaited Schweitzer’s command,
Clark Fork Coalition scientist Christine Brick told the Missoulian “I feel like an 8-year
old kid waiting for Christmas.” The Christmas present was $120 million for remediation.
But with overwhelming local support, cleaning up the toxins at Milltown became the
starting point for restoring the watershed. Part of that evolution was figuring out what
restoration of a natural environment meant. Or as Brick once observed, “without
restoration the river would have been left to run in a rock-lined ditch.”2
Environmental historians have argued that restoration in the West began with
efforts to return individual species to their native places. In the late-20th century grizzly
bears and wolves returned to Montana, for example. In The Natural West Dan Flores
proposed that the bigger challenge was for westerners to tackle whole ecosystems, such
as watersheds, and to do so with the understanding that virtually all environments are
products of a long and varied human presence. Thus, restoration would be another new
human manipulation of the environment, not a return to untrammeled nature.
In many ways, restoration at Milltown was moving in that direction. No one
involved at Milltown suggested that Superfund implementation would return the area to
pre-European conditions. Overlooking the site of the former dam and toasting its
removal included watching cars and trucks roar by on Interstate-90 directly opposite the
confluence. Remembering that the area once bore the names “place of the big bull trout”
and “shining waters” was more about recognizing that people could help undo some of
2
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the last hundred year’s worth of industrial damage to the environment, rather than hoping
that they could wholly erase the world wrought by industry. Milltown’s restoration in the
history of Superfund also demonstrated that that new environmental project was a
national undertaking, not just a western one. As Elizabeth Grossman pointed out in
Watershed: The Undamming of America cases like Milltown were part of a national trend
whereby more dams have been decommissioned than built in the U.S. since 1998.3
At Milltown, restoration came to include the dispersal of Superfund money and
addressing impacts well beyond the confines of the site. Corporate and public interests,
federal and state laws, Native American efforts, as well as the riparian environment all
played a part in determining the course of dam removal and river restoration at Milltown.
So too, thinking about how to repair and revitalize the river led to considering the health
of the local economy. Superfund implementation aided a rise in the environmental
restoration business, as well as providing a catalyst to local entrepreneurship.
Since Superfund’s passage, remediation of sites has meant removing or
containing the source of toxins that threaten human health. At Milltown that effort
centered on removing contaminated sediments. The debate over where to move tons of
contaminated sludge brought with it the question of environmental justice. The choice to
move Milltown’s waste to an upstream community came about because of ecological
concerns, rather than social disparity or corporate malevolence. Just as remediation
affected environments outside the Superfund site, restoration spread beyond the
designated site as well. One of the most unique dispersals of Superfund impacts
3
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happened on a tributary to the Clark Fork watershed on the Flathead Indian Reservation.
Finally, Superfund implementation at Milltown demonstrated how improving an
environment could help redevelop a fading extractive economy. And as a 2011 EPA case
study of Milltown’s accomplishments demonstrated, integration of the three Rs, backed
by robust and consistent community involvement was a model “that can help guide
similar projects at contaminated lands across the country.” Public participation in the
Superfund process at Milltown became part of a new, more thorough definition of toxic
waste cleanup for the EPA.4

Heavy metal-laden sediment behind Milltown Dam was the culprit that earned the
site federal designation, and it was the first major consideration when cleaning up the
place became a reality. As project manager for Milltown Russ Forba told Waste News
shortly after the EPA released its first cleanup plan, “(T)he main emphasis of this and the
main cost is the removal of sediments to restore groundwater.”5 EPA estimates showed
that “300,000 cubic yards of uncontaminated sediment scoured from the mouth of the
Blackfoot River” would wash downstream in the months following dam removal. In the
next ten years the Clark Fork would probably flush another ten times that much sediment,
“the largest sediment load ever released by a dam removal in the United States”
according the Missoulian’s account of the federal agency’s remediation plan. So, as
monumental and iconic as dam removal was, it was the removal of the contaminated

4
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280

Chapter 7: The Three Rs

sediment that stirred the first crucial debates about how to implement the EPA’s decision
for Milltown. In fact, the issue of sediment altered that decision from its outset.6
The public comment period that followed the EPA’s draft plan elicited fervent
response to the question of sediment removal and forced one of the major changes in the
agency’s plan. It also complicated historical arguments about the overlap between social
justice and environmental issues. Environmental historians attuned to social justice have
argued that polluted environments disproportionately affect working class and minority
populations. Either those populations can’t afford or don’t have access to the political
power and scientific knowledge to fight pollution, or the low property values surrounding
polluted places draw disadvantaged populations. A caveat to that argument is that people
who can afford the efforts maintain a “Not In My Backyard” attitude toward
environmental pollution. At Milltown, the sediments wound up at a significant remove
from the Superfund site, but the forces behind that decision challenged traditional
arguments about “NIMBYism.” Milltown had the same history and contemporary
demographics as a working class community as the place the area’s sediments ended up.
The reason an environmental justice controversy arose over the movement of that
contaminated waste was because Missoula residents were so active in getting them
moved. Their destination, Opportunity Ponds, Montana, certainly suffered from its
proximity to industrial waste. But injustice within the Milltown Superfund process did
not account for those circumstances. Mining history, public opinion based on
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John Cramer, “Into the Breach: Clark Fork, Blackfoot rivers punch through Milltown
Dam,” Missoulian, 3/29/2008, A1. Sherry Devlin, “Dignitaries hail return of unhindered
flows,” Missoulian, 3/29/2008, A1. Personal observations by the author. Diana Hammer
Interview, OH 428-02, Archives and Special Collections, Mansfield Library, The
University of Montana-Missoula
281

Chapter 7: The Three Rs

environmental science, and, most importantly in the case of Milltown, the knowhow of a
new corporate restoration industry shaped the sediment decision.7
The issue of where to put contaminated sediments gained momentum as early as
2000. A study contracted by the EPA evaluating disposal sites estimated that a site
needed between 15 and 184 acres of land depending on how much of the sediment the
final cleanup produced. The study identified two local sites that would entail creating a
new, plastic-lined disposal complex on undeveloped land on the margins of the Clark
Fork floodplain.8
Others had local waste repository sites in mind as well. In August, 2000, Peter
Nielsen wrote to Russ Forba to tell him that the Missoula city-county health department
had identified no less than “eleven sites” in the county that might work.9 The state’s
Trout Unlimited director, Bruce Farling, thought that most of the local environmental
community agreed that it “was fine having it (sediment) around here somewhere as long
as it’s high and dry,” as well as closely monitored. “As long as it isn’t under water, it’s
OK,” he offered. That opinion wasn’t the same as every environmentalist taking home a
share of the waste, as one opponent of dam removal had once suggested, but it wasn’t a
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‘not in my backyard’ response either. It was a practical understanding that cleaning the
river meant sacrificing some other landscape. At the time, a local place was acceptable.10
In the end, the practicalities changed. Local sites were too close to the water. In
April, 2002, state EPA director John Wardell wrote to Dan Watts, the president of
Montana Rail Link, and the economics of using his company to haul sediments away
from Milltown. Dennis Washington, who had grown his fortune in the 1980s by buying
most of the mining in Butte, owned MRL. Having seen ARCO saddle itself with
environmental liability, Washington purchased entities like Butte’s East Continental Pit
from ARCO, while leaving that company with all the liability for past contamination. As
Butte-born journalist Edwin Dobbs put it in an article for Harper’s Magazine,
“Washington’s net worth…reportedly shot up to more than $1 billion, the bulk of it made
in Butte on an investment of only $18 million, the fire-sale price ARCO accepted for the
Richest Hill on Earth.” Wardell’s letter helped position Washington to make even more
money from ARCO and its environmental liability. The state EPA director was opening
discussions with Watts about getting “the best possible estimate for the potential cost of
rail transport of the dewatered sediments from Milltown to Opportunity Ponds.” With
Watts’ positive response, the possibility of moving the waste about 100 miles upriver and
spreading it in an existing repository within sight of where the toxic mess had been
produced became a reality. Watts roughed out that possibility at $20-$34 million
depending on the amount of sediment, not including the construction of new rail spurs.
With that, Opportunity Ponds became central to the debate about Milltown solution.11
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When the EPA released its proposed plan for Milltown a year later on April 15,
2003, it still included placement of the sediments “in a lined repository located less than a
mile downstream from the Dam.” The plan was to use “hydraulic dredges” to scoop the
contaminated sediments off the bottom of the reservoir and “send them via slurry
pipeline” to the disposal site.12 As with so many turns in the Milltown story, vigorous
public participation prompted an extension of the EPA’s official comment period on its
dam removal proposal.13 In a newspaper article about the comment period, project
manager Russ Forba encouraged people to help answer questions about the how and
where of sediment removal. Opportunity Ponds became the favored location.14
In 1914 ARCO’s predecessor, the Anaconda Mining Company, established what a
New York Times retrospective called “a model community to show that people could raise
crops and livestock” in the midst of heavy mining and known pollution. Opportunity had
been a dumping ground for toxic waste from its inception. With streetcar service, a
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school and golf course, people had readily bought 10-acre parcels and moved their
families to the new town of Opportunity as the town boomed alongside copper
production during and between both world wars. Residents accommodated the waste
repository as a normal, necessary part of life in the heart of industrial mining country.
But with most mining jobs gone by the early 21st century, many locals began to balk at
having to suffer the industry’s consequences.15
Forba, along with EPA’s John Wardell and Diana Hammer, received plenty of
answers to the question of where to dump Milltown’s wastes, especially during public
forums on May 7 and 8, 2003, in Bonner and Missoula. The most common comments
about the agency’s proposal addressed moving sediments to Opportunity. Local resident
and Friends of Two Rivers member Mary Erickson opened the discussion by asking,
“why purchase another property here, prepare it, line it, build the site and duplicate that
kind of expenditure when perhaps we could utilize the Opportunity Ponds?” Locals and
people from up and down the river agreed that using undeveloped land on the lip of the
river’s floodplain for a toxic waste repository that had to last in perpetuity was a
questionable notion of permanent cleanup. Proposals ranged from stuffing the wastes
back into the Butte mines and pits from whence they came, to the more practical and
thoroughly supported option of the Opportunity Ponds.16

15

Jim Robbins, “In a Town Called Opportunity, Distress Over a Dump,” The New York
Times, 8/24/2005, A10.
16
Martin-Lake & Associates, Inc., The Court Reporters, “Superfund Program Clean-up
Proposal Milltown Reservoir/Clark Fork River, Transcript of Proceedings, 5/7-5/8/2003,
in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Montana Office, Milltown Administrative
State Site Records, reel 1709, Government Documents, Mansfield Library, University of
Montana.
285

Chapter 7: The Three Rs

The day before the Bonner and Missoula meeting commenced, US Senator Max
Baucus weighed in on Milltown. In a letter to Russ Forba, Baucus summarized how an
Opportunity repository “would allow EPA to coordinate and manage in one place” all the
waste produced from cleaning up the entire Clark Fork Superfund complex, with plenty
of space available if that amounted to more than expected. Along with that justification,
Baucus offered to help negotiate a deal between the “interested parties,” which meant
getting ARCO to pay a Dennis Washington enterprise for the work of dealing with the
kind of waste that Washington had been savvy enough to avoid liability for in his
purchase of Butte mines from ARCO. Baucus added that his proposal would create more
Montana jobs as well. The Missoula-based Carpenters Local Union #28 and the Montana
Community-Labor Alliance/Jobs with Justice registered its support of the dam removal
proposal and favored the Opportunity Ponds option as a jobs creation or redevelopment
prospect, too.
State Senator Sherm Anderson, who represented the district encompassing
Opportunity Ponds, denounced Baucus’s proposal to the EPA, claiming that the area
already suffered enough from being a waste repository and that moving Milltown’s
sediment the 100 miles there would cost an additional $100 million. Besides being a
gross exaggeration of the added cost of freighting the material upriver, compared to
building a new site near Milltown, Anderson obviated the fact that the addition to
Opportunity would be a fraction of what was already there. The EPA estimated
Milltown’s waste would need less than 180 acres, whereas the Opportunity site was 4000
acres. And, as Bruce Farling put it, he and Peter Nielsen had traveled to Anaconda and
Opportunity over the years and gotten figuratively “beaten up” for their efforts at trying
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to help residents push ARCO to improve its sprawling waste repository. Instead, area
residents had preferred that the company spend $48 million of Superfund liability dollars
on a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf course covering portions of the area’s old smelting
grounds, including bunkers filled with black mining slag instead of sand.17
Ecological arguments also pushed the EPA to change its plan for Milltown’s
sediments. A Missoula ecological consulting firm sent a four-page letter to Russ Forba
outlining its stance on the Milltown proposal. The letter argued that moving sediments to
Opportunity would help make the “fullest possible re-naturalization of the
river/floodplain/riparian area” possible. Penning the Missoula county health
department’s eight-page letter to the EPA, Peter Nielsen said that the first priority was
getting the sediment out of the river and if that entailed creating a local repository, local
government would support it. But, he confirmed that it made more ecological sense to
use the Opportunity site instead of breaking “clean ground.”18
Corporate opinion agreed. In early 2003, Missoula-based Envirocon, with
ARCO’s encouragement, had won the bid for performing sediment cleanup at Milltown.
In 1988 Dennis Washington had started Envirocon to apply the “heavy construction”
resources and know-how of major industry, like mining, to environmental cleanup.
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Having performed such work on thousands of projects, many of which fell under the
direction of federal agencies, the company now helped shape the sediment removal plan,
as well as carry it out. At Envirocon’s first meeting with local government and the
public, the company’s regional manager, Kris Kok, explained the technical and
ecological wisdom of draining the reservoir and excavating dry sediments with backhoes
and dump trucks, instead of scooping and sucking up wet muck with floating machinery.
For one, Envirocon could do the job in half the time since crews could work longer days
and year-round on dry ground, as opposed to discontinuing work most of the winter due
to a frozen reservoir if the pool were left in place. Even at two and a half instead of five
years, the project would be Envirocon’s largest, most lucrative, and its first in Missoula
county. Kok also proposed that the EPA retool its plan by rail freighting the
contaminated soil to Opportunity. Acknowledging that his company had no real say in
the matter, Kok echoed the suggestion that using the Opportunity site would eliminate
building and monitoring another repository.19
Opportunity residents were less excited about the possibility of acquiring
Milltown’s mess than local residents were of sending it upstream. When Kok explained
his company’s preferred plan to people in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, they had more
concerns than praise. They wondered why the sediments were called toxic waste in
Milltown, but described upriver as relatively good organic material that would help
“revegetate” the Opportunity Ponds repository. Area residents believed it was because of
the community’s declining population, high unemployment, and poor wages compared to
the relatively opposite situation in Missoula. Kok and ARCO spokesmen explained that
19

Sherry Devlin, “Ready to go: Envirocon answers questions on cleanup plans,”
Missoulian, 7/23/03, 1.
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location mattered, and the sediments were not in Missoula. When in the river and
Milltown groundwater the stuff was a health concern worthy of Superfund designation; as
a covering for wastes with much higher concentrations of heavy metal, Milltown’s
sediment would be an enhancement. Still, some opposition remained, although it seemed
infused with an anti-Missoula sentiment, as much as it was concern about adding a bit
more material to Opportunity’s repository. Anaconda resident Charlene Hagan proposed
turning Opportunity’s “lose-lose situation to a win-win for Missoula. In her letter to
Forba she asked if the sediment could be “unloaded and sculptured, then capped at a
proper site…to construct a world class ski jump hill (or hills) for different height jumps
as well as acrobatic jumping?” Hagan’s assessment of Missoula as a town of ski
enthusiasts was more about aiming sarcasm downriver than proposing a viable waste
containment site.20
While Opportunity area residents were slow to accept the new proposal, others
did so quickly. Governor Martz wrote to John Wardell supporting the change in the
EPA’s plan. By May 2004, the EPA released a Revised Proposed Cleanup Plan, which
acknowledged that along with public input, ARCO’s promotion of the Envirocon method
of removing sediment had swayed the agency. The new plan spelled out its “key
revisions” as: draining the reservoir and rerouting the Clark Fork temporarily to help dry
the sediment, removing 2.5 million cubic yards of it mechanically (instead of using
hydraulic methods), and transporting the waste by Montana Rail Link to Opportunity
Ponds. Although the revisions inflated the estimated price tag of cleanup from $95 to
20
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$106 million, the EPA clarified that public opinion and the responsible party was helping
to drive that change. At the same time the EPA released its Record of Decision for the
upper Clark Fork, which included sending toxic sediment from nearly 100 miles of
riverbank to Opportunity Ponds. That helped squelch the reality of building separate sitespecific repositories throughout the floodplain. So did a steady flow of public input.21
Along with Milltown and Missoula area residents, some people from upriver, like
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County resident Jim Flynn, wrote to the EPA voicing the opinion
that “removal of the Milltown Tailings to the Opportunity Ponds is also a good and
positive step forward.” A Butte “extractive resources engineers and geosciences” firm
produced a technical report confirming Envirocon’s assertion that dry excavation of
sediments would reduce the amount sent inadvertently downstream. A coalition of seven
Montana NGO’s, ranging from labor alliances to the Clark Fork Coalition, co-authored a
letter to Russ Forba praising his agency’s revised plan. Tracy Stone-Manning sent John
Wardell a separate letter enclosing 558 citizen comments to the same affect. Scores of
citizens provided their own postage or clicked emails to the EPA offering support for its
new plan. By mid-June, 2004, even Dan Cox, the chief executive of Anaconda-Deer
Lodge County, informed Forba that his office favored the decision to dump Milltown’s
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sediment at Opportunity Ponds, although he insisted that the effort receive as much
attention to protect human health as the dam site had.22
Opportunity residents’ complaints about being left out of the decision and being
dumped on, literally, contrasted with the EPA governed process. Milltown’s cleanup
added 2.6 million to the nearly 200 million cubic yards of mining waste already stored in
the ARCO-owned waste facility. Instead of trying to find the more than $2 billion it
would take to clean up Opportunity Ponds by hauling that waste somewhere else, the
EPA required ARCO to monitor local water wells and airborne dust, which was the
primary complaint of local residents. The company also maintained a trust fund to pay
for future problems should they arise. ARCO and the EPA both supported adding
Milltown’s sediment, in part, because studies showed that it would help abate dust by
capping the existing contaminants with a layer of viable topsoil. Yet, some residents still
felt ignored in the process.
A community was going to have toxic waste dumped near them against some
people’s will. Opponents described the issue in class terms – white collar Missoula
pushed Milltown’s contaminants on blue collar Opportunity. It looked like classic
environmental injustice. In reality, the decision had far less to do with polarized
communities than ecological considerations. As much as anything, the solution to
Milltown’s sediment illustrated a major element of environmental cleanup and
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restoration. Mending one place meant sacrificing another. Contrary to a few letters the
EPA received, it wasn’t possible to stuff the sediment back down mining shafts. It was
possible to consolidate it in a single repository.23
When finally the EPA favored the upriver storage of Milltown waste, it was not
choosing a disenfranchised community for dumping over an affluent one piqued with
NIMBYism. Nor was it opting for a cheap solution to handling pollution. The agency
picked an established, large and safer place to dispose of the waste instead of creating a
new repository on the margins of the floodplain. Because of transportation costs, using
the established site raised the cost of cleanup. And, both communities in question shared
an industrial, working-class history, just as both communities garnered EPA attention
throughout the process. In addition, opposition in Opportunity led to closer regulation of
its repository. Finally, all the attention about sediment centered on its going to
Opportunity. Yet, the trainloads of waste that began leaving Milltown in early October,
2007, ended up hauling 2.6 million cubic yards of sediment upriver, leaving nearly
double that amount in the Clark Fork River floodplain where the river had carried it and
the Milltown Dam sequestered it over the last century.24

Other controversies besides the sediment issue arose in the process of
implementing the Superfund cleanup at Milltown. The EPA and state of Montana had to
file court proceedings against NorthWestern Corp., the dam’s owner, and ARCO to prove
that the private agreement the two companies made limiting NorthWestern’s liability
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lacked legal teeth. Champagne and celebration greeted the EPA’s release of its Consent
Decree in August, 2005. The decree obligated NorthWestern Corp. to surrender its dam
license, pay $11.4 million toward removing the structure, and give the state its land and
water rights in the Milltown area, as well as a few miles of riverside property along a
downstream section of the Clark Fork renowned as a whitewater canyon. As for ARCO,
it had to pay $100 million for cleaning up Milltown. From locals to federal officials,
people gathered on the dam’s overlook to toast the decree, which also committed the state
to spend $7.6 million (from its previous suit against ARCO) on restoration work at
Milltown.25
With the first steps toward dam removal scheduled for as early as January, 2006
and the money to do the work secured, the EPA had the intervening time to press forward
with a few important legal provisions of the Superfund law. The agency had released its
Record of Decision on the last day of spring, 2004. Although the document was the final
decision to remove Milltown Dam and sediments, the specifics of the work took time to
determine. Those specifics varied from engineers figuring out the realities of dismantling
the dam and powerhouse, to fisheries biologists preparing studies on how the process
altered fish survival and populations, to an Army Corp of Engineers ice researcher
determining how the dam’s absence might change the formation and dynamics of ice
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floes through Missoula. The planning and scrutiny would last through 2006 when actual
remediation work commenced.26
Even with the dam still standing, most of the public attention shifted to the
prospect of restoring the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers. The emphasis the Clark Fork
Coalition had put on restoration in its: “Remove the Dam. Restore the River” campaign
pervaded the public comment periods leading up to approval of the EPA’s final plan.
Just as the public had absorbed other campaign language such as the “toxic time bomb,”
people followed the Coalition’s lead in asking the EPA to “dovetail” Superfund cleanup
with restoration. The public, the CFC and, eventually, local government and the state
encouraged the EPA to make sure that money and time spent dealing with sediment and
dam removal would make restoring a natural, free-flowing stream more efficient.
Because of its responsibility for recovering bull trout, the U.S. Department of the Interior
pressed the EPA to make restoration an “integrated” part of remediation, too.27
Media attention on the Milltown Dam Superfund site tended to emphasize visions
of its restoration. In the years between the EPA’s Record of Decision and Governor
Brian Schweitzer’s call to “Let ‘er run,” numerous local newspaper articles about the
project included a diagram depicting the confluence of free flowing rivers. When The
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New York Times published a story about the dam’s removal, the quip it included from
Tracy Stone-Manning celebrated “putting a river back together,” rather than taking apart
a dam. Plenty of dams had come down in America. The removal for the Edwards Dam
from the Kennebeck River in Maine became a model for such projects in 1999.
According to the nation’s leading river conservation organization, American Rivers, “the
number of recorded dam removals has grown each year” in the decade since the Edwards
came down. Dismantling Milltown’s dam would help revitalize the Clark Fork and the
river made famous by Norman MacLean and Robert Redford, going beyond just
removing the dam, and doing so as the first such project at a Superfund site.28
Lots of attention went to figuring out what restoring the confluence meant.
Studying rocks, soil and landforms to recreate the Clark Fork’s historic riverbed, its
natural drop in the area where the reservoir had impeded it for a century, the particulars
of its union with the Blackfoot, and its new inclinations below the dam site had to be
modeled and undertaken. Site-specific restoration also included revegetating the
floodplain with native plants. Natural processes would account for some of the
restoration. In one surprising and feel-good twist to the process, many native plants came
out of a hundred years of dormancy under the reservoir and sprouted on their own in its
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absence.29 The EPA estimated that it would take four to ten years for the Milltown
aquifer to clean itself and become a viable water source for residents again. Meanwhile,
Envirocon hauled sediment from riverbed to dump truck to train car, sculpted bends and
cut banks, entangled logjams and graded the floodplain around the confluence. Because
of a Superfund-required monitoring plan, the EPA kept tabs on water quality throughout
the remediation. Lots of that restorative work happened in the course of removing
contaminated sediments, but took place before ARCO had agreed to pay the state’s
Natural Resource Damage Program an additional $11 million for restoring Milltown, on
top of the $168 million it owed for the same purpose throughout the watershed, none of
which included the company’s liability for remediation. In the end, restoration at
Milltown was practical, scientific, cost-conscious, and driven by notions of what people
could do make a section of the Clark Fork a healthier ecosystem, rather than trying to
erase human presence or turn back the clock. As the EPA-funded Clark Fork Technical
Assistance Committee defined it, restoration was, at its simplest, “returning natural
functions” to the river, which meant recreating viable riparian fish and wildlife habitat,
including making the river safe for people to enjoy.30
EPA’s oversight of restoration at Milltown also allowed that restoration wasn’t
always site specific. Some work financed by ARCO’s restoration dollars happened well
beyond the boundaries of Milltown or the Clark Fork’s main body, as well as stretched
the definition of restoration beyond returning a waterway to its natural state.
29
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As 2005 waned through the middle of bird- and bow-hunting season in Montana,
another gathering took place near the Milltown dam. Organized as “Community Days at
the Confluence,” the autumn congregation of people on the banks of the reservoir
celebrated the past, present and future ways of life where the Blackfoot meets the Clark
Fork River. The Missoulian’s front-page coverage of the event featured a photo of Salish
elder and storyteller Louis Adams. Adams reminded five- or six-dozen picnickers that
long before people called the area Milltown or Bonner, they called it “place of big bull
trout.” Recalling that his ancestors moved throughout western Montana on a regular
basis and buried their dead wherever they died, he said that the confluence, as well as
most of the region, was sacred. With the sun spotlighting him, Adams also emphasized
how removing the dam and toxins would help restore the river, its former namesake fish,
and a general sense of its sacredness.31
Just as Louis Adams described the confluence as one point in a region connected
both naturally and culturally, Superfund restoration at Milltown radiated beyond the
retooling of the old reservoir site. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes on the
Flathead Indian Reservation undertook one of the most unexpected of those radiations.
While federal listing of the bull trout helped bring cleanup and restoration to the
Milltown site, the CSKT used Superfund money to help foster conservation of bull trout
habitat far from “the place of big bull trout.” Tribal efforts on behalf of the threatened
fish were part of a cultural restoration project as well.
Using funds garnered in 1998 from participating in the state’s Natural Resource
Damages Program, CSKT chose to start a Bull Trout Restoration Project on the Flathead
31

Betsy Cohen, “Where the Blackfoot and Clark Fork meet, residents look to the future,”
Missoulian, 9/26/2005, A1.
297

Chapter 7: The Three Rs

Reservation, about 15 miles north of Missoula. Germaine White, director of the project,
remembered the tribe’s decision to use some of its $18.5 settlement (with ARCO and the
state of Montana’s NRDP) to restore a tributary of the Clark Fork River that ran across
the reservation. In particular, the tribe wanted to mend a waterway that was comparable
to the headwaters of the Clark Fork, where Butte had disastrously damaged Silver Bow
Creek.
All fifty miles of the Jocko River flow through the Flathead Indian Reservation.
Resident bull trout survived in the river’s upper reaches at the turn of the millennium.
But its lower stretch wound through agricultural land and increasing development before
joining the Flathead River, which, in turn, flowed into the Clark Fork near the
reservation’s western edge. Those pressures on the lower Jocko had decimated bull trout,
especially the migratory population. Using what White called a “watershed” approach,
the Bull Trout Restoration Project included retooling up to 22 miles of the Jocko’s
riparian environment. Restorative efforts included improving irrigation so that more
water stayed in the stream, restricting new development within the floodplain, repairing
the riverbanks and bed in places damaged by livestock grazing and development,
reconstructing nearly 800 acres of wetlands and replanting native plants throughout.
By the time the Clark Fork flowed past the partially dismantled Milltown Dam in
2008, the lower Jocko was meandering, pooling and purifying in new wetlands, swirling
and depositing clean sediment in handcrafted logjams and back eddies, quenching the
roots of expanding patches of willow and cottonwood, as well as helping birth a growing
population of native trout. Those efforts mirrored the kind of work happening at
Milltown and the upper Clark Fork. As often as possible, the CSKT tried to implement
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what White called “passive management,” or removing “the change agent that’s causing
the disturbance and allow the natural processes to restore the river…The rivers always
want to heal themselves.” It is “the best way to restoration,” according to White. In
addition to pushing restoration into distant tributaries, and by using unique methods, the
CSKT project emphasized education and cultural renewal, as well.
Germaine White helped guide CSKT to publish Bull Trout’s Gift: a Salish story
about the value of reciprocity. Based on a series of fifth-grade field trips to the Jocko,
the book used the grade-schoolers’ interest in the bull trout as the starting point for them
to learn a bit about the natural history of the area and the people who lived there.
Illustrations accompanied an intertwined retelling of the field trip to the modern-day
Jocko and the tribes’ history, traditions, and religion associated with western Montana
waterways, as well as changes that settlement by non-Indians brought. CSKT produced
the book as part of an educational package including a field journal and an interactive
DVD called Explore the river: bull trout, tribal people, and the Jocko River. While
scientific data on restoration drove much of the actual work on the Jocko, the tribes
believed that lasting changes necessitated a “sense of stewardship among the
community,” which depends on “public information and education,” in White’s words.32
Classrooms on and beyond the Flathead reservation adopted Bull Trout’s Gift and
took field trips similar to the one in the book. White has enjoyed seeing this offshoot of
the Clark Fork Superfund site encourage lots of “experiential and observational learning”
32
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or actually “being in the water” as a way for children to study bull trout, riparian habitats
and people’s relationship with the natural world. So in very intimate ways, restoring bull
trout has offered the gift not just of more and healthier native fish, but a renewed
connection between people and their local environments, their history and in many cases,
their culture.
Throughout the book, readers grapple with the pronunciation and meaning of
Salish names, especially those associated with rivers, wildlife and western Montana.
Those words are part of a tribal emphasis on restoring a nearly dead native language to a
new generation. In 2001, CSKT opened Nkwusm, the only Salish language immersion
school in the world. The tribe has continually expanded and revised it native language
dictionary in the last decade. Salish elder and storyteller Johnny Arlee, who has written
numerous books of Salish stories, as well as consulted for and acted in movies, such as
Jeremiah Johnson, appears in Bull Trout’s Gift. Sitting along the banks of the Jocko, he
tells the story’s grade school class a tale of forbidden love that carries the message of the
importance of knowing and respecting the environment on which you depend.
Throughout his story within the story, Arlee familiarizes his audience with important
Salish place names. The book reinforces this effort at restoring language with a detailed
pronunciation guide. As the book’s subtitle explains, it’s about reciprocity. To give is to
receive; to know the bull trout is to know a whole environment, a way of life, and a
language.33
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The story also made it plain that the state of the environment depends on people’s
actions.

As with so many Native American stories about the relationship between

people and their environments, Bull Trout’s Gift emphasizes the profound impacts
humans have on the rest of the world. In this case, when a pair of Salish parents
disrespects an unknown element of the environment, symbolized by their daughter’s
forbidden love interest, the river’s dry up, sucking the life out of the surrounding
watershed. Trekking to the river’s source “to make amends” for their disrespect helped
coax the rivers back to life. Damaging and restoring environments was part of Salish
history and Bull Trout’s Gift was meant to acknowledge human’s capacity for such
change.34
The Clark Fork’s restoration led to resuscitating other histories as well. In
November, 2005, Envirocon finished removing a small dam on the Blackfoot River just
above the Milltown structure. As a small power-producing project and an endpoint for
millions of board feet of logs that once flowed down the river to the Milltown and Bonner
area mills, the dam had been a precursor to Milltown Dam. Removal of the Stimson Dam
was a precursor as well, or as Envirocon’s project superintendent, Brian Vibbert said,
“It’s been a good practice run for Milltown Dam.” That practice run evoked many
retellings of the area’s logging and milling history. Some of that history came to life as

34

CSKT, Bull Trout’s Gift, 29. For other literature on how Native American stories
reflect ideas about environmental impacts or management see: Keith Basso, Wisdom Sits
in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western Apache, (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1996); Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth
and History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1999); Richard White, Roots of
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century old logs, preserved by the cold water of the river, washed ashore in the following
seasons. The restoration company plucked many of the massive logs from the river.
Four of them became pillars in a new Native American Studies building on the University
of Montana campus in Missoula. Others were reserved for possible use in an interpretive
center planned for the old reservoir site. Just as remediation blended into restoration,
restoration was meant to promote regional economic development.35

By the time engineers shut off the Milltown Dam’s generators for the last time on
April 7, 2006, locals and the county had devised a restoration and redevelopment plan for
the area. The plan included physical changes such as new hiking trails, a park, and an
interpretive center. It also foresaw the need for setting up and funding a community
council so that area residents would have an ongoing say in shaping the confluence. The
efforts of the Milltown Superfund Site Redevelopment Working Group prompted
Montana Sen. Max Baucus to insert a $5 million redevelopment package for the group
into a federal highways bill. By 2010, Baucus garnered nearly $1 million more in federal
appropriations, aside from the state NRDP’s $2.6 million to turn the confluence into a
state park. The state park would feature a restored river environment, while also
attracting people to recreate.36
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Using the river to aid the local economy seemed to make sense to everyone.
Along with its dam and reservoir, Milltown was losing its namesake industry. By the
summer of 2006, the Stimson Mill had laid off most of its workforce and was nearing a
complete shutdown. In a town named for producing wood products, the nationwide
slump in the lumber industry meant that redevelopment was important. Rather than
garnering blame for the mill’s closure, the environmental effort to remove the dam
became a source of economic possibility.37
Three decades after its passage, debates and measurements of how Superfund has
impacted the national economy have focused mostly on the law’s negative economic
impacts – to insurance, PRPs, banks and taxpayers, primarily. But Milltown was an
example of another set of Superfund’s economic consequences. Superfund projects had
become part of a growing restoration economy. Just as Superfund implementation in
western Montana provided a business opportunity for Envirocon, the U.S. government
was embracing restoration in other ways. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Interior Lynn Scarlett
had visited Missoula in September 2006 to deliver a keynote called, “From Resource
Damages to Restoration.” Speaking at the 30th annual Public Land Law Conference, she
both detailed and promoted the federal government’s concerted effort to encourage an
economy of restorative work by the private sector on public land projects. By 2010, Tom
Vilsack, U.S. Agricultural Secretary, informed the national media that his agency’s new

Assistance Committee newsletter, “Redevelopment: Milltown State Park & Trail Projects
Progress, Winter, 2011.
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Missoulian, 12/15/2006; 5/28/2007, A1, A1. Perry Backus, “Stimson: Cutting back in
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vision “begins with restoration.” The secretary singled out watersheds as particularly
important to fostering the health of federal lands. The Society for Ecological Restoration,
a clearinghouse for all aspects of the restoration economy, from jobs to conferences to
major corporations, began in 1988 and counted members in more than 70 countries by
2010. Using national parks as case studies, Washington University (at St. Louis)
professor William Lowry argued in his 2009 book Repairing Paradise that by the 21st
century Americans and their government had realized that preserving renowned
environments was not enough. Even many of the country’s most cherished landscapes
warranted restoration. By 2012, American Rivers, which had once ranked the Blackfoot
River at the top of its most endangered waterways list, launched a campaign to remove
100 dams and restore the sections of rivers they impounded within a year. The group
listed Milltown as a model.38
Besides serving as an emblem in a national trajectory, fixing environmental
damage at Milltown held potential for local entrepreneurs as well. As Missoula
marketing entrepreneur Sean Benton said of the campaign to remove the dam and restore
the river, “I think that it’s been great for our company and, to a certain extent, it’s shaped
a lot of the kind of work that we do.” In the heat of the summer, 2005, a new tube rental
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and river shuttle service was thriving along the Blackfoot. Fly-fishing guides reported
that the improved image of the rivers associated with restoration (even if most of it was
yet to happen) was boosting business. State economic reports showed that 39% of all
guided trips in Montana were on rivers, amounting to more than $50 million a year. A
1999 study showed that tourism brought $150 million to Missoula County each year. By
the spring of 2006, the Missoulian reported that a two-day event spurred by the
magnitude of work on the Clark Fork called the “Governor’s Restoration Forum” was
“the first comprehensive look at the economic and public benefits of revitalizing
Montana’s landscapes.” Storm Cunningham, the keynote speaker, had recently authored
The Restoration Economy: The Greatest New Growth Frontier. Positioning themselves
on that frontier, a Milltown couple reopened a defunct whitewater rafting company in
2007. In the small riverside town of Turah, just upstream from the doomed dam, Kathy
Marshall, owner of the hamlet’s single small store, credited the Superfund cleanup at
Milltown with renewing her hopes for staying in business.39
As UM economist Thomas Powers argued in a 1996 book on the value of place,
“(A)ttractive natural landscapes influence the location of economic activity.” While
39

Benton, OH 428-05. Robert Struckman, “Cooling off, cashing in,” Missoulian,
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River: Unlocking potential,” Missoulian, 9/8/2009, A1. Missoulian editorial, “Tourism
district a great promotional tool,” Missoulian, 10/16/2009, B4. Clark Fork Technical
Assistance Committee, newsletter, “Author Speaks on Restoration,” June 2006. Norma
Nickerson, “Niche News: Montana’s Outfitter and Guide Industry,” Institute for Tourism
and Recreation Research, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, January 2007,
http://www.itrr.umt.edu/NicheNews07/MTOutfitting%20Industry%20Summary.pdf. Al
Ellard, Kristin Aldred Cheek, Norma Nickerson, “Missoula Case Study: Direct Impact of
Visitor Spending on a Local Economy,” Institute for Tourism and Recreation Research,
University of Montana, Missoula, MT, April 1999,
http://www.itrr.umt.edu/research/MslaCase.pdf
305

Chapter 7: The Three Rs

Powers used preserved places, such as National Parks and federal Wilderness Areas, to
make his point, what was happening on the Clark Fork demonstrated that reviving
damaged environments led to similar economic benefits.40

There were many immediate and tangible qualities to remediation, restoration and
redevelopment at Milltown. Millions of tons of toxic sediment were gone. The river
flowed in a sinuous channel feeding native riparian plants and depositing sediment that
would foster aquatic life rather than kill it. Businesses sprang up in hopes of capturing
clientele that would come to fish and float the renewed rivers. Groundwater models
predicted that the area’s aquifer would rid itself of arsenic in four to ten years.
Yet in some ways, the removal of Milltown Dam and the area’s restoration was an
experiment, the outcome unknown. The renewal of language study on the Flathead
Reservation was one such trial. Another was a series of art exhibits at four Missoula
museums in the fall, 2006. The art ranged from photographs of the rebounding rivers, to
a branch and cloth sculpture that looked a bit like clean water flowing over skeletal
hands, perhaps signifying new life emerging from a dead past. The most notable of the
exhibits in the “Changing Currents” show was a room-sized installation piece. Germanborn, “internationally renowned artist [Gerhard] Trimpin” constructed a wall map of the
Clark Fork River and marked it with significant river restoration events and places. He
wired the map so that when a sensor mounted on rails glided over each mark, it closed an
electric circuit that activated the lifting and lowering of bamboo tubes within vats of

40

Thomas Michael Power, Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies: The Search for a
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water placed throughout a room of the Missoula Art Museum. Cut to precise lengths, the
tubes hummed different notes as their movement blew air over reeds within them.
Trimpin’s installation, like all of the art, was an abstract way of pondering the future of a
restored river. As critic Betsy Cohen wrote, the art asked such questions as: “What will
the river sound like? What new paths will it forge? How wild will it be?”41
Answers to those questions came in small steps. In late 2006, tiny trout swam in
Butte’s Silver Bow Creek for the first time in nearly a century. The Missoulian likened
the fish discovered by a Montana FWP electroshocking project to a “canary in a coal
mine in reverse,” the fish an indicator of a rejuvenating stream. It took three more years
before someone actually caught a trout from that stream using rod and reel, and another
three before the state published a fishing report for the Clark Fork’s headwaters. At
Milltown, the river was flowing through its newly created “historic” channel by then.
And in 2010 the state FWP was in the process of buying land around the confluence of
the Blackfoot and Clark Fork, as well as the overlooking bluff, the site of so many
celebrations. After giving a parcel to the Bonner school, making it “possibly…the first
elementary school in the nation with its own community school forest,” according to
superintendent Doug Ardiana, the state aimed to gather community input to steer its plans
for making the land into a state park with a series of new paths. Superfund money from
ARCO would fund the purchase and development. With the dam’s removal playing no

41
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small part, fisheries biologists declared the bull trout recovered in places like Clearwater
River, one of the Blackfoot’s last major tributaries before it joins the Clark Fork.42
But the Superfund pocket filled by ARCO was not bottomless. Within two years
of the dam’s removal, the number and diversity of proposals for restoration work strained
the fund and its management. As Peter Nielsen said of projects that ranged from
museums and trail work “miles away from the Clark Fork…There’s not enough money.”
Although it demanded more money from ARCO, fixing a problem with Milltown’s
sediment in Opportunity Ponds got swift approval from the EPA, river advocates, and the
community. As of February, 2012, the Milltown soil had failed to grow much vegetation
on 700 acres of ARCO’s upper Clark Fork repository, so the company continually
mitigated dust blowing off the site. Having pushed the decision to put the sediment in
Opportunity, all the involved parties agreed on as quick, thorough and permanent solution
to the bare site as possible. ARCO consented to pay another $15 million to cap the
Milltown deposit with a combination of lime, fresh topsoil, and a new round of
plantings.43
Superfund implementation at Milltown demonstrated the efficacy of combining
remediation, restoration and redevelopment, as well as making community involvement
an integral part of that combination. Having helped write the EPA’s first guidelines for
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developing community advisory groups at Superfund sites, Diana Hammer saw her work
as the community coordinator at Milltown helping to push the agency in that direction.
She saw the measure of success at the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork as “the
opportunity to take a federal Superfund site and turn it into a state park.” That
transformation echoed the progress in the law from its inception as an emergency waste
cleanup measure to one that, at best, made cleaning up toxic waste one step in renewing
damaged landscapes and revitalizing economies.44
Montana skiers loved the winter of 2010-2011. Slopes reported near record
snow-pack, as well as lift ticket sales. Come spring, river watchers were more anxious
than excited about all that snow. With high flood levels a distinct possibility, Envirocon
workers bulked up protection of their restoration work. But a lot would depend on the
river. Running at the “35-year flood” level, the Clark Fork flushed nearly 14,000 cubic
feet per second through Milltown after gaining the Blackfoot’s flow. When runoff finally
settled in mid-summer, the results were encouraging. Except for tweaking some of the
newly built S-curves upriver from the old dam site, the restoration work held, signifying
that what Envirocon had constructed was acting like a fairly natural floodplain. Once
again people celebrated.45
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Men may dam it and say that they have made a lake, but it will still be a river. It will keep
its nature and bide its time, like a caged animal alert for the slightest opening. In time, it
will have its way; the dam, like the ancient cliffs, will be carried away piecemeal in the
currents.
Wendell Berry
In a mucked up lovely river,
I cast my little fly.
I look at that river and smell it
And it makes me want to cry.
Oh to clean our dirty planet,
Now there's a noble wish,
And I'm puttin' my shoulder to the wheel
'Cause I wanna catch some fish.
Greg Brown, "Spring Wind" in Dream Cafe
What happened at Milltown didn’t tip the balance of any presidential elections,
nor did it birth or overturn any major laws. Few national environmental organizations
got involved. On the rare occasions they did, it was to lend a token of support for what
was already transpiring. What happened at Milltown was that people participated in the
implementation of a major environmental policy over the course of more than thirty
years. They engaged in the kind of process that was more common than extraordinary.
Rather than laying claim to shaping a rare sea change, they made the kind of history that
happens most every day by affecting incremental change from within the bounds of the
law. It is tempting to compare the patient, often tedious, work people undertook and the
unexpected changes that work bore to the slow steady forces of a river that, as Wendell
Berry noted, “will have its way.”
One of the things that made the Superfund process at Milltown important, and
perhaps a little frightening, was its commonness. By 2012, the EPA had considered tens
of thousands of places as possible Superfund sites. At any one time since the law’s
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inceptions, a few hundred to a few thousand of these make it onto the agency’s annual
National Priority List. The majority of them share qualities with the Milltown site, such
as their location on the fringes of urban centers, industrial history (especially mining),
contribution to water (especially groundwater) contamination, and the presence of arsenic
or other heavy metals as their primary human health risk. They range in size from about
the area of an average suburban back yard to the 120 miles of river and riparian area that
made the Clark Fork Superfund Complex the largest such site in the country. Every state
has them and even in a large, thinly populated place like Montana, Superfund sites are
usually within an hour or so drive of any point on a map. In other words, just about
everyone in the United States lives near their own Milltown. And, the cleanup that
happened at Milltown, as well as its impacts on Superfund implementation was, in large
part, due to local residents.387
Milltown had the advantage of being just upstream from a community with a long
history of social activism, of which environmental advocacy was a developing strong
suit. Missoulians spearheaded public participation at Milltown where more people wrote
to the EPA about the site than ever before and did so mostly outside the regimented
comment period. That response to the Clark Fork Coalition campaign and the realities at
Milltown encouraged the EPA to embrace more and earlier public input. The EPA now
maintains a community involvement link on its Superfund website. The agency helps
fund and organize half a dozen kinds of community groups meant to help citizens engage
in the Superfund process. And each year since 2000, EPA administrators select an
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individual or group to receive the “Citizen’s Excellence in Community Involvement
Award.” People’s participation at Milltown did not single-handedly bring about all these
changes. But as Milltown’s EPA community coordinator, Diana Hammer, recognized,
“Cleanup [at Milltown] was unique and a great Superfund model because of all the
involvement of informed advocates…The EPA does a better job of this now than we used
to [of] being more upfront with people about what’s going on and letting them look
behind the curtain and seeing how are those decisions being made and actually be part of
it.”388
Because public input promoted, if not demanded, restoration, Milltown’s outcome
was part of a shift in Superfund toward a greater concern for restoring natural
environments, instead of simply removing or containing toxins. At Milltown that meant
getting the worst toxic sediments out of the floodplain. Equally important, the EPA
dovetailed sediment removal, a traditional remediation, to Envirocon’s (the Montana
restoration company that got the contract to do the work at Milltown) creation of a
naturally functioning and historically mimetic river channel that is beginning to improve
water quality, provide a variety of fish and wildlife habitat from riparian trees and shrubs,
to wetlands and modest river rapids. Superfund money generated through the law’s
corporate liability provisions has helped pay for and demonstrate some of the law’s
unexpected consequences. Restoration of bull trout habitat, as well as native language
recovery efforts on the Flathead Indian Reservation made that point. Those unexpected
types of restoration also revealed how the law’s implementation encouraged tribal
participation in issues off the reservation that were of broad public interest.
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In addition, the EPA used remediation and restoration as springboards to
economic redevelopment. At the turn-of-the-millennium, cleaning up and restoring the
Milltown site became one of Envirocon’s largest and most lucrative undertakings. For
the first time along the Clark Fork, enhancing rather than extracting from the natural
environment became a viable economic driver. The fix at Milltown was meant to create
long-term financial opportunities as well. The Montana State Parks department
conversion of nearly 500 acres of land once owned by the local mills, much of which had
spent 100 years underwater, into the Milltown State Park is one such example. A place
once deemed a toxic waste site of national concern will become a healthy environment
for people to congregate, recreate, and, ostensibly, spent money in the local community.
The new state park, like so much at Milltown, resulted from public input and
involvement.
While much of how Superfund implementation happened at Milltown was
because of the diligent participation of local residents, like so much history,
contingencies helped along the way. As Wendell Berry discerned, the Clark Fork kept
“its nature” and bided “its time.” A few spring floods and ice jams heightened attention
to the dam’s age and safety, as well as attuned peoples’ attention to the river’s ailing
health beyond the defined boundaries of the original Superfund site on the Clark Fork.
Bull trout and other native fishes continued to follow their evolutionary impulses
upstream in search of ancient spawning waters even though a man-made collection of
rock, timber, concrete, and steel had blocked their way for a century. The presence of
fish thwarted in their spawning efforts provided biologists and concerned citizens with
added justification for removing Milltown Dam. When a non-native northern pike in
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Milltown Reservoir opted to eat Pollywog, a cutthroat trout radio-tagged by a fisheries
biologist and tracked by a group of grade school students in the area, it educated a
growing contingent of people about yet another way the Superfund site was wreaking
havoc on native fish.
Other contingencies were of a more human nature. Peter Nielsen’s inadvertent
discovery of classified documents about Milltown on a FERC webpage, which someone
in an office thousands of miles away posted mistakenly, harnessed post-9/11 fears of
terrorism to the more tangible concerns about the Milltown Dam’s stability and
downstream impacts. When an acquaintance bumped into Tracy Stone-Manning in the
grocery store and suggested a Milltown to Downtown float, he added a powerful
demonstration of community and recreational concern to her organization’s dam removal
and river restoration campaign. Admitting that it might be a “corny” expression, Diana
Hammer said that her colleagues “joked that it’s not only a project at the confluence of
two rivers but it’s been a confluence of people and a confluence of events,” some
purposeful, some not.389
Most of what happened at Milltown resulted from how a community involved
itself in the Superfund process. Local scientists connected arsenic pollution in drinking
water to the reservoir and the long history of upstream mining. People who moved to
Missoula to attend the university, stayed and committed their lives to working for local
government or environmental organizations that shaped the outcomes at Milltown. Local
business owners devoted money and time to the same causes. A record number of
citizens wrote to the EPA supporting the eventual solution of removal and restoration.
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Opponents of the plan pushed the cause of economic redevelopment. As Greg Brown
wrote in his song “Spring Wind,” people participated in the Superfund process because of
very personal cares and ways of knowing the Clark Fork watershed.
Then there are outcomes that may still be in the making and will not be found in
any law, state park, or river. When asked if Milltown is important beyond the local
communities and local environmental organizations, Trout Unlimited’s state director,
Bruce Farling, who was active in the site’s implementation from nearly the beginning,
said, “[T]his is a pretty big deal…I think this tells other communities what the
possibilities are. They don’t have to settle for lowball stuff…I mean a $140 million
cleanup and restoration…against two very powerful corporations.” Farling’s sentiments
fit with those of Jenny Price’s 2008 call for river restoration to become the icon for 21st
century environmentalism. Both of them seem to understand that just as many places,
particularly watersheds, need serious revitalization, people need stories of an improving
environment as much as they need reminders of its degradation. But what happened at
Milltown is more than a single story or icon. Rather, practical restoration of damaged
environments represents the heart of American environmentalism at the turn of the
millennium.390
Three years after the combined flow of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers
scoured its way through a breach in Milltown Dam, the river’s course through Hellgate
Canyon ran nearly unimpeded. Footings for Interstate-90 still stood in the Blackfoot, just
above the confluence. I-90 still followed the river’s path through most of western
Montana. Old logs from Milltown’s former life as the major industrial processing center
390
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between forest and finished timber jutted onto the nearby banks. The stumps of trees cut
more than a century ago studded the old reservoir bed. Restoration did not mean that the
Clark Fork would look like it did when the Salish gave it names like “place of the big bull
trout,” or “shining waters.” It did mean that arsenic levels were dropping in the
groundwater. Native plants were sprouting on the riverbanks and non-native fish
populations were dwindling. So, too, native fish swam freely past the old dam site. And
although it was closed to recreational traffic for at least another year, a few rogue boaters
floated through the confluence on nights when moonlight allowed them to cast flies for
trout, see the shine of water tumbling over rocks, and enjoy a stretch of river no one had
plied for generations.
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